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ABSTRACT 
  
The execution against immovable property, or foreclosure, involves a delicate 
balancing of mortgagor and mortgagee rights. From a mortgagor perspective, he or 
she is protected by Section 26 (1) of the South African Constitution which provides 
that ‘everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing’. Although the right 
to have access to adequate housing does not entitle one to a right to ownership of a 
home, this right ensures that everyone has the right to a fair standard of living and is 
linked to other fundamental human rights such as the right to dignity, privacy and 
freedom. From a mortgagee perspective, they are protected by Section 25 of the 
Constitution which provides for the right to acquire property, and the right not to be 
unlawfully deprived of such property. Section 25 thus protects a mortgagee’s 
property rights and, in particular, his real right of security (foreclosure rights).  
 
Foreclosure against a home can be seen as an infringement of a mortgagor’s right to 
have access to adequate housing. However, it must be accepted that during 
foreclosure, the mortgagee enjoys a right to direct execution against the 
hypothecated immovable property (the home), in the event of a default by the 
mortgagor. When a mortgage agreement is signed, the mortgagor hypothecates his 
home as security for the capital lent by the mortgagee. During foreclosure a balance 
needs to be struck between the mortgagor’s right to have access to adequate 
housing and the mortgagee’s foreclosure rights. Unfortunately, South African law has 
not provided clarity as to the balancing of mortgagor and mortgagee rights during the 
foreclosure process and this has resulted in much inconsistency and, in some 
instances, abuse of process. The foreclosure process is currently not regulated by 
any specific legislation. With the exception of Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of 
Court, there is no statute that specifically governs the foreclosure process. This gap 
in the law is concerning, given the economic and social impact of mortgage and 
foreclosure. Therefore, the decision to foreclose against a person’s home requires a 
structured framework.  
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In this thesis it will be argued that the current laws governing foreclosure and the 
debt relief process, namely: the court rules, debt review under the National Credit 
Act, and insolvency laws, are inadequate and lack clarity, despite being intended to 
assist mortgagors facing foreclosure. In particular, the current laws do not provide 
any clarity as to when foreclosure against a home is justifiable or when it is not, nor 
do they provide any guidelines for the courts to consider during foreclosure 
proceedings. This lack of clarity has resulted in much confusion, and it is submitted 
that there is a need for clarity to be established. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis 
is to expose some of the inconsistencies and lacunae within the current foreclosure 
process, and to provide recommendations as to how these issues can be resolved.  
 
It will be concluded that the current foreclosure process and debt relief mechanisms 
in South Africa are inadequate as they lack clarity and uniformity. In particular, the 
current foreclosure process does not provide clarity as to how a mortgagee should 
exercise his foreclosure rights, nor does it provide adequate protection or debt relief 
options for South African homeowners. It is submitted that regulation and 
development of the foreclosure process is urgently needed. Accordingly, it will be 
argued that a Foreclosure Act is required to establish clarity in foreclosure 
processes, and to ensure a fair balance between the interests of all parties during 
foreclosure against a home.  
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DISCLAIMERS 
 
Research end date. The foreclosure environment is a constantly changing world. It 
will be noted that legal developments occurs frequently, almost monthly, in 
foreclosure practice. Hence, legal developments that occurred after 1 October, 2018 
were not considered in this thesis. 
Content limitations. The research undertaken in this thesis relates specifically to the 
current laws, rules and practices for the foreclosure process, or the enforcement of a 
mortgage agreement. Accordingly, debt relief and foreign laws and process will only 
be considered in relation to their application to foreclosure process. 
Foreclosure. The term ‘foreclosure’ is not defined in South African law. The term is 
generically used in South Africa to describe the action or process by a mortgagee to 
enforce a mortgage agreement and execute against the hypothecated immovable 
property, when a mortgagor fails to meet his/her mortgage repayments. Thus, the 
term ‘foreclosure’ will be used in this thesis to describe the action or process taken 
by the mortgagee to enforce its real right of security against the mortgagor’s home. 
(See Annexure to Chapter Seven for a suggested definition of the term ‘foreclosure’). 
Mortgagor/Debtor and Mortgagee/Creditor. These terms will be used 
interchangeably. In other words, the term ‘debtor’ includes the term ‘mortgagor’, and 
the term ‘creditor’ includes the term ‘mortgagee’. 
Home. The term ‘home’ is also not defined in South African law. It will be used in this 
thesis to describe immovable residential property, or immovable property used as a 
primary residence for its occupants. In particular, this thesis will consider the issue of 
when a home – primary residence, which is hypothecated or mortgaged, is under 
foreclosure (See Annexure to Chapter Seven for a suggested definition for the term 
‘home’). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Housing forms an indispensable part of ensuring human dignity. Adequate housing 
encompasses more than just the four walls of a room and roof over one’s head. Housing is 
essential for normal healthy living. It fulfils deep-seated psychological needs for privacy and 
personal space; physical needs for security and protection from inclement weather; and social 
needs for basic gathering points where important relationships are forged and nurtured. In 
many societies a house also serves an important function as an economic centre where 
essential commercial activities are performed. Our Constitution provides for justiciability of the 
Bill of Rights, including the right to adequate housing. It expressly confers legal standing to 
aggrieved persons and their representatives to approach the courts to enforce their rights.
1
   
1.1 Introduction  
 
In the case of Jaftha v Schoeman and Others,2 the Constitutional Court held that the 
joy of having a home to call one’s own, even under the most basic circumstances, 
can be a most empowering and dignifying human experience.3 The ‘home’ is an 
important aspect of every individual’s well-being. The home is a place where families 
are made, memories are created, and where people feel most secure.4 The value of, 
and protection afforded by, the home has been expressed in several well-known 
maxims, such as ‘a man’s home is his castle’, ‘home is where the heart is’, and 'safe 
as houses’.5 These encapsulate the idea that a home is much more than a physical 
object – it holds deep sentimental value and is a symbol for security, autonomy, 
comfort and freedom. 
 
                                                 
1
 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W), para 49 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Rand Properties’). 
2
 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Jaftha’). See also Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 (4) SA (CC) (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Sarrahwitz’), and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Grootboom’). 
3
 Jaftha, para 39. 
4
 See Fox O’ Mahony & Sweeney, The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (Law, 
Property and Society), (2010), 4 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Fox & Sweeney’), and Radin, ‘Property 
and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review, 957 (hereinafter referred to as ’Radin, ‘Property 
and Personhood’’). 
5
 See Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A financial history of the world, (2008), Chapter 5, 241 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Ferguson, The Ascent of Money’), and Steyn, ‘Safe as houses? Balancing 
a mortgagee’s security interest with a homeowner’s security of tenure’ (2007) 11, Law, Democracy 
and Development, 101 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Steyn, ‘Safe as houses”). 
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Despite the significance attached to it, the idea or concept of ‘home’ is not solidly 
present in law.6 While various international statutes7 and court judgments have 
highlighted the importance of a home to individual and family life,8 in South Africa 
there is no statute that exclusively protects the sanctity of the home.9 Furthermore, 
South African law does not provide any legal definition for the term ‘home’, nor does 
the law provide any specific protection to a home.10 Several international property 
law scholars11 argue that, given the unique nature and value of a home, it should 
enjoy an enhanced legal status.12 International property law experts Lorna Fox and 
Dean Barros, argue that the idea of a home has carried little weight in law, 
particularly when balanced against easily measurable, and legally definable, 
contractual rights, such as a mortgagee’s right to foreclose against a home.13 Barros 
submits that the idea of a home as a ‘castle’ is a powerful metaphor suggestive of its 
role in providing protection. However, the metaphor has its limits, and the ‘castle’s’ 
walls can be breached by sufficiently strong competing interests.14 One of these is a 
mortgagee’s right to foreclosure. 
 
Foreclosure can be seen as a threat to one’s home. Despite the value and 
significance attached to owning a home, there is equal significance attached to a 
mortgagee’s right to foreclosure (or right to execute against the hypothecated 
immovable property). When a mortgage agreement is signed, the mortgagee lends 
the mortgagor the necessary finance to purchase a home on the condition that, 
                                                 
6
 Fox & Sweeney, 1. 
7
 There are various international statutes that recognise the value of the home by providing for the 
right to an adequate standard of living and/or housing. These include the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 11 (1)), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(article 25), the European Social Charter (article 31), and the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights. See also the Convention on the Rights of the Child which imposes an obligation on States to 
assist parents in providing adequate housing for their children, and the Protocol to the African 
Charter, which explicitly guarantees women and children the right to adequate housing. 
8
 See Jaftha, and Grootboom. 
9
 Section 26 (1) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 provides that ‘everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing’, and section 26 (2) provides that ‘the State must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of 
this right’. Despite, the existence of section 26 (2), it is submitted that there is currently no legislation 
in place that exclusively protects the right to have access to adequate housing, in particular one’s 
existing right to housing. 
10
 This will be discussed further in Chapters Two and Three. 
11
 See Fox & Sweeney, Radin ‘Property and Personhood’, 957-972, and Barros, ‘Home as a Legal 
Concept’, Santa Clara Law Review, (2006), 46.2, 255, 256 (hereinafter referred to as Barros, ‘Home 
as a Legal Concept’). See Chapter Two (2.3) for a detailed discussion on ‘the home’. 
12
 Radin ‘Property and Personhood’, 957-972, and Barros, ‘Home as a Legal Concept’, 256. 
13
 See Fox & Sweeney, ‘Chapter One’, and Barros, (2006), 276. 
14
 Barros, (2006), 276-277. 
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should the mortgagor default on the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee will have a 
right to attach and sell the hypothecated immovable property (the home). The 
mortgage agreement gives the mortgagee a real right of security over the 
hypothecated immovable property and allows him the right to seek direct execution 
against the home in the event of a default by the mortgagor. In Standard Bank v 
Saunderson,15 Cameron JA emphasised the importance of the mortgagee’s right by 
finding that: 
 
The mortgage bond is an indispensable tool for spreading home ownership. Few people can 
buy a home immediately: by providing security for a loan, the mortgage bond enables them to 
do so. There can hardly be a private residence in this country that has not at one time or 
another been mortgaged, nor a home-owner who has not at some time been a mortgagor....  
A mortgage bond is an agreement between borrower and lender, binding upon third parties 
once it is registered against the title of the property that upon default the lender will be entitled 
to have the property sold in satisfaction of the outstanding debt.  Its effect is that the borrower, 
by his or her own volition, either on acquiring a house or later when wishing to raise further 
capital, compromises his or her rights of ownership until the debt is repaid. The right to 
continued ownership, and hence occupation, depends on repayment. The mortgage bond 
thus curtails the right of property at its root, and penetrates the rights of ownership, for the 
bond-holder’s rights are fused into the title itself.
16
   
 
Given the strength of a mortgagee’s right and the impact that foreclosure may have 
on a mortgagor and his or her family,17 it is concerning that there is no specific 
legislation that regulates the manner in which a mortgagee can enforce his 
foreclosure rights against the home. As a result, different mortgagees use different 
policies when making a decision as to whether or not to execute against residential 
property.18 Moreover, due to the lack of specific legislative guidelines relating to the 
foreclosure process, courts have made contrasting decisions in relation to the 
                                                 
15
 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others, 2006 (2) SA 264 SCA (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Saunderson’) 
16
 Saunderson, paras 1-2. See statistics compiled by the Deed Registrations Office of South Africa 
and Lightstone for 2015 and 2017 available at www.gov.za/stats, which reveals that approximately 
sixty percent of home-owners in South Africa are burdened with mortgage debt. 
17
 See Chapter Two  for an overview of the effects of foreclosure. See also Peterson, ‘Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the home mortgage foreclosure crisis’, Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law, Vol 10 
(2009) 149, 157, Ellen and Dastrup, ‘Housing and the Great Recession’, (2012), The Stanford Centre 
on Poverty and Inequality, and Baker, ‘The housing bubble and the financial crisis’, Real World 
Economics Review (2009) Issue 46, 73, and Holt, ‘A summary of the primary causes of the housing 
bubble and the resulting credit crisis’, The Journal of Business Inquiry (2009) 8.1, 120. 
18
 In practice, different mortgagees adopt different approaches to assist their mortgagors during 
mortgage repayment default. Some mortgagees assist their mortgagors with holiday instalment 
payments, recapitalisation of the arrear amount, or restructuring and/or extending the mortgage 
period. Other mortgagees do not provide such relaxed repayment terms, and prefer to initiate 
foreclosure proceedings immediately upon repayment default. Accordingly, there is much uncertainty 
in practice between mortgagees. For example of the different internal debt relief options used by 
mortgagees see www.fnb.co.za/home-loans, www.absa.co.za/personal/loans/for-a-home, 
www.standardbank.co.za/southafrica/homeloans, and www.sahomeloans.com/advice-centre. 
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mortgagee’s right to direct execution against the home.19 This has created 
inconsistency and distrust in the current foreclosure process.  
 
From a mortgagor’s perspective, there are minimal protective debt relief mechanisms 
in place to assist them during execution against their immovable property, this being 
normally their home.20 The current debt relief mechanisms provided during 
foreclosure are unsatisfactory and limited legislative guidelines have been provided 
to interpret existing debt relief legislation, in particular, the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NCA’). This gap in the law, involving lack of a 
clear foreclosure framework, and failure to provide adequate debt relief to 
mortgagors, creates uncertainty and potentially allows for abuse of process. This 
thesis seeks to reveal these inconsistencies and gaps within the current South 
African foreclosure process and debt relief mechanisms21, and suggests the 
introduction of a uniform structure in the form of a proposed Foreclosure Act, which 
would appropriately balance the interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee. Such a 
Foreclosure Act would create clarity in the foreclosure process by providing clear 
rules and procedures, thus creating certainty and uniformity in the foreclosure 
process. It would also ensure that execution against a home only occurs under fair 
and just circumstances. 
 
1.2 The history of debt relief mechanisms in South Africa 
 
The South African legal structure has never effectively equipped its consumers with 
an adequate debt relief system to assist them in the rehabilitation of their finances.22 
In particular, there has been little or no assistance provided to a mortgagor facing 
foreclosure of his home. During the 1980s, the administration order provided for in 
                                                 
19
 These court decisions will be considered in Chapter Three (3.3). 
20
 See Heyns and Mmusinyane, ‘Should the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 be amended to 
Address Homelessness? Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 8 BCLR 925 (CC)’, PELJ 2017(20), 1, 13 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Heyns and Mmusinyane, PELJ’), and Evans, ‘Waiving of rights to property 
in insolvent estates and advantage to creditors in sequestration proceedings in South Africa’ (2018) 
De Jure, 298, 299 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Evans, (2018) De Jure’). Historically there is a need for 
debtors and creditors to seek assistance from the legislature during the repayments of debts. In South 
Africa, legislative assistance to provided for in the NCA and Insolvency Act. 
21
 The consideration of debt relief laws will be specific to the options available for mortgage debt. 
22
 Roestoff and Coetzee, ‘Consumer debt relief in South Africa: Lessons from America and England; 
and suggestions for the way forward’ (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ, 53 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Roestoff 
and Coetzee (2012) SA Merc LJ’). 
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section 74 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, was used by many South 
African debtors to rearrange their debts. However, this system proved ineffective as 
the total debt could not exceed R50 000 and in futuro debts could not be included 
under administration.23 Therefore, the administration order provided no solution for 
mortgage debts. At the turn of the millennium, the South African Law Commission 
(now called the ‘South African Law Reform Commission’) recognised the 
inefficiencies of these debt relief mechanisms and undertook a re-evaluation of 
insolvency and consumer legislation. One of the key proposals of the Commission 
was the ‘pre-liquidation composition’ procedure. This essentially proposed the 
restructuring of a consumer’s unsecured debts. Secured debts, such as mortgage 
debts, could not be included under the composition repayment plan. Many 
academics believed that this would have been a favourable solution for both 
mortgagors and mortgagees.24 However, more than two decades have passed since 
the initial proposals by the Commission and this proposal has yet to be 
implemented.25 This delay would seem to indicate a lack of concern on the part of 
the government for providing effective debt relief for its citizens. 
 
In 2007, the NCA was implemented. This provided consumers, including mortgagors, 
with a framework, which was previously lacking in South Africa, to mediate, 
negotiate, rearrange and resolve conflicts with creditors. It introduced a unique 
system of debt relief into South African law by way of a debt review mechanism 
which allowed for the consensual restructuring of debts. It was hoped that this 
legislation would provide much needed relief to South African home-owners. 
However, the NCA has been subject to much criticism on the basis of poor drafting 
and inconsistency. The anomalies and ambiguities of the NCA have created 
confusion in practice, and this can be seen in several conflicting judicial decisions 
that will be discussed in this thesis.26 Further, debt review does not provide the 
debtor with any discharge of the debt. In other words, a debtor who is under debt 
review is bound to pay the full outstanding debt together with accumulated interest. 
Accordingly, debtors, in particular mortgagors, have minimal debt relief remedies to 
                                                 
23
 See Greig, ‘Administration orders as shark nets’, (2000) SALJ, 622. 
24
 See Steyn, Statutory regulation of forced sale of a home in South Africa, LLD thesis, University of 
Pretoria (2012) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Steyn, LLD thesis’), 335. 
25
 See Chapter Five (5.4). 
26 
See Chapter Four (4.2.4 and 4.3). 
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assist them during foreclosure, and some debtors have been left with no alternative 
but to voluntarily apply for the sequestration of their estates. This has also proven 
challenging as debtors are placed with the burden of proving strict sequestration 
requirements which cannot always be met.27 Moreover, during sequestration, the 
home is put up for sale as a matter of course, and no consideration is afforded in 
ensuring protection of the debtor’s constitutional rights, in particular, the right to have 
access to adequate housing. 
 
Mortgagees have equally felt the frustrations of the lack of clear debt relief 
procedures and a uniform foreclosure framework. The mortgagee’s right to direct 
execution against the hypothecated immovable property, and the right to accelerated 
payment upon default, have been subject to several conflicting court decisions.28 
This has left mortgagees wary and uncertain of the process to be used in enforcing 
their rights. Further, the nature and strength of their foreclosure rights have been 
disputed, and this has created a lack of confidence in the mortgage bond as an 
instrument of security.29 
 
It is submitted that the need has arisen for the legislature to scrutinise the current 
foreclosure rules and debt relief options available during the foreclosure process, 
and to close the gaps in the law. The lack of strict regulation during execution 
against residential property is concerning in view of the social and economic impact 
of foreclosure and debt relief in any country.30 Hence, it is submitted that 
development in the foreclosure process is long overdue and that immediate reform is 
required to create more certainty in relation to mortgagee and mortgagor rights 
during the execution against a home. 
 
1.3 Purpose of this thesis 
 
                                                 
27
 See Chapter Five (5.3). 
28
 These issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three (3.3) and Four (4.4). 
29
 See Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC), para 54 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Gundwana’), and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher and Another 2011 (4) SA 314 (GNP), 
para 39 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Folscher’). 
30
 See Chapter Two (2.2) which will discuss the importance of mortgage, and the effects of 
foreclosure, in society. 
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The primary purpose of this thesis is to analyse the South African legal system 
governing foreclosure, debt review, and insolvency,31 and to investigate whether the 
present laws provide adequate and clear rights and responsibilities for mortgagees 
and mortgagors during the foreclosure process. Several South African academics 
have recently undertaken research in this area, and considerable knowledge has 
been gained on this topic over the past decade.32 This thesis seeks to build on this 
research and intends to create a new approach to South African foreclosure law. As 
indicated above, foreclosure of a home is currently not governed by specific 
legislation,33 nor is there any specific debt relief mechanism designed to assist a 
mortgagor financially when facing execution against his home. This gap in the law 
has created uncertainty in practice. Consequently, it will be recommended that in 
order to create clarity in the law, the adoption of legislation, such as a proposed 
Foreclosure Act, is required specifically to govern execution against a home. The 
adoption of a Foreclosure Act would create uniformity in the foreclosure process as it 
would set out a clear set of rules and responsibilities for both mortgagees and 
mortgagors. It is also recommended that a debt relief system be created in South 
Africa that applies specifically to mortgage debt, preferably in the form of a 
moratorium on the forced sale of a home and/or a formalised mortgage debt 
restructuring programme. Thus, the main purpose of this thesis is to address the 
flaws in the current foreclosure process and, ultimately, to put forward the provisions 
of a Foreclosure Act for consideration by law-makers and policy-makers. 
 
1.4 Structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter serves as an introduction 
to the topic and outlines the background and challenges surrounding execution 
against residential property.  
 
                                                 
31
 Debt review and insolvency law will only be considered in relation to foreclosure process. 
32
 See Steyn, LLD thesis, Brits, Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and 
the National Credit Act, LLD thesis, University of Stellenbosch, (2012) (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Brits, LLD thesis’), and Evans, A critical analysis of problem areas in respect of assets of insolvent 
estates of individuals, LLD thesis, University of Pretoria (2008) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Evans, LLD 
thesis’).  
33
 With the exception of Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court, there is no specific statute that 
protects the home or governs the foreclosure process. 
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Chapter Two discusses the two main rights implicated during execution against a 
home, namely the mortgagor’s right to have access to adequate housing, and the 
mortgagee’s right to direct execution against the home. The foundations and 
jurisprudence of these rights will be analysed and the balancing of these rights will 
constitute a theme throughout this thesis. The concept and theories of mortgage law 
will also be considered in relation to the constitutional and international protection 
afforded to a home.34 
 
Chapter Three will discuss the inconsistencies within the current foreclosure process 
and, in particular, the conflicting judgments that have been given relating to 
execution against residential property. Early and recent case law will be discussed in 
detail. This chapter will also investigate the different steps during the foreclosure 
process which eventually results in a sale in execution of a home. Most importantly, 
this chapter intends to expose the inconsistencies and contradictions within the 
current foreclosure process and will provide suggestions to resolve these by creating 
an explicit statutory framework, in the form of a Foreclosure Act, to govern execution 
against a home. 
  
Chapter Four will consider the application of debt review under the NCA in relation to 
the foreclosure process. This section will investigate the processes behind debt 
review and the inconsistencies and ambiguity in the NCA. In this respect, sections 
129 and 86 of the NCA, and case law interpreting these sections in respect of 
foreclosure law, will be considered in detail. This chapter will also consider whether 
or not debt review has provided any debt relief to a mortgagor who is facing 
foreclosure against his or her home. 
 
Chapter Five will provide a brief overview of insolvency law in South Africa. This 
chapter will briefly analyse the process of sequestration and consider whether 
insolvency law provides an insolvent with any protection for his/her home.35 
 
                                                 
34
 Chapter Two does not intend to provide a detail exposition of the history and rights of mortgagees 
and mortgagors. The main purpose of this chapter is to serve as a backdrop to the topic and 
understand the balancing of these two rights during the foreclosure process. 
35
 Chapter Five does not intend to provide a detailed exposition of insolvency law. The main purpose 
of this chapter is to determine whether insolvency law provides any protection to the home.  
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Chapter Six will undertake a comparative analysis of foreclosure and debt relief 
mechanisms found in England and the United States of America. This chapter will 
also summarise the debt relief forms used in these jurisdictions and identify lessons 
that may be learnt from them. 
 
Chapter Seven will serve as the conclusion to the thesis. This chapter will 
summarise the findings of each of the preceding chapters and further provide 
recommendations as to how the flaws exposed in the thesis can be addressed.  It 
will conclude that the problems discussed in the thesis could be resolved by the 
enactment of a Foreclosure Act. The implementation of such an Act would provide 
clarity in the rules governing execution against the home and would set out step by 
step guidelines for the foreclosure process. Such an Act would set out clearly the 
rights and responsibilities of both mortgagors and mortgagees, and establish an 
unambiguous framework indicating how these rights can be protected. Further, it is 
recommended that a special mortgage debt relief mechanism be adopted to assist 
home-owners, as the current mechanisms do not provide any assistance to 
mortgagors who seek to protect their home from foreclosure. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that a foreclosure moratorium, in the form of a stay on foreclosure 
proceedings, should be considered in South Africa. The adoption of a moratorium 
will provide mortgagors with a period of relief to allow them an opportunity to either 
recover from their financial difficulties, or consider alternatives to foreclosure. 
However, the adoption of a moratorium could potentially open the door to abuse of 
process by mala fide mortgagors and therefore it is suggested that this moratorium 
should not be available to all mortgagors, but that it should only be available to a 
bona fide mortgagor after due consideration of certain specific requirements.36  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 The option of a home moratorium will be considered in Chapter Seven (7.3). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF MORTGAGORS AND 
MORTGAGEES37 
 
[T]he right to execute is not absolute. It has its limitations. Certain assets necessary for the 
maintenance and sustenance of a debtor and the means of earning a livelihood are beyond 
the reach of execution…. What is of significance is that a residential home is not placed 
beyond the process of execution…. [I]n the competition between the rights of the judgment 
creditor to obtain satisfaction of the judgment debt by execution against immovable property 
and the rights to housing of a judgment debtor, or person in the position of a beneficial owner 
occupying through the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor's rights will enjoy relative 
primacy. If this were not so, it would bring about a situation in which debtors could borrow 
money to purchase immovable property and defeat their creditors' legitimate claims to 
repayment by asserting a constitutional right to housing at the expense of the creditor…. 
Viewing considerations on a macro-economic level beyond the parochial concerns of 
individual litigants, the two social values are not so much juxtaposed as symbiotic. To put 
residential immovable property which is a person's home into that class of assets beyond the 
reach of execution would be to sterilise the immovable property from commerce thereby 
rendering it useless as a means to raise credit. Preventing debtors from using their homes as 
security to raise credit will create a class of homeless persons; those who are unable to afford 
the full purchase price of their homes in a cash sale, but could afford to repay a loan for the 
purchase price.
38
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Section 26 (1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing. While section 26 does not provide for the right to 
ownership of property or the right to a home, several judgments have confirmed that 
the right to have access to adequate housing forms an indispensable part of 
ensuring human dignity, freedom and security of person.39 Thus, this important right 
should be strongly protected and should not be trifled with.40 While it is internationally 
accepted that every person enjoys the right to have access to adequate housing,41 it 
is also internationally accepted that creditors’ rights must be enforced in order to 
                                                 
37
 This chapter is not intended to provide an extensive exposition of mortgagor and mortgagee rights. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the mortgagor’s and mortgagee’s rights 
and understand the competing nature of these rights during the foreclosure process. 
38
 Nedbank Ltd v Fraser and Another 2011 (4) SA 363 (GSJ), (hereinafter referred to as ‘Fraser’) 
paras 18-21. 
39
 See Jaftha, para 39, Sarrahwitz para 2 and Rand Properties, para 49. See also ‘The right of access 
to adequate housing’ April 2000 – March 2002, Report by the South African Human Rights 
Commission, available at www.sahrc.org.za (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘The right to of access to 
adequate housing’ SAHRC’). 
40
 See Sarrahwitz para 41, wherein the court held that the right to access to adequate housing serves 
as a catalyst in the liberation of home-ownership. The State should thus take all reasonable measures 
to realise the right to access to adequate housing and should limit the interference with that access 
unless otherwise justified. 
41
 Ibid 7. 
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ensure sanctity of contact and the maintenance of social order. The protection and 
enforcement of creditor rights is clearly important to the positive development of the 
economy and consumerism.42 In South Africa section 25 of the Constitution provides 
for the right to acquire property, and the right not to be unlawfully deprived of such 
property. When a mortgage agreement is signed the mortgagee acquires a real right 
of security (a property right which falls within the ambit of section 25 of the 
Constitution), and accordingly has the right not to be unlawfully deprived of this 
property.43 This provides the mortgagee with a right to execute directly against the 
hypothecated immovable property (the mortgagor’s home), in the event of a default 
by the mortgagor. 
 
During execution against hypothecated immovable property, the rights of 
mortgagees and mortgagors are therefore in competition with each other. A delicate 
balance is required when these two rights, namely the mortgagor’s right to have 
access to adequate housing, and the mortgagee’s real right to security, are weighed 
against each other. Accordingly, it is necessary to appreciate the importance of both 
these rights in the current economic system in South Africa, in order to envisage a 
better balancing of these rights during the foreclosure process. This chapter will 
consider the economic and social value of the rights of the mortgagee and the 
mortgagor, and will investigate the legal protection afforded to these rights. The first 
part of the chapter will consider the rights of the mortgagee and the right to direct 
execution against the home. The second part will consider the rights of the 
mortgagor, the right to have access to adequate housing and the legal protection 
afforded to a home. A third part will briefly consider the main constitutional rights 
implicated during foreclosure.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 See Chapter Six. See Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, Chapter 5, and Suresh, Economy and 
Society: Evolution of Capitalism, (2010), Chapters 6 and 7. Ferguson and Suresh each state that 
economic theory provides that markets cannot function without mortgages, as it is through borrowing 
money that houses are purchased and entrepreneurs build their business. Should protection not be 
afforded to mortgages, this will result in a global financial crisis - this was seen in the latest global 
recession. Mortgage is thus vital for the proper functioning of the economic system and marketplace. 
43
 See Chapter Two (2.2). 
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 2.2 The mortgagee’s rights  
 
2.2.1 The definition of mortgage 
 
Under early Roman-Dutch Law, Grotius defined mortgage as a right over another’s 
property which serves to secure an obligation.44 In the 21st century, South African 
foreclosure expert, Reghard Brits, defines mortgage as any right over the property of 
another to secure an obligation, and in this sense it is a generic term for every form 
of hypothecation.45 In a stricter sense, mortgage can also be described as a ‘real 
right of security’ created by contract and registration which hypothecates the 
immovable property of the mortgagor for the purpose of securing a loan obtained 
from the mortgagee.46 Hence, a mortgage is a credit agreement47 between a 
mortgagor and mortgagee and, by its very nature, a mortgage will require the 
mortgagor to willingly register a mortgage bond over his property in favour of the 
mortgagee as security for a debt.  
 
Maasdorp has listed four requirements for a mortgage to come into existence: (1) a 
principal obligation has to be secured; (2) a hypothecated property must be 
identified; (3) a valid mortgage agreement must be concluded; and (4) the mortgage 
must be publicly registered.48 Hence, in order for a mortgage to be concluded there 
must be an agreement between the mortgagee and mortgagor to burden the 
property with a real right of security. The act of registration converts the mortgagee’s 
right from a personal right to a real right of security. This occurs because the act of 
registration makes the mortgage effective against third parties.  
 
Maasdorp submits that mortgage is an indivisible right, as the right burdens the 
property as a whole and, even when the hypothecated property has a higher value 
                                                 
44
 See Grotius (2.48.1). See also Steyn, LLD thesis, 47, and Singer, Introduction to Property 
(Introduction to Law Series) (2005) 565. 
45
 Brits, LLD thesis, 28-30.  
46
 See section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 which defines a mortgage bond as an 
instrument hypothecating immovable property to secure existing and future debt. 
47
 See section 8 of the NCA which defines the different categories of a credit agreement, and includes 
a mortgage agreement as a credit agreement. 
48
 See Maasdorp, ‘The law of mortgage’ (1901) 18 SALJ 233 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Maasdorp, 
‘The law of mortgage’’).  
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than the debt owed, the mortgagee can still have the whole property sold in 
execution to satisfy his claim.49 Mortgage does not transfer the right of one person to 
another, but it limits the mortgagor’s right of ownership by creating a new right for the 
mortgagee, namely a real right of security. The mortgagee retains this real right of 
security over the property until the mortgage debt is paid in full. Accordingly, the 
mortgagor’s right is limited during the mortgage period (the duration of the mortgage 
agreement), as the mortgagor is not entitled to dispose of the hypothecated property 
without the mortgagee’s consent and faces the constant threat of execution against 
the property in the event of a default on the mortgage agreement.50  
 
South African property law expert, Badenhorst, contends that the two most important 
rights that flow from any mortgage agreement are the mortgagee’s ‘foreclosure 
rights’ and ‘acceleration rights’.51 These rights entitle the mortgagee, upon default by 
the mortgagor, to enforce the mortgage and demand that the mortgagor pay the full 
outstanding amount due in execution to recover his debt. When a mortgagor signs a 
mortgage agreement hypothecating his property as security for a debt, the 
mortgagor acknowledges the risk that his property may be lost if the debt is not 
paid.52 Thus, the mortgagee’s foreclosure right (right to direct execution against the 
hypothecated property) occurs by operation of law as this is the very nature of a 
mortgage and is a result of the intentions of both parties. The mortgagor’s payment 
of the mortgage is bound to his ownership of the property, and the mortgage serves 
the effect of ensuring that the mortgagee has a real right in the property so 
pledged.53  
 
 
                                                 
49
 See Maasdorp, ‘The law of mortgage’, 237. See also Brits, Real Security, 1
st
 ed (2016), Chapter 
Two. 
50
 See Juma, ‘Mortgage bonds and the right of access to adequate housing in South Africa: 
Gundwana v Stoke Development & Others 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC)’, (2012), Journal for Juridical 
Science 37(1), 1, 2, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Juma, Journal for Juridical Science’) Kritzinger, 
Principles of the law of mortgage, pledge and lien (1999), 1, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kritzinger, 
Principles of the law of mortgage, pledge and lien’) and Hamese, ‘Attachments of immovable property 
in execution of a debt’, available at ul.netd.ac.za (hereinafter referred to as Hamese, ‘Attachments of 
immovable property in execution of a debt’’). 
51
 See Badenhorst, ‘Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property’ (1992) 419-429, and 625. See 
also Nedbank Ltd v Fraser and Another 2011 (4) SA 363 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Fraser’), Chapter 
Three (3.3.9). 
52
 This is referred to as the ‘voluntary placing at risk’ principle. See also Gundwana, and Nedcor Bank 
Ltd v Kindo and Another 2002 (3) SA 185 (C) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kindo’). 
53
 See Kindo, paras 4-5.  
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2.2.2 The economic and social value of mortgage  
 
In Folscher, the court held that: 
 
Absent any extraordinary circumstance, the judgment creditor will normally be entitled to 
enforce his judgment by executing against the immovable property that is bonded as security. 
Bond finance is an important socio-economic tool enabling persons to acquire their home, to 
make the most important investment in their lives, to build up a nest egg and to eventually 
enjoy the fruits of capital growth, quite apart from acquiring an asset that may provide security 
for further access to capital….. If the lender were no longer to enjoy the assurance of bond 
security, access to housing for persons not qualifying for a State subsidy would become 
expensive and beyond the reach of the man on the street, with grave negative consequences 
for society and its social and commercial stability. Thus, the trust in bond finance, based upon 
the assurance that its repayment will be upheld by our courts, should not be undermined.
54
  
 
The above dictum confirms that mortgage is a valuable tool in the South African 
economy, as mortgage finance serves the role not only of spreading home 
ownership, but also of promoting foreign investment in the country.55 It follows that 
mortgage, as an instrument of security, has been afforded strong enforcement 
ranking in the law, and has often overshadowed competing rights.56 The value of a 
mortgage agreement lies in the confidence that the law will give effect to its terms, in 
particular, the mortgagee’s right to have the hypothecated property sold for the 
satisfaction of the mortgage debt in the event of a default by the mortgagor.57 In 
Jaftha, the Constitutional Court held that: 
 
The interests of creditors must not be overlooked. There might be circumstances where, 
notwithstanding the relatively small amount of money owed, the creditor’s advantage in 
execution outweighs the harm caused to the debtor. In such circumstances, it may be 
justifiable to execute. It is in this sense that a consideration of the legitimacy of a sale in 
execution must be seen as a balancing process…. In this regard, it is important to bear in 
mind that there is a widely recognised legal and social value that must be acknowledged in 
debtor’s meeting the debts that they incur.
58
 
   
                                                 
54
 Folscher, para 39. 
55
 See also Absa Bank Limited v Mokebe and Others (case number 2018/00612) SGHC (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Mokebe’), para 1, wherein the court held that it is an economic reality that most people 
are unable to acquire immovable property by cash. The mortgage is thus an important instrument to 
assist the man on the street to acquire property and become a home owner. 
56
 Roos, ‘Execution against immovable property’, The Velile Tinto Voice (April 2016). Roos submits 
that commercial reality and sustainable bond financing requires that efficacy in the foreclosure 
process is specifically important and critical. The goal should therefore be to conduct an effective and 
relatively expeditious foreclosure process, whilst giving paramount importance to the principle of 
consumer fairness. See also Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, 232-234, wherein he submits that 
mortgage is one of the safest forms of lending due to the fact that the lender can repossess the 
debtor’s home should they default. 
57
 Saunderson, para 2. 
58
 Jaftha, paras 42-57. 
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The court, in Jaftha, acknowledged the view that, even although the value of the 
home, and the need to protect the home, are significant to an individual’s well-being, 
the value of mortgage and debt enforcement are equally important to ensure social 
order and trust in the law. Thus, there may be instances where the right to have 
access to adequate housing may be limited to protect the mortgagee’s rights in 
terms of the mortgage agreement. Credit provision is a common characteristic of 
modern trade and the successful functioning of any credit system largely depends on 
creditors having the assurance that they will retrieve their investment in the event of 
a default by the debtor.59 When a mortgage agreement is signed the mortgagor puts 
up his property as security for the loan, this allows the mortgagee to have the faith 
that he will retrieve his investment (the loan) as the property value should cover the 
value of the debt.60 The underlying theories forming the strength of mortgage will be 
discussed in the following subsection. 
 
2.2.3 A brief analysis of the history of mortgage 
 
South African mortgage law is founded on the principles of Roman law and Roman-
Dutch law. The Roman-Dutch authorities summarised the power of mortgage by 
holding that, if a debtor failed to pay the creditor what he owed, the creditor was 
entitled to appropriate to himself the encumbered property or sell it of his own 
motion.61 Roman law recognised three forms of security.62 A mortgage was referred 
to as hypotheca and occurred when the hypothecated property remained with the 
debtor, but, if the debtor failed to pay the debt, the creditor had a real right to obtain 
possession of the hypothecated property and sell the property in order to satisfy his 
claim in terms of the lex commissoria or pactum de vendendo.63 Under Roman law, 
creditors enjoyed strong protection and strict enforcement of their contractual 
                                                 
59
 See Brits, LLD thesis, 27, Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, 232, and Scott and Scott, Willies’ 
Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, 3
rd
 ed (1987) 5. 
60
 See Brits, LLD thesis, 27. 
61
 See Voet Commentarius (20.5.1) Digest (D13.7.4), and Grotius, Jurisprudence of Hollard (1) 2.48, 
41. 
62
 See Grotius, Inleidinge, (2.48.7), Voet Commentarius (20.1.2), and Digest (D13.7.21). The three 
forms of security were: Fuducia, Pignus and Hypotheca. See also Steyn, ‘Protection against forced 
sale of a debtor’s home in the Roman context’, (2015) Fundamina, 119 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Steyn, Fundamina’) 122-129, Brits LLD thesis, 31-34, and Steyn, LLD thesis 128. 
63
 Under Roman law, during foreclosure, the debtor could also forfeit the property to the creditor or 
sell the property to the creditor. Parties could agree to a forfeiture clause which would provide that if 
the debt was not paid by a certain date, the creditor would become the owner of the property. This 
was initially known as ‘foreclosure’ under Roman law.  
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rights.64 This, however, did not mean that debtors were helpless and left without any 
debt relief remedies. During 500 AD, Justinian undertook significant modifications to 
Roman law. One of the major legal modifications ensured that where the parties 
agreed that the creditor would sell the property, no sale could take place until two 
years after formal notice of his intention to the debtor.65 This two year period afforded 
the mortgagor an opportunity to save his home. Other significant measures were 
also put in place to delay foreclosure and require a judicial decree, thereby 
effectively protecting the debtor from immediate loss of his home.66 Certain laws 
allowed a debtor to redeem his property even after a period of two years, and 
Justinian permitted foreclosure only where no purchaser could be found for the 
property for an adequate price.67 Accordingly, under Roman law, while there was a 
strong emphasis on the protection and enforcement of creditor rights, the rights of 
debtors were also protected by ensuring that execution against the home was 
undertaken only as a last resort. The rights of mortgagors will be considered in the 
section below. 
 
2.3 The mortgagor’s rights  
 
2.3.1 The right to have access to adequate housing 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognises the right to have access 
to adequate housing in Section 26 of the Constitution. This section reads as follows: 
 
 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
 (2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
 resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
 (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
 of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
 arbitrary evictions. 
 
                                                 
64
 Chapter Two (2.3.3) will; provide an overview of Roman law. 
65
 See Hunter, Roman Law, 437, and Steyn LLD thesis, 32. 
66
 See Voet Commentarius (20.5.1), Codex (8.28.5) and Digest (D.13.7.4). See also Hunter, Roman 
Law, 437, Steyn, Fundamina, 131-134, and Brits LLD thesis, 34. 
67
 See Voet 20.5.1, Voet 20.5.10, Voet 20.1.25, the Placaat of Charles V of 10 May 1529, and the 
Politique Ordonantie of 1580. See also Steyn, LLD thesis, 34, and Steyn ‘Execution against a debtor’s 
home in terms of Roman-Dutch law and the contemporary South African law: Comparative 
observations, Fundamina, 23:2 (2017), 94 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Steyn, Fundamina (2017)’) for 
an overview of Roman Law and Roman-Dutch Law provisions. 
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The right to have access to adequate housing, provided for in section 26 of the 
Constitution, is a central right in South Africa’s constitutional democracy.68 Without 
access to housing other rights, including the rights to a safe environment, access to 
healthcare, and access to social services and water, are jeopardised.69 The right to 
have access to adequate housing is a basic universal human right and is a key to 
dignity and freedom, and also an important element in realising other human rights.70 
Thus, the right to have access to adequate housing is arguably one of the most 
important of all basic human rights and is recognised in a number of international 
human rights charters, conventions and treaties.71 One of the judgments that best 
describes this right in South Africa is the Constitutional Court case of Grootboom. 
Here, the Constitutional Court held that: 
 
The right delineated in section 26 (1) is a right of “access to adequate housing”…. It 
recognises that housing entails more than bricks and mortar. It requires available land, 
appropriate services such as the provision of water and removal of sewage, including the 
building of the house itself. For a person to have access to adequate housing all of these 
conditions need to be met: there must be land, there must be services, there must be a 
dwelling. A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the state who 
is responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, including 
individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing. The state must create the conditions for access to adequate housing for people at all 
economic levels of our society. State policy dealing with housing must therefore take account 
of different economic levels in our society.
72
  
 
It must be emphasised that section 26 of the Constitution provides for the ‘right to 
have access to adequate housing’ and not for the ‘right to housing’ itself. In other 
words, section 26 does not provide a right of home-ownership to citizens, but merely 
a right to access to a fair standard of living.73 Nevertheless, from an international 
                                                 
68
 See ‘The right to of access to adequate housing’ SAHRC’, Chapter Two, 20. 
69
 See ‘The right to of access to adequate housing’ SAHRC’, Chapter Two, 20-21. 
70
 See ‘Report on the public hearing on housing, evictions and repossessions’, (2008) 9, available at 
www.sahrc.org.za. See also Rand Properties para 49, and Jaftha 2005, paras 24-29, where the court 
held that section 26 is a decisive break from the past injustices and emphasised the significance of 
the right to have access to adequate housing in our new democracy. See also ‘Heyns and 
Mmusinyane, PELJ’, 2 – 3. 
71
 See Ibid 7. See also The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and 
the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlement 1996 which prescribe that adequate housing has to 
protect one from natural elements, provide suitable living space for its inhabitants, and be located in a 
pleasant living environment for economic and social opportunities, such as shopping and 
entertainment centres. This is reiterated by Article 60 of the United Nations Habitat Agenda 1996, 
which states that ‘adequate housing’ means more than just a roof over one’s head. It also means 
adequate privacy and space, adequate security, and structural stability and freedom.  
72
 Grootboom, paras 35. 
73
 See Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 11 (1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also ‘The right to have access to adequate 
housing’ SAHRC, 20. 
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perspective, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has emphasised that the ‘right to have access to adequate housing’ need not be 
given a restrictive interpretation74 and the concept of ‘adequacy’ is significant to the 
right to housing. The United Nations Committee has held that ‘adequacy’, in terms of 
the right to have access to ‘adequate’ housing, is determined by social, economic, 
cultural and other factors. Accordingly, it is submitted that, although Section 26 may 
not provide for ‘a right to housing’ in the form of ownership, the right to have access 
to ‘adequate’ housing can be associated with a wide range of other social, economic 
and cultural rights and factors, as it entitles one to have a reasonable standard of 
living, a safe environment and access to essential human resources, such as water 
and electricity.75 It is therefore submitted that Section 26 enshrines one of the most 
important rights in the Constitution, as it ensures the protection and preservation of 
dignity and is the catalyst for other fundamental constitutional rights such as the right 
to privacy and the protection of children’s rights (who may be occupants of the 
home). Without access to adequate housing, these basic human needs and 
constitutional rights cannot be realised. Thus, the protection of one’s right to have 
access to adequate housing (in particular, the protection of one’s home) is 
fundamental to the development of society and this right should be limited only in 
exceptional circumstances and as a last resort. 
 
2.3.2 The value of the home and the rights attached to the home  
 
a. Property (the home) and personhood76  
 
Over the last several decades, a number of international property law scholars have 
developed various theories of property and personhood.77 These scholars 
                                                 
74
 General Comment No. 4: The right to adequate housing, of the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (December 1991). See also the 3
rd
 Economic and Social Rights 
Report by the South African Human Rights Commission, Access to adequate housing, 1999/2000. 
75
 See ‘The right to of access to adequate housing’ SAHRC, 21-22. See also Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 91) SA 217 (CC), para 17, wherein Sachs J that ‘a home is 
more than just a shelter from the elements. It is a zone of personal intimacy and family security. Often 
it will be the only relatively secure place of privacy and tranquillity in what (for poor people, in 
particular) is a turbulent and hostile world’. 
76
 See Oxford Dictionary definition of ‘personhood’ which defines personhood as the status of being a 
person in the world. The term ‘personhood’ is a controversial topic in both philosophy and law and is 
closely tied with legal and political concepts of citizenship, equality, and liberty. The term personhood 
will be used in this thesis to describe the quality or condition of being a human. 
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emphasise that the property rights in relation to a home involve more than just 
ownership rights.78 The ideas of privacy, shelter, security, freedom, family and 
continuity are deeply rooted in the psychology of the home.79 The home is also the 
physical centre of everyday life and is associated with a range of emotions.  
 
Several scholars contend that the home is necessary for the development of one’s 
personhood and family.80 These scholars classify the home as a ‘personal asset’ that 
cannot be replaced by market value (monetary) compensation. In other words, these 
scholars contend that certain assets, such as a home, are personally attached to an 
individual, and these personal assets become important to the self-development and 
personhood of that individual. International property law experts, Radin, Jones and 
Stern, each believe that the owner of a personal asset, such as a home, has a 
personal relationship with that property. The home can thus be an extension of its 
owner and his family, and displacement from it can result in deep emotional 
trauma.81 Radin submits that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
77
 See Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’, 957, Barros, ‘Home as a legal concept’, 277. Jones, 
‘Property and Personhood Revisited’, Wake Forest Journal of Law and Public Policy, (2011), 101 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Jones, ‘Property and Personhood Revisited’’), and Davidson, ‘Property and 
Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the Housing Crisis’, Harvard Civil Rights Liberties Law Review, 
Vol 47 (September 2012), 119 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Davidson, ‘Property and Identity’’). See also 
Locke, The Second Treatises of Government (1689) Cambridge University Press, (1988), and, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Oxford Clarendon Press (1975). 
78
 See also Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’, (2011) Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 452, 
Dagan, Property, Values and Institutions (hereinafter referred to as ‘Alexander, ‘Pluralism and 
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[M]ost people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of them. These objects are 
loosely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves 
as continuing personal entities in the world. They may be as different as people are different, 
but some common examples are a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house (home).
82
 
 
Radin, Jones and Stern claim that personal assets, like a home, should trump 
competing fungible assets, like a mortgagee’s real right of security. They argue that 
certain types of property, like the home, are so bound to the holder, that they are 
necessary for self constitution, identity and human flourishing. The loss of such 
property can cause pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement. Radin, 
Jones and Stern therefore argue that enhanced legal protection should apply to the 
home, for personhood.83 Similarly, for Hegel and Locke, the justification for private 
property is rooted in the role of property in the formulation of identity and dignity.84 
Property is identified as a vehicle through which a person can manifest himself as 
being a human being (that is, his personhood). Property denotes a sense of 
belonging and confers a personal meaning onto the property which expresses the 
owner’s identity.85 The ownership of property (in particular, a home) satisfies the 
human need for possession and enables a person to experience freedom and to 
engage with civil society.86 Thus, the significance of a home is held to be necessary 
for self-development, self-preservation and personhood. An individual’s attachment 
to a home can be so strong that the property becomes constitutive of their 
personhood, identity and dignity.  
 
Radin and Davidson also argue that a strong positive relationship exists between a 
person and his or her home.87 Thus, forced displacement from a home goes beyond 
merely losing a property, as there may also be a loss of dignity, freedom, and 
identity.88 Accordingly, Davidson submits that property not only influences one’s 
sense of self, but may also influence how others perceive that self through social 
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status. When identity and status become tied to property, losing this property can 
carry deep negative emotional and economic consequences.89  
 
The cultural cliché that ‘a house is not a home’ suggests that the home is far more 
than just a physical structure. The home is a psychologically special form of property 
and has become a cherished entity in property law.90 Many academics have 
therefore submitted that the home should be treated more favourably in the law than 
other types of property.91 The common maxim that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ 
signifies the home as a source of security, privacy and liberty. The law of delict and 
criminal law empower a man to defend his home in certain circumstances, and 
further impose severe criminal sanctions upon persons who invade another’s home. 
These principles and laws signify the home as a special type of asset deserving of 
protection under the law. However, this does not mean that a homeowner’s interest 
of security, privacy and liberty should trump other bona fide legally competing 
interests, such as a mortgagee’s right to execution against the home. Thus, although 
the idea of a home as a castle is a powerful metaphor and is a major component of 
the ideology of the home, this metaphor has its limits and the ‘castle’s walls’ (the 
home) can be breached by a significantly stronger competing interest, such as a 
mortgagee’s right to execute against the home.92  
 
In sum, it is concluded that the home is a vital part of human existence and 
development. Various other basic human rights, such as the right to dignity, identity, 
privacy, freedom and security are all dependant upon it. The home (be it the joys of 
owning a home, or having the security of living in a home) is a significant part of 
human culture and society and should be protected against infringement. A conflict 
thus arises when the home is subject to execution by a mortgagee.93 The major 
challenge when balancing the right to have access to adequate housing, with the 
right to execution against immovable property, is that the courts have not been able 
to quantify the sentimental and emotional value of the home. It is submitted that each 
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country, society, cultural group and individual has a unique moral and value system, 
and these differences make defining the value of the home very difficult. The idea of 
the home as a legal concept will be discussed in the following subsection. 
 
b. The idea of the home as a legal concept 
 
[T]he idea of a home is both present and absent in the law. In one sense, ideas concerning 
the home – both in the sense of the dwelling place and as a special type of property, and 
territorial claims to homeland - underpin many contemporary legal problems, typically where 
people are displaced or dispossessed from their homes. For example, the significance of the 
home as a dwelling place has been highlighted in the rise in repossession and foreclosure 
statistics following the recent credit crunch in the credit markets and housing markets have 
demonstrated the risks of foreclosure and the value of a home in society…. A home signifies 
shared human need for a secure dwelling place and sense of security…. The loss of a home 
has widespread consequences, not only to the owner of the home and his family, but also to 
society at large. Hence, the home as a physical structure is protected, however, the home as 
a sentimental and psychological feature is absent in the law.
94
  
 
Although the concept of a ‘home’ is instantly familiar, and a daily feature in 
everyone’s life, the definition of the ‘home’ has therefore had little attention before 
the law. As indicated in the subsections above, the home is a special type of 
property and is central to most people’s everyday life.95 Despite the significance 
attached to the home, the concept cannot be easily defined and measured for legal 
purposes.96 A home represents complex psychological, cultural, political, economic 
and emotional interests for its owner and its occupants. Thus, the home, although 
being a tangible and identifiable asset, also exhibits subjective elements and values 
which cannot be easily quantified for legal purposes. Fox submits that this fact, 
namely the intangible and symbolic aspects of the concept of a home, hamper the 
development of ‘the home’ as a coherent legal concept,97 and often the intangible 
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qualities of a home are only identifiable when the home is lost.98 Due to the personal 
and emotive nature attached to the concept, the value of the ‘home’ has historically 
been trivialised, particularly when measured against objective and quantifiable rights, 
such as mortgagees’ rights during execution against residential property. If a legal 
concept or definition of the home is developed (which takes into account both the 
tangible and intangible aspects of the home), this could be used to inform decision 
making in cases where the home is the centre of a dispute, in particular, during 
foreclosure. 
 
According to Fox, the concept of the home can be broken down into four elements.99 
The first element is the home as a ‘house’, namely the physical structure and the 
building itself. This element can be easily quantified for legal purposes and the 
housing structure or building can easily be evaluated to determine its monetary 
value. The second, third and fourth elements of the home, are the home as a form of 
‘territory, identity and culture’. However, the home as a foundation of security, 
identity and culture are sentimental and emotional values that do not attract 
monetary value for legal purposes. These aspects are thus difficult to conceptualise 
legally.100 Herein lies the challenge in formulating a legal definition for the ‘home’. 
 
In English law, specific emphasis is placed on the concept of a ‘family home’ and the 
notion of ‘family’ and its contribution to creating a home.101 In England, the presence 
of children and the activity of family life is said to make a house into a home. The 
home is thus a projection of that family’s identity and protection.102 The focus on 
family in English law has been helpful in avoiding the forced sale of homes at the 
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hands of creditors.103 English law has always recognised the family home to be of 
great social importance. The family home plays an important role in securing and 
safeguarding social values such as the institution of marriage and family.104 Several 
attempts have been made in England to make the family home immune from 
execution. However, most of these attempts have been unsuccessful in light of the 
pro-creditor and pro-sale English regime.105  
 
Several academics have argued that the legal definition of the ‘home’ should follow 
the English example – namely, that the definition of the home should be based on 
the notion of a family. However, many of the ideas which are associated with the 
concept of the home such as, shelter, security, privacy and identity, fall outside the 
definition of a ‘family home’. On the one hand, it is submitted that simplifying the 
definition of the home as a ‘family home’ may be easier for legal purposes. However, 
if such a definition is developed in South Africa, this will exclude single occupants, as 
well as cohabitating and same sex couples. Single occupants and cohabiting and 
same sex couples may fall outside the definition of a family, and thus fail to be 
included within the definition of a family home.106 Fox therefore submits that this 
proposition of a ‘home’ being defined as a ‘family home’ is incomplete. While a family 
may be regarded as adding value to the home, there are many other values 
represented in the concept of a home that are not dependant on a family, including 
the values of shelter, identity, security, and privacy.107 Further, sole occupants may 
be as, or more, dependent on the protection of the home for security, identity and 
privacy, than a family.108 Hence, the definition of a ‘family home’ does not embrace 
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all the elements and values of the home. This indicates the difficulties encountered in 
narrowing down a legal definition of the concept of a ‘home’. 
 
As a result of the gaps in the ‘family home’ definition in English law, the Law 
Commission for England and Wales endorsed the ‘home per se’ model.109 The home 
per se model recognised that special protection should be afforded to the home, not 
on the basis of family structure and relations, but on the relationship and attachment 
between the individual and the home.110 The home per se model created a more 
individualistic approach and provided a modern basis on which to construct legal 
protection for the home.111 The individualistic home per se model focuses on the 
relationship between the occupier of the home and the home itself, rather than the 
relationship with the occupier and the owner or other occupants of the home (which 
occurs with the family home model). Thus, the home per se model recognises that, 
although the existence of a family may be a significant element to the meaning and 
value of a home, it is not an essential attribute.  
 
In sum, it is submitted that the sentimental and emotional values attached to the 
home, such as security, identity, comfort and privacy, have been an obstacle to the 
recognition and legal definition of the home. However, it is maintained that the 
successful development of a more systematic approach to the protection of a 
person’s home in law must be premised on developing an understanding of the value 
and meaning of the home outside of its economic value and physical 
manifestation.112 There have been strong arguments in favour of developing a 
coherent legal definition for the concept of the home, which encapsulates the 
meaning and value of the home, both economically and emotionally. It will be noted 
throughout this thesis that during disputes between home-owners and mortgagees 
the balancing of each party’s rights, and in particular the home-owner’s rights, has 
been difficult. Achieving a clearer understanding of the values which underpin the 
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concept of the home could however result in stricter court scrutiny and a fairer 
balancing of mortgagor and mortgagee rights during the foreclosure process.113 
 
2.3.3 Mortgagor rights under early Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
 
It is well known that much of South African law is founded on Roman law, Roman-
Dutch law and English law.114 Hence, it is important to consider the historical 
treatment and protection of the home in these jurisdictions to understand the 
development of the current South African position.  
 
a. Roman law  
 
The development of Roman law encompasses more than a thousand years of 
jurisprudence, from the Twelve Tables to the Corpus Juris Civilis ordered by 
Justinian. Roman law was effective throughout the Roman Empire and later served 
as a basis for legal practice in Western Europe and in certain parts of Africa and 
Latin America. Today, Roman law is no longer applied in legal practice, however, 
certain countries, including South African and San Marino, derive many of their 
current legal rules and practices from Roman law provisions. 
 
Debt enforcement in Rome initially occurred via self-help against the debtor. The first 
formal source of Roman law was provided for in the Laws of the Twelve Tables. 
Written laws contained in Table II and III of the Twelve Tables regulated the 
structures and procedures around trials and debt enforcement.115  
 
 Table III provided that … one who has confessed a debt, or against whom judgment has been 
 pronounced shall have thirty days to pay it in. After that forcible seizure of his person is 
 allowed. The creditor shall bring him before a magistrate. If the debt remains unpaid, the 
 creditor shall take him home and fasten him in stocks or fetter as a prisoner. On the third 
 market day let them cut his body among them. If they cut more or less than each other’s 
 share it shall be no crime. 
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In the legis actio procedure under Roman law, if the judgment debt had not been 
settled within thirty days, the creditor could arrest the debtor and if the debt remained 
unpaid, the creditor could hold the debtor in chains in a private prison until a 
compromise was reached. After a period of sixty days, if no compromise was 
reached and the debt remained unpaid, the creditor was entitled to sell the debtor as 
a slave, a ‘debt slave’.116 Where the debtor had more than one creditor, the creditors 
were entitled to ‘cut shares’ from the debtor. Some commentators describe this as 
meaning cutting the debtor’s body into pieces, while others regard this to mean that 
the creditors shared from the proceeds of the debtor’s sale into slavery. The primary 
purpose of this harsh procedure was to pressurise the debtor into payment.117 In 
instances where the debtor had no assets, the debtor could enter into a transaction 
of nexum and submit himself to working off the debt to the creditor. During the later 
Roman Republic, slavery was replaced with imprisonment of the debtor. In 320 AD, 
Constantine abolished imprisonment for debts. Nevertheless, many debtors still sold 
themselves into slavery or hired their wives and children to work off the debt.118  
 
Thus, debt enforcement procedures in Roman law imposed harsh treatment upon 
debtors which originally confined them to slavery, imprisonment and possibly even 
death, as a consequence of default on their contractual obligations.119 During the 
17th century, the law developed to permit execution against the assets of the 
debtor.120 Although some assets of the debtor were exempt from execution, the 
debtor’s home did not enjoy this immunity. Despite this, the home held great socio-
economic and religious significance under Roman law.121 Roman law appreciated 
the value of the home and consequently developed to afford the debtor some 
protection to avoid the loss of this property. In the time of Justinian, a moratorium, in 
the form of a stay of foreclosure proceedings, was granted to debtors to allow them 
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an opportunity to save their home. During the moratorium period, the creditor could 
not institute any foreclosure proceedings against the debtor, and this period provided 
time for the debtor to either recoup his financial situation or consider alternatives to 
foreclosure. With the development of mortgage, Justinian introduced more protective 
measures which sought to delay foreclosure for up to two years after judgment had 
been granted, and, in appropriate cases, to only allow foreclosure by judicial decree 
or imperial decree.122 
 
b. Roman-Dutch law  
 
Much of Roman-Dutch law is founded on early Roman law customs and 
principles.123 However, unlike the strict creditor oriented regime under Roman law, 
Dutch debt procedures showed leniency towards debtors. Roman-Dutch law 
required all creditors to first claim satisfaction of their debts in a ‘friendly manner’ 
before instituting litigation and issuing summons.124 Further, several measures were 
developed to protect debtors and their families and ensure that the forced sale of the 
debtor’s home occurred only as a last resort.125 Similarly as in Roman law, a 
moratorium was introduced in Holland in the 17th century, and this allowed for the 
postponement of the debtor’s duty to pay his debts for up to five years. During this 
time no creditor could sue the debtor or execute against the debtor’s property or 
person.126 
 
Several Roman law and Roman-Dutch law principles have been imported into South 
African law. For example, South African law has adopted much of the strict creditor 
oriented policies of Roman law. However, Roman law’s protective measures, such 
as the moratorium against creditor enforcement, and the two year delay on the sale 
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of the home, have not been adopted by South Africa. Accordingly, one may conclude 
that South Africa has continued to enforce harsh rules against its debtors and has 
afforded little or no protection to the ‘home’.127 Thus, at present, it is submitted that 
South African law fails to provide adequate relief to a debtor, and further fails to 
provide any protection to the home against execution.128  
 
2.4 Constitutional implications when executing against residential property 
 
In 1994, the dawn of a new democracy and the introduction of a new constitutional 
dispensation also brought about a new dynamic and revised consumer environment. 
A new segment of home-owners, who were previously disqualified from purchasing 
their own homes due to their race, entered into the credit environment. It is submitted 
that, with this change, which occurred over two decades ago, the need has arisen to 
balance, evolve and improve the foreclosure process. The preamble of the 
Constitution provides for the establishment of a society based on social justice and 
fundamental human rights. These rights and principles enshrine not only the right to 
have access to adequate housing, but also the sanctity of contract. Sanctity of 
contract is considered to be one of the most important factors in sustaining and 
promoting commerce in an economy.129 In Reddy v Siemens,130 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that contractual autonomy is part of freedom, informing the 
constitutional value of dignity, as it is by entering into contracts that one takes part in 
economic life. In this sense, freedom of contract is an integral part of section 10 (the 
right to dignity) and section 22 (the right to trade) of the Constitution. It is also 
incidental to section 25 (the right to acquire property) and section 18 (freedom of 
association) of the Constitution.131  
 
Sanctity of contract is fundamental to the conduct of business and is at the heart of a 
free market system in every country. It therefore follows that the enforcement of 
contractual rights is important in developing an economy and protecting and 
promoting the welfare of a country and its citizens. In a mortgage context, the 
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assurance that the mortgagee can rely on, and realise, his real right of security 
acquired against hypothecated property, is important in promoting the sanctity of 
contract.132 The principle of pacta sunt servanda (sanctity of contract) provides that 
once a valid binding contract has been formed, when one party breaches the 
agreement, the other party is entitled to hold the former to it and enforce its terms.133 
Cameron JA confirmed the principle of sanctity of contract in Brisley v Drotsky,134 in 
which it was held that: 
 
… neither the Constitution nor the value system it embodies gives the courts a general 
jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis of judicially perceived notions of unjustness or 
to determine their enforceability on the basis of imprecise notions of good faith…. On the 
contrary, the Constitution’s values of dignity, equality and freedom require the court to 
approach their task of striking down contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive 
restraint…. [C]ontractual autonomy is part of freedom [and] also informs the constitutional 
value of dignity.
135
  
 
Accordingly, when a mortgage agreement is signed, sanctity of contact will be 
protected and enforced. In other words, sanctity of contract ensures that the terms of 
a mortgage agreement are honoured in order to ensure contractual autonomy and 
contractual liability. Should the mortgagee default on the mortgage agreement, the 
mortgagor is entitled to hold the mortgagee to the terms of the mortgage, and 
execute against the hypothecated immovable property. Several courts have held that 
the fact that the hypothecated property is one’s residential premises (or home) does 
not in itself justify the conclusion that the Constitution, in particular section 26, will be 
infringed during foreclosure.136 The question thus arises as to which circumstances 
must exist for execution against the home to be rendered unconstitutional. It is 
contended that something more is required than mere execution against the home. It 
is submitted that in order for a foreclosure to be deemed unconstitutional there must 
be infringement of other constitutional rights, in addition to section 26, such as an 
infringement of the right to dignity or children’s rights. Historically, the execution 
against residential property potentially implicated three important sets of 
constitutional rights, namely, the right to have access to adequate housing (section 
                                                 
132
 Steyn, LLD thesis, 126. 
133
 See Christie, The Law of Contract, 5ed (2006) 199, and Steyn, LLD thesis 126. 
134
 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Brisley v Drotsky’). 
135
 Brisley v Drotsky, paras  93-94. See also Barkhuisen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), para 150, 
and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), para 70. 
In these cases, the court confirmed that the primary aims of the principle of pacta sunt servanda are 
legal certainty and ensuring that contacting parties honour their obligations. 
136
 See Chapter Three (3.3). 
31 
 
26 (1)); the right to have access to the courts (section 34); and the prohibition of 
unlawful and arbitrary eviction (section 26 (3)). The subsections below will briefly 
discuss some of the main constitutional rights implicated during execution against 
residential property. 
 
2.4.1 Section 34 of the Constitution – the right to have access to courts 
 
Section 34 of the Constitution is the embodiment of the rule against ouster clauses in 
any contract or law. The section provides that ‘everyone has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of the law to be decided in a fair 
public hearing before the court’.137 The case that best demonstrates the right to have 
access to the courts, provided by Section 34 of the Constitution, in a matter involving 
execution against immovable property, is Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural 
Bank.138 In Lesapo, the Constitutional Court rejected the idea that a creditor could 
attach and sell a debtor’s property without a court order. The court declared that 
section 38 (2) of the Agricultural Bank Act 14 of 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘ABA’) was unconstitutional. Section 38 (2) of the ABA allowed a creditor to seize 
and sell a defaulting debtor’s property, without recourse to a court of law. The court 
found that Section 38 (2) of the ABA allowed creditors to bypass the courts and 
failed to provide any statutory safeguard to debtors.139 The court confirmed that 
Section 34 of the Constitution embodies a fundamental rule of natural justice which 
provides that everyone should have the right to have a dispute settled by a court of 
law, and further prescribes that nobody is allowed to take the law into their own 
hands and usurp the functions of the court.140 Mokgoro J confirmed that judicial 
process guaranteed by Section 34 of the Constitution also applied to attachments 
and sales in execution, even where no dispute existed.141 The court confirmed that 
the ordinary way of securing execution of debts was via court process, and the 
seizure of property without a court order amounted to self-help and an infringement 
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of Section 34.142 Accordingly, a creditor’s action of executing against immovable 
property must be heard before a court of law, and any provision allowing otherwise is 
unconstitutional. The court confirmed that: 
 
… access to courts is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensures that 
parties to a dispute have an institutionalised mechanism to resolve their differences without 
recourse to self-help…. The right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of 
an orderly society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalised mechanisms to 
resolve disputes, without resorting to self help. The right of access to court is a bulwark 
against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy which it causes. Construed in this context of 
the rule of law and the principle against self help in particular, access to court is indeed of 
cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful considerations would be required for its 
limitation to be reasonable and justifiable.
143
 
 
Section 34 of the Constitution therefore demands that everyone has a right to access 
to courts, and a right to have a dispute resolved by a court of law. The court in 
Lesapo confirmed that execution against immovable property must follow due court 
process, and that such execution without court process amounted to an infringement 
of Section 34. In a foreclosure context, Section 34 ensures that a mortgagor has the 
constitutional right to have the foreclosure proceedings heard by a court of law. 
However, it will be noted in Chapter Three (3.3) that the foreclosure process, at one 
stage, failed to make any provision for judicial oversight. This might have been an 
infringement of Section 34 of the Constitution. This position has now been corrected 
by the Gundwana decision, where the Constitutional Court confirmed that judicial 
oversight is required in every application for execution against immovable 
property.144  
 
2.4.2 Section 26 of the Constitution – the housing clause 
 
Section 26 (1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing, and this right was affirmed by the Constitutional Court 
in Grootboom.145 Although Section 26 (1) may seem to oblige the State with a 
positive duty to provide access to adequate housing, several academics and courts 
have held that Section 26 (1) also imposes a negative duty on all persons not to limit 
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another’s existing right to have access to adequate housing.146 Therefore, Section 26 
(1) also aims to prevent the loss of existing adequate housing. During foreclosure, 
Section 26 (1) may be implicated as the mortgagor’s right to have access to 
adequate housing may be infringed if his home is sold in execution.147  
 
Section 26 (3) of the Constitution provides that no one may be evicted from their 
home, or have their home demolished, without a court order and after considering all 
relevant circumstances. This Section requires a substantive judicial enquiry, and 
Brits believes that this enquiry is applicable for both evictions and foreclosures.148 
Section 26 (3) provides that any proceedings that might lead to a person being 
evicted must be authorised by the court after taking into consideration ‘all relevant 
circumstances’. There has, however, been a high degree of confusion as to exactly 
what this enquiry entails (what is meant by the term ‘all relevant circumstances’). 
Thus, although there is now wide acknowledgement given to the protection of 
housing rights, there is uncertainty as to how these rights are protected in practice 
due to lack of uniformity and clarity.149 
 
It is well known that constitutional litigation usually involves a two-step approach. 
First, the claimant must show that he is a beneficiary of the right and that his right 
has been infringed. Secondly, the defendant has to show that if any infringement 
exists, such infringement is justifiable in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution. 
During foreclosure, the mortgagor is required to show that his right to have access to 
adequate housing will be limited if execution against his home proceeds.150 If there is 
an infringement, the mortgagee must prove that any limitation of the mortgagor’s 
Section 26 rights is justifiable. In defense, the mortgagee will usually use the 
existence and terms of the mortgage agreement as justification of any limitation of 
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Section 26.151 The court will thereafter have to undertake a proportionality exercise 
by balancing the mortgagor’s and mortgagee’s rights against each other. This 
balancing exercise will usually involve an analysis of Section 36. 
 
2.4.3 Section 36 of the Constitution – the limitation clause 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be 
limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on dignity, 
equality and freedom. Section 36 lists five factors that must be considered when 
testing an infringement: 
 
1) the nature of the right; 
2) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
3) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
4) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and  
5) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
Section 36 requires that the impact of the infringement must be proportionate to the 
purpose of the limitation.152 This requires consideration and application of the 
‘proportionality test’. During foreclosure, the proportionality test requires an 
evaluation of the justifiability of execution when balancing the mortgagee’s and 
mortgagor’s rights. The cases of Jaftha and Absa Bank v Ntsane153 are prime 
examples where the proportionality test was applied.154 In these cases, the impact of 
the limitation, namely, the possibility of the mortgagors being without a home, far 
outweighed the purpose of the limitation, which was enforcement of trivial 
debts/arrears of not more than R 200. In both cases, it was held that such a limitation 
was unjustifiable, and the courts confirmed that it would not enforce a menial 
collection of debts to override one’s access to adequate housing, especially in 
circumstances where there are alternative means to satisfy the debt. The potential 
prejudice and hardship to be suffered by the mortgagor far outweighed, and was 
disproportionate to, the mortgagee’s right to debt recovery.  
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The application of the proportionality test requires the courts to balance the purpose 
of execution with the social and economic effects on the home-owner.155 It is 
submitted that some of the factors that must be considered by the court during the 
application of the proportionality test are, inter alia, the amount outstanding under the 
mortgage agreement, the arrear amount due, and alternatives sought to avoid a sale 
in execution - such as the private marketing of the property, entering into a payment 
arrangement, and executing against the mortgagor’s movable property. However, it 
must be remembered that mortgage is a limited real right and there is no duty on the 
mortgagee to seek execution against other assets.156 
 
2.4.4 Comments on the constitutionality of foreclosure 
 
From the above, it is concluded that foreclosure against a home has the potential to 
infringe certain fundamental constitutional rights. However, it is unclear whether the 
infringement of these rights is justifiable in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution. 
Brits and Van Der Walt comment that it would be helpful if there were guidelines to 
indicate the degree to which Section 26 (and other constitutional rights) are limited 
and under what circumstances infringement will not be justifiable during execution 
against the home.157 Van Heerden and Boraine suggest that the only question that 
must be asked when considering a foreclosure application is whether the execution 
will render the mortgagor homeless. The issue of whether alternative 
accommodation is available is important in answering whether the mortgagor will 
have access to adequate housing. However, it will be noted that it appears that 
foreclosure may only be considered unconstitutional if the result of the process is 
‘disproportionate’ to the means, or the action amounts to an ‘abuse of process’.158 
These are ‘non-exacting’ or ‘unclear’ factors and courts and creditors have struggled 
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to determine what amounts to a ‘disproportionality’ or an ‘abuse of process’. It is 
submitted that the only way in which clarity can be achieved is by implementing 
legislation which specifically regulates foreclosure process. It is submitted that the 
enactment of a Foreclosure Act could create clarity by providing proper guidelines for 
the balancing of mortgagor and mortgagee rights. A Foreclosure Act would further 
set out exact instances that would amount to an infringement of each parties’ rights, 
and factors to be considered by the courts when applying the proportionality test.159   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The home is a significant element of every individual’s life. The home is much more 
than just an economic asset or a means of shelter. It is uniquely connected to 
personhood and thus should be recognised for both its economic (the monetary 
value of the home) and non-economic values (the emotions and sentiments that 
attach to the home). The home is a special type of property to which its occupants 
develop a special attachment. The home provides a range of functions including 
shelter, security, freedom, privacy and identity. It is also central to the development 
and maintenance of family and culture. English law has accordingly recognised the 
significance of the family home and has provided protection to the family home in its 
law and policy.  
 
As indicated above, there have been strong arguments in favour of developing a 
legal definition of the concept of the ‘home’. However, attaching meaning to the 
intangible sentiments that relate to the home has proven difficult. When the home is 
subject to foreclosure and the sanctity of the home is threatened, a complex 
balancing of interests ensues between the home-owner and the mortgagee. It is 
therefore of paramount importance that the value and significance of each party’s 
interests be fully understood in order that they may be appropriately balanced. 
Historically, during foreclosure, the fact that a mortgagor and his family reside in the 
home, and have a personal attachment to the property, has carried little weight in 
preventing a mortgagee from subjecting the home to foreclosure. This may be due to 
the fact that mortgagee rights are easily definable when compared to mortgagor 
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rights. It is therefore suggested that a clearer understanding of the meaning and 
value of the home could result in a stricter consideration of home-owner interests 
during foreclosure proceedings. Accordingly, in Chapter Seven, it will be 
recommended that a legal definition for the home be provided in the proposed 
Foreclosure Act. Further, it will be recommended that a proportionality test also be 
implemented in order to balance the rights of mortgagors and mortgagees in the 
foreclosure process and to establish clarity in practice.  
 
The following chapter will consider how the rights of mortgagees and mortgagors are 
balanced during the foreclosure process and will expose how the lack of clarity in the 
current foreclosure process creates uncertainty in practice. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FORECLOSURE PROCESS AND PRACTICES 
 
It must be accepted that execution in itself is not an odious thing. It is part and parcel of 
normal economic life. It is only when there is disproportionality between the means used in 
the execution process to exact payment of the judgment debt, compared to available means 
to attain the same purpose, that alarm bells should start ringing. If there is no other 
proportionate means to attain the same end, execution may not be avoided.
160
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, various aspects of the law relating to execution against residential 
property will be considered. In particular, the chapter will consider the history of 
cases relevant to execution against a debtor’s home, and the legal process leading 
up to a sale in execution. During the past decade, the foreclosure process has 
become more intricate, mainly due to the introduction of the NCA and conflicting 
judicial precedents.161 This chapter will discuss, in chronological order, the most 
important judgments relating to execution against immovable property since the 
implementation of the Constitution, and will consider the jurisprudence that these 
decisions have added to South African law. The principles that have stemmed from 
these judgments have translated into new rules of practice and procedure. The 
required processes, judgments and academic commentary will be analysed with a 
view to establishing the level of clarity and adequacy of the current laws relating to 
foreclosure, as well as the extent to which there is a need for these laws and policies 
to be reviewed and developed. In the light of this analysis, suggestions will be made 
for improvement of the current position. It will be submitted that government, the 
legislature and financial institutions all need to rethink the management of mortgages 
and defaulting debtors. In particular, there is a need for the legislature to provide 
clarity as to the application and alignment of mortgagor and mortgagee rights during 
foreclosure. To this end, it is submitted that a ‘Foreclosure Act’ is required to 
specifically regulate and balance mortgagor and mortgagee rights during foreclosure.  
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3.2 The right to execute against immovable property under a mortgage 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two,162 the overall value of mortgage relies on the 
foundation of its enforcement. Under South African law, security rights which inure 
debtors to foreclosure under mortgage fall into the category of limited real rights and 
are created by registration.163 The security rights which flow from a mortgage 
underwrite the mortgagee’s entitlement to direct execution against the hypothecated 
immovable property in the event of the mortgagor defaulting on the agreement. The 
strength of the mortgage was best rationalised in Gerber v Stolze,164 where the court 
held that: 
 
Where a monetary judgment is obtained by a mortgagee, then in the normal course of 
execution, the court is asked to dispense with the circumlocution of taking execution against 
movables. When immovable property is specially hypothecated, it allows the creditor to take 
execution straightaway against the immovable property. However, the mortgagee’s real right 
of security does not provide him with an inherent right to sell the property privately. The 
mortgagee is required to employ the mechanisms under the law to give effect to his right to 
sell the property after the fulfillment of several legal provisions.165  
 
The Gerber case confirmed that, although mortgagees have the right to direct 
execution against the hypothecated immovable property, this right is subject to law of 
general application. Thus, a mortgagee who wished to enforce his right to execute 
against the hypothecated property has to follow certain rules and laws, inter alia, 
Section 27A of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, Rule 31 (5), Rule 45 (1) and Rule 
46 (1) of the Uniform Court Rules, or Section 66 and Section 67 of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 32 of 1944.166 These provisions (some of which have been amended) 
permitted the registrar or clerk of the court to grant default judgments and orders of 
executability against immovable property. The main concern with these provisions 
was that they allowed for direct execution against one’s home without any court 
supervision.  
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Much debate arose around the application of Rules 31 (5), 45 and 46, and the 
registrar’s powers to grant judgments and orders of executability of immovable 
property. The powers granted by these provisions had the potential to counteract 
certain constitutional rights, in particular Section 26 and Section 34 of the 
Constitution.167 Rules 31 (5), 45 and 46 potentially infringed Section 34, as it allowed 
for execution against immovable property without any judicial oversight. Section 34 
of the Constitution provides everyone with the right to have a dispute resolved by a 
court of law. Thus, any law that allows for a limitation of this right or resolution of a 
legal dispute without any court intervention may be unconstitutional. However, the 
rationale behind Rule 31 (5) was articulated in Standard Bank v Ngobeni,168 where 
the court held that:  
 
The purpose of the amended Rule (Rule 31 (5)) was clearly to relieve the burden resting on 
the Judges of the Supreme Court by delegating to the Registrar the right (and duty) to grant 
or refuse judgment in uncomplicated default matters where he simply checks that all 
administrative and formal steps have been taken to justify a judgment. He is not expected to 
decide extraordinary or obscure points of law or fact. The golden rule is: if the Registrar has 
any legitimate doubt whether judgment should be granted or not, it is his duty to refer the 
matter for hearing in terms of Rule 31(5)(b)(vi)).169 
 
In practice, the general proposition has always been that the courts will grant a 
warrant of attachment against a debtor’s immovable property, only if a Sheriff has 
issued a nulla bona return in respect of the debtor’s movable assets. The purpose of 
this rule is to ensure that one’s home is not sold in execution where there are other 
assets, such as movables, to satisfy the debt. This principle serves to avoid any 
abuse of process, as it prevents unscrupulous creditors from selling a debtor’s home 
for menial debts. However, when the debt relates to mortgage, the creditor is entitled 
to direct execution against the hypothecated immovable property, even if there are 
sufficient movable assets available to satisfy the mortgage debt. This is an exception 
to the normal rule of debt enforcement, which requires execution against movables 
first.170 
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The mortgagee’s right to direct execution against hypothecated immovable property 
has, however, not involved a clear and precise procedure. The case analysis below 
will highlight the conflicting judgments by the courts when executing against 
immovable property. The main controversy on the subject of direct execution has 
been whether an order of executability could be granted by the registrar or the clerk 
of the court, or whether an order of executability could only by granted by a court of 
law. The judgments discussed below further considered the question as to whether 
the creditor still enjoys the right to direct execution against the hypothecated 
immovable property, despite the fact that there may be sufficient movable property, 
or alternative methods, to settle the full outstanding debt (or the arrears on the 
mortgage agreement). Although the controversy of judicial oversight was resolved by 
the Constitutional Court in the Gundwana decision, and the amended Rule 46 came 
into effect on 24 December 2010, the various court decisions highlight the continued 
need for certainty during execution against residential property. Moreover, it is 
contended that the further amendment to Rule 46, namely Rule 46A, which came 
into effect on 22 December 2017, has not created any clarity in the foreclosure 
process. In fact, Rule 46A can be seen to have created more uncertainty.171 Hence, 
it is submitted that the enactment of specific legislation is required to create clarity in 
the foreclosure process. The case analysis below will discusses the lack of clarity in 
the foreclosure process. 
 
3.3 An analysis of cases relating to execution against immovable property  
 
As indicated above, the case analysis below will provide a historical overview of 
several foreclosure judgments that were decided after the implementation of the 
Constitution. While some of the issues considered in these cases have been 
resolved, it should be noted that there is still much inconsistency in practice. Clarity 
is urgently needed and this can only be established by the implementation of a 
Foreclosure Act.  
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Jaftha v Schoeman 
 
The Jaftha case was the first case in South African law that questioned the 
constitutionality of execution against residential property. The case centred around 
the issue of whether Section 66 (1)(a) and Section 67 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
violated a citizen’s right to have access to adequate housing. 
 
Jaftha and Van Rooyen were both poor women suffering from ill health. They each 
possessed a basic level of education and had each acquired a home via state 
housing subsidy projects.172 Jaftha and Van Rooyen each borrowed small amounts 
of money (R 250 and R 190, respectively) from a community member and agreed to 
repay this money in instalments. These transactions were totally unrelated to the 
purchasing of their homes. Jaftha and Van Rooyen fell into default of their payments, 
and default judgment was taken against each of them.173 
 
Litigation continued against Jaftha and Van Rooyen, and their properties were sold 
in execution for R 5 000 and R 1 000 respectively.174 Jaftha and Van Rooyen 
launched an application to the High Court seeking to set aside the sales and 
interdicting the buyers at auction from taking transfer of the property.175 The debtors 
contended that Section 66 (1)(a) and Section 67 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act were 
invalid as these provisions contravened Section 26 of the Constitution by allowing for 
a sale in execution to take place without any judicial oversight. 
 
The High Court’s decision  
 
The High Court considered the ambit of Section 26 and found that the right to have 
access to adequate housing does not provide that everyone has an entitlement to 
the ownership of property.176 Accordingly, the High Court found that the Section 66 
execution process did not violate Section 26 of the Constitution as Section 26 did not 
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provide for the right to ownership.177 The court held that the lack of judicial oversight 
in Section 66 was not unconstitutional, and despite the fact that Section 66 could be 
used to sell houses at insubstantial amounts for trivial debts, this state of affairs in 
itself did not render the Section unconstitutional.178 The High Court dismissed each 
of Jaftha’s and Van Rooyen’s claims. 
 
Appeal to the Constitutional Court 
 
Jaftha and Van Rooyen were not satisfied with the High Court’s decision and took 
the matter on appeal. In addition to the arguments posed at the High Court, Jaftha 
and Van Rooyen argued that, in terms of Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, both the 
State and private persons had a duty not to interfere unjustifiably with another’s 
existing right to have access to adequate housing. They contended that Section 66 
(1)(a) infringed upon this right, as it allowed for the unjustifiable removal of their right 
to have access to adequate housing.179 They further contended that Section 67 of 
the Magistrates’ Courts Act was also unconstitutional as it limited the range of assets 
that were exempt from the execution process. In particular, it was argued that 
Section 67 was unconstitutional as it failed to exempt the home of the debtor from 
execution. The debtors proposed that homes below a certain value should be 
exempt from creditor execution.  
 
With regard to the argument that Section 67 was unconstitutional, in that it failed to 
provide protection to a home from creditor execution, the court held that such a 
blanket prohibition would be inappropriate. The court held that a blanket prohibition 
against sales in execution below a certain value would create a poverty trap 
preventing the poor from obtaining credit and would also be contrary to the interests 
of creditors.180 Accordingly, the court found that Section 67 was not unconstitutional 
to the extent that it did not provide a blanket prohibition against the forced sale of a 
home. The court thereafter analysed the constitutionality of Section 66 and held that: 
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The importance of access to adequate housing and its link to the inherent dignity of a person, 
has been well emphasised by this Court…. Relative to homelessness, to have a home one 
calls one’s own, even under the most basic circumstances, can be a most empowering and 
dignifying human experience. The impugned provisions (section 66) have the potential of 
undermining that experience. The provisions take indigent people who have already benefited 
from housing subsidies and, worse than placing them at the back of the queue to benefit 
again from such subsidies in the future, put them in a position where they might never again 
acquire such assistance, without which they may be rendered homeless and never able to 
restore the conditions for human dignity.  Section 66(1)(a) is therefore a severe limitation of 
an important right.
181
 
 
Mokgoro J held that any measure which permits one to deprive the existing right to 
have access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in Section 26 (1). 
Whether a measure is justifiable or not requires the balancing of the various interests 
and the qualifying of any limitation under Section 36 of the Constitution.182 During the 
Section 36 enquiry, the importance of the limitation must be weighed against the 
nature of the right and the nature and extent of the limitation. During foreclosure, the 
importance and nature of debt enforcement and an enhanced credit market must be 
considered against the right to have access to adequate housing. In the current 
case, the objective of debt enforcement was diminished by the fact that the 
enforcement of trifling debts (of not more than R 250) could be executed against 
homes without court supervision.183 Accordingly, it was held that there was 
insufficient proportionality between the purpose of the limitation and the effect of the 
limitation. However, this did not mean that every sale in execution for a trifling debt 
would be unreasonable and unjustifiable. Each case must be decided on the facts of 
the matter, and the legitimacy of a sale in execution must involve a balancing 
process.184 The court held that it would be inappropriate to delineate all the 
circumstances in which a sale in execution would be unjustifiable, but held that 
several factors should be taken into account when exercising judicial oversight. 
These factors included, inter alia: 
 
 the circumstances in which the debt was incurred; 
 the attempts made by the debtor to pay off the debt;  
 the financial situation of the parties; 
 the amount of the debt;  
 the debtor’s source of income; 
 alternative debt recovery methods; and  
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 any other relevant factor before the court.
185
  
 
The court found that Section 66 (1)(a) was unconstitutional to the extent that it 
allowed for sales in execution in unjustifiable circumstances without judicial 
oversight.186 It further held that the most appropriate way to remedy the defect was 
to provide for judicial oversight of the process. The court remedied the lack of judicial 
oversight by adding into Section 66 (1)(a) the sentence: ‘a court after consideration 
of all relevant circumstances, may order execution against immovable property of the 
party’.  
 
Comments on the Jaftha case and its aftermath 
 
The overall effect of the Jaftha case was to introduce judicial oversight into the 
process of execution against immovable property.187 The introduction of judicial 
oversight was seen as a mechanism to protect persons who lacked knowledge of the 
legal process and who were ill-equipped to avail themselves of the legal remedies.188 
In Jaftha, the creditor argued that judicial oversight was not required in every case as 
the purpose behind Section 66 of the Magistrates’ Court Act was to assist the courts 
by allowing clerks to attend to regulatory matters and prevent court overload. The 
court found that this purpose was outweighed by the potential prejudice that could be 
caused against the debtor in losing her home. This argument brings into question the 
capacity of courts to hear foreclosure matters, and it will be suggested that the need 
has arisen for specialised foreclosure courts to be established.189 
 
It is important to remember that the Jaftha decision did not diminish the value and 
significance of mortgage as the decision did not place homes beyond the scope of 
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execution.190 The Jaftha case endorsed the principle that, where there is an 
infringement of a right, the limitation must be proportionate to the means. In Jaftha, 
the purpose of the sale in execution, which was the enforcement of a trivial debt, was 
held to be disproportionate to the consequence of execution, which was the potential 
homelessness of the debtors.191 Du Plessis has interpreted the Jaftha case to mean 
that the right to have access to adequate housing during execution weighs more in 
favour of the debtor than the right of a creditor to enforce a small trivial debt.192 This 
highlights the importance of the balancing exercise undertaken by the courts in 
ensuring a proportionate relationship between the effect of the limitation and the 
purpose of the limitation.193 The court in Jaftha laid down certain factors that must be 
considered when undertaking an analysis of Section 36, applying the proportionality 
test, for execution purposes.194 Despite the fact that the court indicated that the 
factors laid down were not hard and fast rules, it was a starting point to assist courts 
in making these decisions. Nevertheless, it is submitted that there is still a need for a 
clear set of rules to be established to provide a more streamlined process in the 
course of which courts may decide whether or not execution against a home is within 
the bounds of constitutionality. In this respect, it is argued that a Foreclosure Act is 
required to establish a clear set of rules to govern the foreclosure process, as the 
current laws lack clarity. It is submitted that a Foreclosure Act would provide an 
exact set of factors for consideration by the courts during a foreclosure application, 
and that this would eradicate the uncertainty that currently exists in the foreclosure 
process.195 
 
After the Jaftha judgment a period of uncertainty arose.196 In particular, mortgagees 
were uncertain as to whether they had a right to execute directly against 
hypothecated property and what they had to allege in their summons and affidavits. 
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The Jaftha case dealt with an extraneous debt unrelated to the purchasing of the 
immovable property. Therefore, there was confusion as to whether the registrar 
could grant a warrant of attachment against hypothecated immovable property 
pursuant to judgment in terms of Rule 31 (5). The requirement of judicial oversight 
created a sense of fear that such oversight might diminish the security value of 
mortgage.197 Much controversy ensued and there were several conflicting 
approaches adopted. The inconsistency in court decisions exacerbated the situation 
and, for a period, creditors did not know what to expect when applying for an order of 
executability against immovable property. This position will be explored in the cases 
discussed below. 
 
Standard Bank v Snyders198 
 
The Snyders case was the first reported decision which related to execution against 
immovable property after the Jaftha judgment. This case involved an action by 
Standard Bank against nine debtors for monetary judgment and orders declaring the 
hypothecated immovable property executable.199 Eight of the nine debtors failed to 
enter a notice to defend and Standard Bank applied for default judgment, in terms of 
Rule 31 (5)(a) of the Uniform Court Rules, before the registrar of the High Court. The 
registrar referred the matter to open court as he was of the opinion that, after the 
Jaftha decision, he did not have the power to grant an order of executability against 
immovable property.200 
 
Amici curiae were appointed to protect the interests of the home-owners. They 
advanced two main grounds as to why the court should refuse the orders sought by 
Standard Bank. First, they argued that the court did not have any power in terms of 
Rule 31 to grant the relief sought. Secondly, they contended that the debtors should 
have been informed of their Section 26 constitutional rights before action was taken 
against them.201 
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The court assumed that each of the immovable properties in question were the 
primary residences (homes) of the debtor, and confirmed that an order for 
executability against a home was subject to Section 26 (3) of the Constitution.202 The 
court considered the contention by the amici curiae that the debtors should have 
been notified of their Section 26 constitutional rights before litigation, and found that 
the summons served on the debtors made no mention of Section 26. In Jaftha, the 
court found that Section 26 (3) was introduced as a pre-requisite for the court to 
consider all relevant circumstances before granting an order.203 Therefore, in the 
present case Standard Bank had to comply with Section 26 (3) of the Constitution. 
The court held that without express reference in the summons to the debtor’s 
Section 26 constitutional rights, the debtor would not be aware of this protection. The 
court accordingly held that the creditor’s summons should contain an indication to 
the effect that the facts alleged by it were sufficient to justify an order in terms of 
Section 26 (3).204 In the current matter, the creditor’s summons lacked this, and 
therefore the creditor’s plea could not succeed. The court dismissed the creditor’s 
claim to execute against each immovable hypothecated property. However, it held 
that there was no reason why default judgment could not be ordered for the 
monetary value of the creditor’s claims. The court accordingly ordered monetary 
judgment in favour of the creditor.205  
 
Comments on the Snyders case  
 
In Snyders, the court had to consider whether Jaftha, which related to execution 
against immovable property in the Magistrates’ Courts process, was applicable in the 
current matter, which related to a High Court claim arising out of mortgage debt. The 
court in Snyders disagreed with the Jaftha decision, as it held that the registrar did 
have the power to hear and decide on default judgment and attachment applications 
by virtue of Rule 31 (5), whereas, in Jaftha, the court had held that the clerk did not 
possess the power to hear default judgment and attachment applications and held 
that Section 66, which provided the clerk with such powers, was unconstitutional.  
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One of the main contributions made by the Snyders case was the finding that the 
creditor’s summons was required to draw the debtor’s attention to his Section 26 
constitutional rights.206 In Snyders, none of the summonses issued by Standard 
Bank made any reference to the debtor’s constitutional right to have access to 
adequate housing. This meant that the debtors were unaware of the protection 
enjoyed by them.207 A question that naturally follows is: if Standard Bank had issued 
and served correctly worded summonses upon the debtors, would the court have 
granted monetary judgment in favour of the creditor and an order declaring the 
property executable? Logically, it seems that it would indeed have been so. 
 
Nedbank v Mortinson208  
 
The Mortinson case involved an application by Nedbank seeking default judgment in 
terms of Rule 31 (5), and an order declaring hypothecated immovable property 
executable.209 The registrar doubted his competence to declare the property 
executable and referred the matter to open court in terms of Rule 31(5)(b)(vi).210 The 
court held that: 
 
[Although] the Jaftha judgment did not deal with section 27(A) of the Supreme Court Act and 
Rule 31(5) of the Rules. It dealt, with section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act. That 
section is analogous to Rule 45(1) of the Rules of Court. Accordingly the Jaftha judgment is 
distinguishable. The ratio of the judgment is however of great persuasive authority in any 
consideration of the constitutionality of section 27(A) of the Supreme Court Act and Rule 
31(5) of the Rules. It establishes the principle that a scheme which permits execution against 
immovable property without judicial sanction is a limitation of the rights contained in section 
26 of the Constitution.
211
 
 
The court found that the current case was distinguishable from the Jaftha case. It 
held that the Jaftha judgment did not concern Rule 31 (5) of the High Court Rules. 
Most applications in terms of Rule 31 (5) dealt with debts above R 100 000. Thus, 
where there was a small amount being claimed (like the situation in Jaftha) there 
was a greater need for scrutiny.212 Further, Rule 31 (5)(d) contained a safeguard, 
unlike that of the Magistrates’ Court, which allowed for the reconsideration of a 
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judgment given by a registrar within twenty days of the party having acquired 
knowledge of the order.213 For these reasons, the Jaftha judgment did not apply to 
enforcement of a mortgage agreement in the High Court. It was, however, 
questionable whether a layperson would be aware of Rule 31 (5)(d). Hence, the 
court set down a rule of practice, which prescribed that the writ presented to the 
registrar for signature must contain a note advising the debtor of the Rule 31 (5)(d) 
provisions.214  
 
The court also considered whether the limitation of Section 26 during execution 
against immovable property was reasonable and justifiable in terms of Section 36 of 
the Constitution. It found that where a debtor specially hypothecates immovable 
property, and where there is no abuse of process, such limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of Section 36. Rules of practice were required to alert the registrar 
to any potential abuses. Accordingly, the court held that the following factors should 
be considered during this assessment:  
 
 In all applications for default judgment, where the creditor seeks an order declaring 
specially hypothecated immovable property executable the creditor shall aver in an 
affidavit, inter alia: the amount of the arrears; whether the immovable property was 
acquired via state subsidy; whether the immovable property is occupied or not; whether 
the immovable property is utilised for residential purposes; and whether the immovable 
property was used as security for the debt. 
 In all applications for default judgment where the creditor seeks executability against 
hypothecated immovable property, where the amount claimed falls within the jurisdiction 
of the Magistrates’ Court, shall be referred to the registrar in terms of Rule 31 (5)(b)(vi). 
 A further rule of practice is laid down that a warrant of execution which is presented to the 
Registrar for issue, pursuant to an order made by the Registrar declaring immovable 
property executable, shall contain a note advising the debtor of the provisions of Rule 
31(5)(d).
215
 
 
Comments on the Mortinson case  
 
The court in the Mortinson case rejected the position adopted by the court in the 
Jaftha case and found that the registrar did have the power to grant an order of 
executability against immovable property. It further disagreed with the Snyders 
judgment and held that the creditor’s summons did not have to refer to the Section 
26 constitutional rights nor justify any limitation of Section 26. The court held that 
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even though this may limit the right provided for in Section 26, the presence of a 
mortgage justified any limitation of the right, provided this did not amount to an 
abuse of process.216 The court further disagreed with the Jaftha and Snyders 
judgments, by holding that it was impractical for the courts to hear 300 to 400 default 
judgment applications in open court per week, as, if this were the case, a specialised 
court would have to be devoted to these applications alone. The concept of 
specialised foreclosure courts will be discussed in later chapters. 
  
Standard Bank v Saunderson  
 
This case was an appeal, by Standard Bank, against the Snyders judgment.217 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal distinguished the facts of the Jaftha case from 
the facts of the current case. It found that in Jaftha, the debt in question was of a 
trifling nature and was not related to a mortgage. In the current matter, the debt 
arouse out of a mortgage agreement, where the debtors had willingly hypothecated 
their property to obtain capital. The debt was not extraneous, but was fused into the 
title of the property.218 In Jaftha, the court did not consider Section 26 (1) of the 
Constitution. In the current case, the court found it unnecessary to consider Section 
26 (1) as it accepted that, in the absence of abuse of process, a sale in execution 
should be ordinarily permitted against hypothecated property.219 The court held that: 
 
The present case does not require us to decide whether s 26(1) may be compromised when 
the rights conferred by a mortgage bond are sought to be enforced in cases where the 
property concerned does in fact constitute ‘adequate housing’. But even accepting for present 
purposes that execution against mortgaged property could conflict with s 26(1) such cases 
are likely to be rare. It is particularly hard to conceive of instances where a mortgagee’s right 
to reclaim the debt from the property will be denied altogether; and it is therefore not 
surprising that the Constitutional Court noted in Jaftha that in the absence of abuse of court 
procedure – and none is alleged here – a sale in execution should ordinarily be permitted 
against even a home bonded for the debt sought to be reclaimed. Nor can the approach differ 
depending on the reasons the property owner might have had for bonding the property, or the 
objects on which the loan was expended.
220
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The court further confirmed that Rule 31 (5) permitted the registrar to grant an order 
for the executability against immovable property. It found that the constitutionality of 
an execution against a home will only arise when the mortgagor defends the matter. 
In such cases, the registrar is obliged to refer the matter to open court. If there is no 
dispute as to the constitutionality of execution, the registrar is entitled to enter 
judgment in terms of Rule 31 (5).221 In the current matter, since none of the 
defendants contested the constitutional validity of execution, there were no proper 
grounds to withhold the order declaring the properties executable and the registrar 
was entitled to issue such an order.222  
 
Comments on the Saunderson case  
 
Throughout the Saunderson judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed the 
power of the security rights provided by mortgage, and emphasised the fact that 
creditors and investors place increased confidence in mortgage agreements and rely 
on courts to uphold the terms of these transactions. The court held that in the 
absence of any abuse, the mortgagee’s real right of security to direct execution 
against hypothecated property will generally be enforced. The Saunderson judgment 
thus acknowledged the economic realities of South Africa and realised the 
importance of protecting commercial interests while balancing them with Section 26 
of the Constitution.  
 
With regard to whether judicial oversight was required in an application seeking 
execution against immovable property, the court held that judicial oversight is only 
required if there is an indication that the sale in execution might threaten the right to 
have access to adequate housing.223 In the absence of this threat, the registrar was 
entitled to grant an order of executability against immovable property. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal, however, did accept the possibility that a sale in execution may limit 
one’s Section 26 (1) rights and held that it would be preferable for the mortgagor to 
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be informed of his Section 26 (1) rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed the High Court’s decision to lay down a rule of practice that the mortgagee 
must inform the mortgagor of their Section 26 constitutional rights in the summons. It 
is submitted that this was one of the most important contributions of the Saunderson 
decision. 
 
Campus Law Clinic v Standard Bank224  
 
The University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Campus Law Clinic225 launched an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court against the Saunderson judgment.226 The Campus Law Clinic 
argued that Section 27A of the Supreme Court Act and Rule 31 of the Uniform Rules 
of Court were unconstitutional as they allowed the registrar to grant an order of 
executability against immovable property.227 It also sought an order declaring that a 
court could declare immovable property executable only if the summons included a 
warning informing the debtor of his constitutional rights. The Campus Law Clinic 
submitted that the Practice Note issued after the Saunderson judgment was 
inadequate as it failed to inform the debtor of the relevance of the interests of 
dependents, and it failed to provide information on how to place information before 
the court.228 
 
The Campus Law Clinic claimed that Section 28 of the Constitution imposed an 
obligation on the State to protect and shelter the children of the nation. They 
contended that the courts, not registrars, were the upper guardians of children. 
Hence, judicial oversight was required in execution against residential property when 
children were involved. The Campus Law Clinic further argued that an execution 
order against the debtor’s home had the potential to infringe the right to human 
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dignity (section 10 of the Constitution) of not only the debtor, but also the innocent 
children, spouse, and dependents who resided in the property.229  
 
The Constitutional Court acknowledged the importance of the issues raised by the 
Campus Law Clinic. However, before these issues could be addressed, the court 
had to decide whether the Campus Law Clinic could seek direct access to the 
Constitutional Court. The court found that the application for direct access had to be 
dismissed.230 It held that it was important for the Minister, lending institutions, and 
other interested parties to have an opportunity to lodge their arguments against this 
claim. Further, with regard to the constitutional challenge against Section 27A of the 
Supreme Court Act, the court found that, since this issue was not before the High 
Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court could not grant leave 
to appeal. 
 
Comments on the Campus Law Clinic case  
 
The Campus Law Clinic case was the first case to raise the possible infringement of 
other constitutional rights, namely, sections 10 and 28, besides section 26 during 
execution against residential property. The case highlighted the fact that execution 
against a home not only had the potential to infringe the right to have access to 
adequate housing, but it also had the potential to infringe the right to dignity and the 
rights of children and other occupants of the home. These contentions were not 
made in the lower courts and it is unfortunate that these issues were not addressed 
by the Constitutional Court. The questions posed by the Campus Law Clinic in 
respect of the possible infringement of section 10 and section 28 of the Constitution 
therefore remain unanswered, and it would be interesting to see how courts would 
deal with this issue if it were posed today. 
  
Another interesting argument made in this case was that the contention by the 
Campus Law Clinic that the ruling in Saunderson of developing a Practice Note, to 
include a statement relating to Section 26 rights in the summons, was inadequate. It 
                                                 
229
 See Steyn LLD thesis, 211, referring to the affidavit of Sarah Linscott representing the Campus 
Law Clinic. 
230
 Campus Law Clinic, para 28. 
55 
 
is submitted that more information should indeed have to be provided to the debtor 
to enable him to understand the nature and consequences of foreclosure, and how 
he might avoid the forced sale of his home. The Practice Note failed to alert the 
debtor to all the rights that may be threatened during foreclosure and the possible 
defenses to the creditor’s action. Thus, the Practice Note’s requirement of merely 
alerting the debtor to his Section 26 constitutional rights is inadequate. It is submitted 
that the debtor should be provided, in the summons, with more information as to his 
rights and remedies and how these rights and remedies can be enforced.231 
 
ABSA v Ntsane 
 
In this case, the Ntsanes defaulted on their mortgage repayments. Absa initiated 
litigation and, relying on the acceleration clause in the mortgage agreement, claimed 
the full outstanding debt owing of R 62 042, 43.232 In compliance with the practice 
laid down in Mortinson, Absa filed an affidavit setting out their cause of action. The 
affidavit indicated that the arrear amount owing at that stage was R 18, 46. The 
affidavit further revealed that the mortgage had been in existence for a period of 
eight years and the Ntsanes has been in default intermittently. Absa submitted 
evidence showing that they had assisted the Ntsanes with several payment 
arrangements and showed that, over the period of eight years, there were 110 
computer recordings indicating the arrear status of the mortgage. 
 
Despite a history of erratic payments, the court was concerned with the insistence 
upon the part of the bank to proceed with litigation in light of the low arrears. No 
explanation had been provided by Absa as to why they sought execution while the 
arrear amount was so small.233 Absa’s conduct in persisting with litigation gave the 
impression that their application was unjust, and the court found the hard-
heartedness of the bank very difficult to accept.234 The court held that there would be 
irreversible prejudice caused to the debtors if execution were granted, as they would 
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potentially suffer loss of their home for the non-payment of a minute amount.235 
Taking heed of the case precedents, the court took guidance from the Jaftha, 
Saunderson and Mortinson judgments and found that: 
 
The Jaftha case confirmed that execution against a home would not be justifiable if the debt owed 
was of a trifling nature to the creditor and would result in a disastrous dispossession of one’s 
home. A court when making its decision must consider the circumstances in which the debt arose 
and the interests of both the debtor and creditor.    
 
In Saunderson, the court held that it was particularly hard to conceive of instances where a 
mortgagee’s right to execution of the property would be denied altogether:… it was more easily 
possible to contemplate a court delaying execution where there was a real prospect that the debt 
may be repaid.
236
 
 
The court found that none of the previous judgments dealt with the question of 
whether the right to enforce an acceleration clause could be refused or reviewed.237 
However, guidance could be sought from the Mortinson judgment in which it has 
held that if a small amount of arrears triggered the action against the debtor, the 
possibility of infringement against Section 26 rights is increased.238 
 
In the current matter, the interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee had to be 
balanced. These included Absa’s rights to commercial activity and the right to 
enforce its agreements, and the debtor’s right to have access to adequate housing. 
The proportionality of the harm caused to the debtor, in losing his property, had to be 
weighed against the harm that Absa would suffer if their agreements were 
commercially ineffective.239 If Absa was denied its right to enforce valid contractual 
agreements, this would not only create uncertainty, but it would also create distrust 
and lack of faith in commercial activities. Accordingly, Bertelsmann J identified the 
following factors as important to consider when balancing the interests of both 
parties: 
 
 the amount of the outstanding mortgage; 
 the value of the property; 
 the history of payments;  
 the debtor’s movable property; 
 the other debts of the debtor; 
 the arrear municipal rates and taxes; and 
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 the debtor’s income.
240
 
 
The court held that it would be difficult to imagine a ground where a creditor’s 
election to enforce acceleration would be unlawful.241 However, even if the terms of 
the loan agreement allowed for acceleration of the debt, a court would be entitled to 
refuse to grant an order of execution against the immovable property if the result 
would be seemingly iniquitous or unfair and amount to abuse of process. The court 
held that enforcing the right to execute against immovable property, when the 
arrears due were minute, would conflict with Section 26 of the Constitution.242 The 
court therefore refused the application to declare the immovable property executable 
and further refused to grant default judgment for the full outstanding debt due on the 
mortgage agreement. It did, however, grant judgment for the arrear amount due, 
namely an amount of R 18, 46.243  
 
Bertelsmann J expressed concern that courts would not be able to undertake such 
detailed investigations as the one held in this case and suggested that there was a 
need for compulsory arbitration proceedings to be introduced to resolve matters of 
this nature, informally and speedily.244 Such arbitration forums could be used as a 
platform to resolve mortgage disputes and ensure that poor home-owners are not 
deprived of a roof over their heads. The idea of compulsory mediation forums will be 
considered in Chapter Seven.  
 
Comments on the Ntsane case  
 
The main issue in the Ntsane case was whether the court was entitled to refuse a 
creditor enforcement of its right to acceleration and its real right of security to 
execute directly against the hypothecated immovable property. The court held that 
the decision by Absa to proceed to execute against the debtor’s immovable property, 
where the arrears amount was merely R 18, 46, constituted an infringement of the 
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debtor’s right to have access to adequate housing. The court found that Absa’s 
decision to proceed with litigation was morally questionable and amounted to an 
abuse of process. The Ntsane case thus illustrates a circumstance, namely abuse of 
process, when a court may deny enforcement of the mortgage agreement and deny 
the creditor his right to security.245 This can be seen as a departure from the 
Saunderson judgment in which it was found that ‘it would be hard to find instances 
where a mortgagee’s right to direct execution against immovable property would be 
denied altogether’.  
 
The Ntsane case also emphasises the need for creditors to seek alternative 
methods, such as executing against the debtor’s movable assets, prior to executing 
against the home. This can be seen as a change to the established position which 
entitled a mortgagee to seek direct execution against the hypothecated property. 
Brits and Van Der Walt claimed that this change has become necessary in light of 
our constitutional dispensation and the need to protect the right to have access to 
adequate housing.246 On the other hand, it is submitted that a mortgagee’s right to 
direct execution against the hypothecated property is fundamental to the value of 
mortgage as security and any interference with this right dilutes its function in our 
legal system. Courts should not overlook the mortgagee’s rights during foreclosure, 
and it is submitted that in Ntsane the court failed to give full effect to Absa’s rights. In 
Ntsane, despite the recurring defaults by the debtors, the court did not find any 
prejudice or loss suffered by the creditor.247 It is submitted that the court failed to 
take a detailed look into the prejudice that would be suffered by Absa. As previously 
mentioned, the refusal to enforce a mortgagee’s right to acceleration and direct 
execution would have a significant impact on the value and confidence of mortgage 
agreements as an instrument of security and investment. Creditors also have the 
potential to suffer harm if their rights are not protected, and courts must equally 
balance both debtor and creditor rights during foreclosure against a home. The 
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Ntsane judgment highlights the importance of the balancing and proportionality 
exercise required by the courts and is a prime example of how the lack of judicial 
oversight can result in abuse of process.248 In the Ntsane judgment, despite the court 
ruling that the execution process must be guided by a proportionality test in order to 
balance the rights of the parties, the court did not go far enough to set out a detailed 
proportionality test which would assist courts in making these decisions. It is 
submitted that this once again exposes the uncertainty and lack of guidelines in 
foreclosure litigation, and the undesirable effect of developing the law on a case by 
case basis alone. A clear and uniform set of rules is urgently required.249  
 
It is submitted that another valuable insight gained from the Ntsane judgment is the 
importance placed on the role of alternative dispute resolution during the foreclosure 
process. It is contended that, given the small arrear amount, alternative methods of 
resolution should have been considered to assist the debtor, such as assisting the 
debtor with the private marketing of the property, or entering into a payment 
arrangement with the debtor. These options were mentioned by the court as 
alternatives to execution and, in particular, arbitration and the need for this medium 
to be expanded in the South African foreclosure process. It is interesting to note that, 
internationally, banks and home-owners are responding to the mortgage crisis by 
engaging in mediation.250  
 
Various South African laws recognise mediation as an important tool for remedying 
disputes. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the King Code III acknowledge 
mediation as a vital tool to be employed before litigation, and the social responsibility 
placed on companies may require them to affect a reaction plan to the foreclosure 
crisis by creating mediation houses for mortgage disputes. The NCA affords the 
debtor an opportunity to consider mediation and arbitration as a means of dispute 
resolution and as an alternative to debt counseling. However, many debtors are 
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ignorant of the mediation rules and processes. It is submitted that mediation could 
play an indispensable role in saving home-ownership in South Africa. Not only will it 
serve as a quicker alternative to resolving the dispute between the debtor and 
creditor, but it is also an inexpensive remedy that will be to the benefit of both 
parties.  
 
Gundwana v Steko Development 
 
After the Saunderson decision, registrars of the High Court continued to grant orders 
of executability against homes, without any judicial oversight occurring.251 This was 
concerning, especially in light of the Jaftha decision and the amendment to section 
66 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which prohibited the clerk of the court from 
granting an order of executability against immovable property. As a result of these 
concerns, Rule 46 (1) of the High Court Rules was amended on 24 December 2010 
to restrict the registrar’s power to grant default judgment and to make orders as to 
the executability of immovable property.252  
 
Prior to the Rule 46 amendment, courts were left with two conflicting approaches. 
The first followed the Jaftha decision, which provided that execution against 
residential property could not occur without judicial oversight. The second followed 
the Mortinson and Saunderson decisions, which provided that judicial oversight was 
not required in the foreclosure process. This set the scene for the Gundwana 
judgment to become a vital case in settling this conflict.  
 
Gundwana had fallen into default on her mortgage repayments. Nedbank instituted 
foreclosure proceedings, and the registrar granted default judgment against 
Gundwana, together with an order declaring the immovable property executable. 
Nedbank did not take further legal action against Gundwana for approximately four 
years, and Gundwana remained in occupation on the property and made payments 
to the account, albeit irregularly.253 Several years later, Gundwana discovered that 
                                                 
251
 Brits, LLD thesis, 83. 
252
 This amendment was published in Government Notice R 981 of 19 November 2010 and came into 
effect on 24 December 2010. A further amendment was implemented by Rule 46A and become 
effective on 22 December 2017. 
253
 Gundwana, para 6. 
61 
 
the property was set down for sale in execution. She contacted Nedbank and they 
advised her that the mortgage was R 5 268, 66 in arrears. The outstanding balance 
owing at that stage was R 23 779, 13. Gundwana was unable to settle the arrears 
and the property was sold in execution to Steko Development CC (‘Steko’).254 
Gundwana refused to vacate the premises and Steko was forced to obtain an order 
for her eviction. After the eviction order was granted, Gundwana sought rescission of 
the default judgment taken against her by Nedbank and also sought leave to appeal 
against the eviction order. 
 
The main issue before the court was whether the registrar was empowered to grant 
a declaration of executability against a person’s home, in the general course of 
granting default judgment in terms of Rule 31 (5) of the High Court Rules. Nedbank 
argued that the present case did not fall within the ambit of the Jaftha case and did 
not require judicial oversight.255 They based their arguments on the following 
grounds: 
 
 In the current case the nature of the person and the nature of the property fell outside the 
Jaftha scope; and 
 Mortgaged property fell outside the reach of the Jaftha judgment, because mortgagors 
willingly accept the risk of losing their property when they fall into default.
256
  
 
Froneman J rejected the mortgagee’s argument and confirmed that in every case an 
enquiry was required to determine whether the facts fell within the scope of Jaftha. 
This enquiry fell beyond the registrar’s powers, and could only be carried out by a 
judge.257 Accordingly, the court made an order referring the rescission application 
back to the High Court and granted leave to appeal against the eviction order. The 
court confirmed that it was unconstitutional for the registrar to declare immovable 
property specially executable when ordering default judgment under Rule 31 (5). 
Judicial oversight is a ‘must’ in the execution process. 
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Comments on the Gundwana case  
 
Before the Gundwana case was decided, there was an expectation that the 
judgment would resolve the conflict surrounding the earlier decisions, and resolve 
the constitutional issues and disputes surrounding execution against residential 
property. However, the Constitutional Court delivered a relatively short judgment in 
which it unequivocally affirmed the need for judicial oversight in the execution 
process. The court did not deal with any issues relating to its role in assisting parties 
during foreclosure and balancing the rights of contract and security with the right to 
dignity and access to adequate housing,258 nor did it consider the impact of 
execution on other constitutional rights referred to in the Campus Law Clinic case. 
 
The Gundwana case strongly confirmed that judicial oversight was required in every 
case relating to execution against immovable property. The fact that judicial 
oversight was required did not mean that creditors were no longer entitled to execute 
against hypothecated immovable property. The introduction of judicial oversight 
merely meant that execution against immovable property must be balanced with the 
debtor’s Section 26 constitutional rights and that reasonable alternatives must be 
considered before execution is implemented. Brits submits that the requirement of 
judicial oversight does not diminish the value of mortgage, but merely serves to 
ensure that the execution process is not abused, and that a sale in execution is used 
only as a last resort. Brits contends that none of this is contrary to the traditional 
principles of mortgage law.259 
 
First Rand Bank v Folscher260 
 
The Folscher case was the first case to be heard after the Gundwana judgment. The 
Gundwana judgment was not decided on the amended Rule 46,261 therefore it was 
necessary for the Folscher case to consider the application of the amended rule. The 
full bench in the Folscher case considered the application between the Gundwana 
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judgment and Rule 46 and found that the requirement of judicial oversight was 
limited to cases where execution was sought against the debtor’s primary residence 
(home).262 Additional dwellings such as holiday homes did not fall within the ambit of 
Rule 46. The court also found that the term ‘judgment debtor’ referred to a natural 
person, and not a legal entity such as a company or trust. Further, the court held that 
the phrase ‘all relevant circumstances’ in Rule 46 (1) referred to ‘legally relevant 
circumstances’.263 
 
The court held that although it was impossible to provide a complete list of factors 
that the court must consider when hearing a foreclosure application, it laid down 
some circumstances that should be taken into account, inter alia: 
 
 whether the mortgaged property is the debtor’s primary residence; 
 the circumstances under which the debt was incurred; 
 the outstanding mortgage arrears; 
 the total amount owing on the mortgage; 
 the debtor’s payment history; 
 the financial strengths of the debtor and creditor; 
 the possibilities of the debt being paid within a reasonable time; 
 the proportionality of prejudice between the debtor and creditor; 
 whether a section 129 notice was sent and the debtor’s reaction to the notice; 
 whether the property is occupied or not; 
 whether the property was acquired by State subsidy; and 
 whether the creditor instituted action with an ulterior motive.
264
 
 
The court emphasised that not every case will require consideration of every factor, 
as each case must be looked at individually. The court confirmed that abuse of 
process will be a clear circumstance to persuade the court not to grant executability 
against the immovable property. The court also held that: 
 
It is obviously impossible to provide a list of circumstances that might be regarded as 
extraordinary which would persuade a court to decline a writ of execution. They would usually 
consist of factors that would render the enforcement of the judgment debt an abuse of 
process, which the court is obliged to prevent. An abuse of process takes place where the 
procedures permitted by the Rules of the Court to facilitate the pursuit of the truth are used for 
a purpose extraneous to that objective…. [T]he creditor’s conduct need not be willfully 
dishonest or vexatious to constitute an abuse. The consequences of intended writs against 
hypothecated properties, although bona fide, may be iniquitous because the debtor will lose 
                                                 
262
 Folscher, para 15. 
263
 Folscher, para 46. It is interesting to note that during the course of arguments it was suggested 
that a practice directive be adopted to ensure the personal service of summons. The court found this 
argument to be unwarranted as it would create uncertainty and cause delay and additional costs that 
would eventually be borne by the debtor. 
264
 Folscher, para 41. 
64 
 
his house while alternative modes to satisfy the creditor’s demands might exist that would not 
cause any significant prejudice to the creditor.
265
 
 
Comments on the Folscher case  
 
The Folscher judgment confirmed that the Gundwana judgment and Rule 46 were 
applicable only to immovable property that was the primary residence of the debtor, 
and only applied to debtors who were natural persons. The court also considered the 
concept of ‘all relevant circumstances’ within Rule 46. Rule 46 did not provide a 
definition for the term ‘all relevant circumstances’ nor did it give any indication as to 
which circumstances must be taken into account by the courts (the term ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ is wide and could potentially include a vast array of factors). The 
court concluded that ‘all relevant circumstances’ must be interpreted to mean ‘all 
legally relevant circumstances’. It is thus questionable whether the debtor’s personal 
circumstances could be taken into account in terms of Rule 46 (1).  
 
Juma submits that the term ‘all relevant circumstances’ in Rule 46 refers to the 
circumstances of the debtor (personal circumstances) rather than to the equity and 
fairness of the execution.266 Juma argues that focus on the personal circumstances 
of the debtor is important, as the debtor enjoys more legal protection than the 
creditor and the position of the debtor should be evaluated as a relevant 
circumstance. On the other hand, it is submitted that subjective factors should not be 
considered during the foreclosure process. It is submitted that an assessment of 
subjective factors will create inconsistency in the law and will delay and complicate 
proceedings. The Folscher case confirmed that the concept of ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ means ‘all legally relevant circumstances’. Thus, according to this 
judgment, circumstances do not become relevant simply for a reason that has a 
subjective effect on the debtor. It must pertain to a legal right and be legally relevant. 
The failure by the legislator to provide a definition for the term ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ once again demonstrates the lack of clarity in the foreclosure 
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process, as it is unclear which factors should or should not be considered by the 
courts.267  
 
It is submitted that another important finding made by the court in the Folscher case 
was in relation to abuse of process. One of the most common grounds for refusing 
an order of executability against immovable property will be abuse of process. This 
will usually occur when the creditor acts in bad faith and enforces the mortgage for 
an ulterior motive (as seen in Jaftha and Ntsane). However, in the Folscher case, the 
court found that the creditor need not act mala fide for there to be an abuse of 
process. The court found that if the consequences of execution are severely 
disproportionate, this will also result in an abuse of process.268 According to this 
interpretation, a bona fide creditor who complies with all the current foreclosure rules 
may be denied his right to acceleration and right to direct execution should the 
foreclosure result in disproportionality. It is submitted that this is an unfair approach, 
as a bona fide creditor should not be denied his rights merely due to the fact that the 
debtor suffers hardship should his home be sold. Abuse of process should be limited 
to instances where a party acts in bad faith. If a creditor complies in good faith with 
all the foreclosure rules, he should not be denied the opportunity to enforce his 
rights. 
 
Nedbank v Fraser 
 
The main issues before the court in Fraser were the interpretation of the term ‘all 
relevant circumstances’ in Rule 46 and the application of the acceleration clause in a 
mortgage agreement.269 The court considered the term ‘all relevant circumstances’ in 
Rule 46 and held an evaluation of the facts of each case to be required.270 Neither 
the Constitution nor the Rules of Court provided any definition for the term ‘all 
relevant circumstances’. The court held that it would be unwise to set out exact 
factors for courts to consider in the exercise of their judicial oversight, as 
circumstances, and the weight to be attached to each circumstance, vary from case 
                                                 
267
 See Chapter Three (3.3.10) for a discussion of Rule 46, Rule 46A and ‘all relevant circumstances’. 
268
 See Van Heerden, ‘Warrant of execution against immovable property’, Guide to the National Credit 
Act (loose leaf) Lexis Nexis. 
269
 Fraser, paras 1-12. 
270
 Fraser, para 14. 
66 
 
to case. The most important factors to consider will always be the circumstances 
under which the debt was incurred and the existence of other alternatives to 
execution against the home.271 The existence of reasonable alternatives will be 
determined by the attempts made by the debtor to pay the debt and the debtor’s 
resources. Although the court must safeguard against abuse, it should not impose 
too great a burden on the creditor to obtain evidence as to the debtor’s financial 
ability. The court confirmed that residential property is not placed beyond the scope 
of execution. The creditor’s right enjoys relative primacy, as, if this were not the 
case, debtors could borrow money and subsequently defeat creditors’ legitimate 
claims.   
 
The court thereafter considered the application of the acceleration clause and held 
that the mortgage agreement provides two rights to a creditor. The first is the right to 
acceleration. The second is a procedural right to execute its claim directly against 
the hypothecated immovable property.272 The court held that Section 26 of the 
Constitution applies to an ‘executive’ right of the creditor and not the right to 
acceleration. The court confirmed that the creditor’s contractual right to acceleration 
could not be interfered with. However, the right to direct execution could be limited to 
protect another’s constitutional housing rights. If courts possessed discretion to deny 
the creditor his right to acceleration, it would create uncertainty and distrust in 
commercial activities.273 Accordingly, the court found that the creditor’s right to 
acceleration is absolute and will go unchecked, despite the disproportionate results it 
may have. The court held that when a court considers a judgment and execution 
application, it must first ascertain the amount to which the creditor would be entitled, 
that is, the amount of the accelerated debt, and not just the arrear amount.274 The 
court criticised the Ntsane judgment and held that the court in Ntsane incorrectly 
focused on the arrear amount as opposed to the full outstanding amount owing.275 
The court held that the arrear amount and the full outstanding amount are two 
conceptually different figures and must not be confused.276 In the Ntsane case, the 
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decision by the court to redefine a creditor’s entitlement to accelerated payment went 
beyond the court’s powers and beyond the role of judicial oversight.277 
 
Comments on the Fraser case 
 
The Fraser judgment sought to give content to the requirements of Rule 46. The 
court emphasised the importance of considering the context and purpose of judicial 
oversight and the apparent tension of balancing two competing social values,278 one 
being the value to ensure that persons have access to adequate housing and the 
other being the value to society that valid contracts are enforced. The court held that 
the process of execution is essential to secure social order and the value of security 
rights. The existence of court structures subsist to give effect to Section 34 of the 
Constitution.279 
 
The case further confirmed that a court has discretion to prevent execution if it would 
amount to an abuse of process. However, it rejected the view that the courts had 
discretion to deny a creditor the right to acceleration. The court criticised the Ntsane 
judgment and rejected the view that judicial oversight grants the court the power to 
redefine contracts and deny a creditor his right to acceleration.280 Brits and Van Der 
Walt agree with the Fraser decision and submit that a creditor could be accused of 
abusing their right to direct execution, however, a creditor cannot be accused of 
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abusing their right to acceleration.281 In agreement, it is submitted that the right to 
acceleration is a legal, bona fide, contractual right which has long existed in our law, 
and any interference by the court to limit this right would amount to the court 
redefining contracts and overstepping its powers. Nevertheless, the Ntsane case is a 
prime example of abuse or misuse of the acceleration clause. The enforcement of an 
acceleration clause should not be upheld if it results in the unjustifiable infringement 
of Section 26. Brits and Van Der Walt are of the view that the best approach to deal 
with these matters lies somewhere in between the Ntsane and Fraser approaches. 
They submit that in cases where the creditor seeks judgment and execution where 
the arrears are low, courts should postpone the matter and allow the debtor an 
opportunity to settle the arrears and reinstate the agreement.282 In concurrence, it is 
suggested that in circumstances such as Ntsane, the court should postpone the 
matter and inform the debtor of section 129 (3) of the NCA and any other 
alternatives, such as debt review, marketing and selling the property privately, or 
entering into a payment arrangement with the creditor.283 It is further suggested that 
guidelines be established to create clarity as to when foreclosure will or will not be 
justifiable. In this respect, it is argued that a Foreclosure Act is required to provide 
rules indicating when a creditor is entitled to initiate foreclosure proceedings.284  
 
Summary of cases relating to execution against immovable property and consideration of the 
current position: Absa Bank v Mokebe 
 
The primary issue in all of the cases discussed above was whether judicial oversight 
was required during execution against immovable property. The cases also 
considered the rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee during the execution process 
and whether the mortgagee’s right to execution could ever be limited or refused. In 
Jaftha, the Constitutional Court considered the constitutionality of section 66 of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act and found that the section was unconstitutional to the extent 
that it allowed execution against a person’s home without judicial oversight. The lack 
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of judicial oversight led to the position where execution could result in 
disproportionate consequences and possibly infringe upon the debtor’s constitutional 
rights. 
 
In the Saunderson and Mortinson cases, the courts acknowledged the practical 
burden of requiring all warrants of execution for immovable property to be heard by 
the courts and held that this would over-extend the capabilities of the courts. In 
Mortinson, the court held that the limitation of Section 26 with regard to Rule 31 (5), 
which allowed the registrar to order execution against a debtor’s home, was 
reasonable and justifiable in light of Section 36 of the Constitution.285 Although the 
court held that the registrar possessed the power to declare hypothecated property 
specifically executable, a rule of practice was laid down requiring the creditor to file 
an affidavit setting forth several averments when applying for default judgment.286 
This rule was established to alert the registrar and assist him in determining whether 
there was any abuse of process. A further rule of practice was laid down requiring 
that the warrant of attachment must contain a note alerting the debtor to Rule 31 
(5)(d) and the right to set down the matter to be reconsidered by a court of law. 
 
The court in Saunderson confirmed the Mortinson judgment and held that registrars 
did possess the power to grant orders of executability, except where there were 
allegations of infringement of Section 26. In such cases the matter had to be referred 
to a judge.287 In Saunderson, another Practice Directive was set out requiring the 
creditor’s summons to alert the debtor to his Section 26 constitutional rights.288 
Despite acknowledging the importance of housing rights, and their possible 
implications for the creditor’s right to direct execution against the home, the court in 
Saunderson found it unlikely that such implication would ever defeat a mortgagee’s 
claim.289 Nevertheless, subsequent cases, namely the Ntsane and Folscher 
judgments, showed that it may be possible to limit the creditor’s rights were there is 
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an abuse of process and an unjustifiable or disproportionate infringement of the 
home-owner’s rights. 
 
The Gundwana decision, and the amended Rule 46, which became effective on 20 
December 2010, settled the conflict between Jaftha and Saunderson, and confirmed 
the position that judicial scrutiny is required during execution against all residential 
property. The decision in Gundwana ensures that the creditor’s right to direct 
execution is not unbridled or unassailable, but is subject to the scrutiny of the courts 
based on the debtor’s substantive housing rights. The purpose of judicial oversight is 
to ensure that all alternatives are pursued and that the decision reached is 
justifiable.290 It is the courts’ duty to ensure that all foreclosures remain within the 
bounds of justifiable limitation of Section 26 and Section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
The Folsher and Fraser cases confirmed that the necessity for judicial oversight 
applied only in cases where execution was sought against the principal residence of 
the debtor. The Fraser case also considered the application of the acceleration 
clause in a mortgage agreement. In Fraser, the court found that the creditor could 
not be restrained from exercising his/her right to acceleration as this was a valid, 
bona fide, contractual right. The court could not prevent a creditor from exercising 
these acceleration rights, and any order by a court which had such an effect would 
amount to the court overstepping its powers. The only right that the court could limit 
was the creditor’s right to execute against the hypothecated property, as this related 
to a constitutional right. It is still unclear, however, whether the creditor has an 
absolute right to acceleration, as several cases have found in the negative.291 
Chapter Four (4.4) will discuss the creditor’s right to acceleration in more detail and 
will consider the application of the NCA with the right to acceleration.  
 
The Folsher and Fraser judgments also found that the term ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ in Rule 46 was not defined by the legislature and confusion once 
again arose as to what factors must be taken into account when a court is 
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considering a foreclosure application.292 It is submitted that the concept of ‘all 
relevant circumstances’ in Rule 46 is vague and confusing. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that this concept should be done away with, as there is no need for the 
court to consider all and wide ranging facts and circumstances. The main factor that 
the court should consider when hearing a foreclosure matter is the bona fides of 
each party. From the debtor’s perspective, the court must consider his conduct to 
maintain the mortgage, the number of times he has been in default, and the 
alternatives he has sought, such as, inter alia, debt counselling, mediation, and 
marketing the property privately. From the creditor’s perspective, the court must 
consider its actions in assisting the debtor with payment arrangements, and assisting 
him in private marketing. The court should also consider the extent of the arrears 
and the total debt still owing. The consideration of any other factor is irrelevant and 
brings into the law a subjective element with broad ranging negative consequences 
and responsibilities. 
 
It is submitted that another important factor that must be taken into account when 
considering executability against immovable property is whether execution will result 
in an abuse of process. This may occur from mala fide behaviour by the creditor, or 
where there will be a disproportionate relationship between the purpose of execution 
and the impact on the debtor.293 Wilful abuse of process usually occurs where the 
outstanding balance or arrear amount owing is small, as seen in the Jaftha and 
Ntsane cases, or where there are several alternative ways to extinguish the debt, as 
opposed to selling the debtor’s home. However, abuse of process does not only 
entail procedural abuses, irregularities and ulterior motives.294 In Folscher, the court 
held that the creditor’s conduct need not be dishonest or vexatious to constitute an 
abuse. Execution against hypothecated property, although bona fide, may be 
iniquitous if the debtor will lose his home while alternative modes exist to satisfy the 
outstanding debt.295 It is submitted that, in practice, this may be very confusing for 
mortgagees and the above circumstances emphasise the need for clear rules to be 
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established to enable mortgagees to ascertain under what circumstances execution 
will, or will not, be justifiable.  
 
Rule 46A, which came into effect on 22 December 2017, has not provided any clarity 
on the above issues. Rule 46A fails to provide any definition for the term ‘all relevant 
circumstances’, and fails to indicate what circumstances the court should take into 
account when considering execution against immovable property. Therefore, 
confusion continues as to what ‘circumstances’ a court can or cannot take into 
account. It is submitted that the amendment by Rule 46A was an opportunity lost as 
it could have created clarity as to the exact circumstances a court must consider 
during foreclosure. 
 
As a result of the inconsistencies and lack of clarity, during September 2018, the Van 
der Linde J referred several foreclosure matters to the full bench of the South 
Gauteng High Court, in the matter of Absa Bank v Mokebe, to hear several concerns 
with Rule 46A, in particular, whether an application for monetary judgment and an 
order of executability must be brought simultaneously or separately, and whether a 
court was required to set a reserve price for a sale in execution.296 The full bench in 
Mokebe considered the history of the foreclosure process and expressed concern 
over the lack of consistency and clarity.297 
 
With regard to the issue of whether an application for monetary judgment and for an 
order of executability must be brought simultaneously, the full bench confirmed that 
the monetary judgment is an intrinsic part of the cause of action in foreclosure cases 
and is inextricably linked to the claim for an order for execution.298 The court found 
that it was both necessary and desirable for these issues to be heard simultaneously 
and not piecemeal.299 Such a process will reduce the litigation costs of hearing the 
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matters separately.300 The court further confirmed that it was the duty of the creditor 
to bring its entire case, including monetary and executability claim, before the court 
in one proceeding. Should the matter require a postponement, the entire matter falls 
to be postponed.301 
 
With regard to the issue of whether the court is required to set a reserve price for a 
sale in execution, the full bench held that, in all circumstances, the court should set a 
reserve price in all matters where the facts indicate it302 (the following section be 
consider the sale in execution process in more detail). 
 
The decision in Mokebe once again exposes the lack of consistency in the 
foreclosure process. It has been a long established practice over the decades that a 
creditor must first seek monetary judgment against a debtor, and only thereafter is 
the creditor entitled to seek execution against the debtor’s immovable property. The 
Mokebe judgment seems to have changed this practice as this ruling requires both 
monetary judgment and execution orders to be brought simultaneously before the 
court. It, however, must be noted that this judgment is only binding in the Gauteng 
jurisdiction, and it is currently being appealed by several creditors. Other 
jurisdictions, such as KwaZulu-Natal still require two separate applications, namely 
separate monetary judgment and executability applications, to be brought before the 
court. The different approaches in the different jurisdictions have catalysed the 
confusion and it is currently noted that the Western Cape High Court has also 
referred several foreclosure matters to its full bench to provide clarity on the issue.303  
 
After consideration of the case analysis above, it can be concluded that there is 
considerable uncertainty in the current foreclosure process. It is submitted that there 
is an urgent need for clarity to be established, as the current case by case 
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development of foreclosure is unfavourable.304 The lack of clarity and regulation in 
the foreclosure process creates the potential for abuse of process. An example of 
abuse of process can be seen in the sale in execution process. This process will be 
discussed below. 
 
3.4 The sale in execution process305 
 
Over the years there has been concern over the lack of governance in the sale in 
execution process. Several courts and academics306 have expressed concern about 
instances where houses were sold in execution for a fraction of their true value. 
Hence, it is increasingly important to determine whether these sales in execution are 
justifiable and fair in order to satisfy a creditor’s debt.307  
 
The case of Nxazonke v Absa Bank is just one example where a sale in execution 
resulted in the property being sold for an unrealistically low price. In Nxazonke, the 
debtor’s property was sold in execution for R 10.00 (ten rand). The outstanding debt 
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due was approximately R 28 000, and the municipal value of the property was R 
81 000.308 The court held that the municipal valuation of the property, when set 
against the fact that it was sold for only R 10.00, pointed to an inference that there 
had been a stimulated transaction and that, in the absence of any plausible 
explanation, there had been an abuse of process.  
 
The fact that a property can be sold for R 10.00 demonstrates a major problem in the 
auction process.309 Even if the court processes of judgment and execution were 
followed correctly, there is still room for abuse at a sale in execution, as properties 
are vulnerable to being sold for unrealistically low prices.310 Research revealed that 
up to 13 000 homes are sold in execution in South Africa every year, and these 
properties are usually sold for a third of their true market value.311 After the sale, the 
debtor is possibly left homeless and becomes liable for any shortfall on the mortgage 
debt. If the property were sold for a higher price, the debtor could receive a surplus 
after the settlement with his creditor, and use these funds to acquire alternative 
accommodation.  
 
Brits therefore submits that a sale in execution should seek to get as close to the 
market value of the property as possible, and should strive to leave the debtor in the 
best possible position after the sale.312 He therefore believes that the sale in 
execution process is problematic and several abuses, such as stimulated sales and 
iniquitous parties, compromise the integrity of the system.313 He contends that it is 
becoming increasingly necessary to improve the sale in execution process to avoid 
results which may be considered unconstitutional. Brits suggests that the auction 
process could be improved, and would be more constitutionally compliant, if judicial 
approval were added into the process. Brits suggests that, after a sale is concluded, 
an application be made to a court for the auction selling price to be approved before 
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the property is transferred.314 A judge would have to consider the value of the 
property and assess whether there is any indication of abuse.  
 
As a result of all the concerns surrounding the sale in execution process, the Rules 
Board for Courts of Law amended Rule 46. Rule 46A (9) of the Uniform Court Rules 
now provides that the court must consider setting a reserve price for a sale in 
execution.315 This amendment seeks to protect debtors by ensuring that homes are 
not sold for extremely low prices. If a property fails to reach its court-set reserve 
price at the sale in execution, that property will not be sold and the matter will be 
referred back to court to set another reserve price or consider alternatives to 
execution.316 Rule 46A (9), however, fails to prescribe what factors the court should 
take into consideration when determining a reserve price, or how the reserve price 
will be calculated.317 This, once again, exposes the failure by the legislature to 
provide guidance and clarity on the implementation of foreclosure rules. Further, it is 
submitted that while the setting of a reserve price for a sale in execution may 
potentially resolve the problem of homes being sold at low prices, the public 
disclosure or the setting of a reserve price by a court may reduce the potential selling 
price of the property at the sale in execution, as buyers will reduce their bidding 
prices in accordance with the court-set reserve price. 
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In the recent judgment of Mokebe, the full bench of the South Gauteng High Court 
considered the application of Rule 46A (9) and the issue of whether a court was 
required to set a reserve price for a sale in execution.318 The creditors argued that 
the setting of a reserve price will result in collusion in the auction process and further 
result in the sale of homes for lower prices. The full bench rejected this argument 
and held that the sale of property, in particular a primary residence, for a nominal 
amount due to there being no minimal reserve, was significantly detrimental to a 
homeowner.319 The court further held that should any difficulties arise when a 
reserve is set, there is no reason why the court could not be approached for a 
variation of the order making it more likely to find a buyer. The court held further that:  
 
The courts duty and power to impose a reserve is founded, inter alia, in s 26 (3) of the 
Constitution. The process of granting judgment against the homeowner is the first step that 
may lead to his or her eviction from the property. Thus a court is to consider all relevant 
factors when declaring a property specially executable… It is incumbent upon the bank to 
place all relevant circumstance before the court when it seeks an order for execution.
320
  
 
The court indicated that the creditor was required to provide the court with details as 
to the proper valuation of the property, the outstanding mortgage and municipal 
arrears and information alike.321 Such information would place the court in the 
position to determine a reserve price that would not necessarily leave the debtor 
without no debt, but rather in a position resulting from a just and equitable process. 
The full bench held that it was not possible to set out all the factors to be considered 
in each case as the reserve price will depend on the facts of each matter. The court 
accordingly found that it was appropriate to generally order a reserve price in all 
matters depending on the facts of each case. The facts of a case may convince the 
court to depart from the general practice of setting a reserve.322 Hence, save for 
exceptional circumstances, a reserve price should be set by the court in all matters 
where execution is sought against the primary residence of the debtor.323 Several 
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creditors were not happy with this decision, and it is noted that an appeal has been 
lodged against this judgment.324 
 
Despite the potential gaps and concerns, general comments from the public have 
viewed Rule 46A in a positive light. It is submitted that Rule 46A is indeed favourable 
as it has the potential to remedy the current stigma attached to the auction process. 
The previous auction process had been tarnished with allegations and evidence of 
collusion and corruption.325 In addition to the current amendments, it is 
recommended that further oversight is required by the courts in the sale in execution 
process. It is therefore suggested that all sales in execution should take place in 
court (a specialised foreclosure court), in partnership with the Sheriff and the 
Registrar of the High Court.326 This introduction of judicial oversight in the sale in 
execution process will eradicate the potential for fraud, corruption and abuse of 
process. Further, it is contended that the Constitution and rules governing judicial 
oversight compel the courts to play an active role in the sale in execution process. 
The inclusion of the courts will allow for a more uniform process, which will prevent 
any potential for abuse or manipulation. However, despite the above amendments 
and proposals, it must be accepted that sales in execution, by virtue of their nature of 
being forced sales, will not always achieve market value prices. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary that procedural checks are in place to ensure that all outcomes of the 
process are in line with our constitutional values. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The primary goal of this chapter was to consider the flaws in the foreclosure process, 
and address how these flaws may be remedied by the implementation of a 
Foreclosure Act. This chapter considered a series of cases that dealt with execution 
against a home and it was noted that there were several inconsistencies in the 
foreclosure process. From the initial case of Jaftha, it was noted that the law 
contained several lacunae as it allowed creditors to obtain judgments and orders of 
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executability against immovable property without any court oversight. This had the 
potential to lead to instances of abuse of process and unconstitutionality. The cases 
of Mortinson, Snyders and Saunderson found multiple gaps within the foreclosure 
process, thereby prompting the courts to issue several practice notes and directives 
as guidelines for foreclosure. The recent judgment of Mokebe seems to have added 
fuel to the fire as it appears to have changed the foreclosure process by requiring 
monetary judgment and executability orders to be brought in s single application. It is 
submitted that this development of foreclosure law on a case by case basis is 
unsatisfactory, as it should not be the role of the courts to set the rules for 
foreclosure. The role of developing the law is cast upon the legislature and 
consistency and clarity can only be obtained in foreclosure law if an Act is adopted 
exclusively to govern it. 
 
Some scholars are of the view that there is legislation already in place, namely the 
NCA, which governs foreclosure law and gives effect to Section 26 of the 
Constitution.327 They argue that Section 26 should be given effect, not by developing 
the common law, but by invoking the NCA, which was Parliament’s primary measure 
to address the negative consequences of foreclosure. They further believe that the 
NCA qualifies the traditional principles of mortgage and provides constitutional 
compliance and alternatives to a sale in execution.328 A contrary argument is that the 
NCA was never intended to govern execution against residential property.329 The 
NCA is badly drafted and even if it was intended to govern the foreclosure process, a 
new Act should still be created to deal with the NCA’s shortfalls. Some of the flaws in 
the NCA, and a number of judgments relating to the execution against a home after 
the coming into operation of the NCA, will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 
 
 
[When interpreting the NCA] a court is forced to go round and round in loops from subsection 
to subsection, much like a dog chasing its tail. Indeed, the language used in the Act suggests 
that foreign draftspersons rather than South African lawyers had a strong hand in preparing 
the text. Nevertheless, it is clear from reading s 3 of the NCA, which sets out the purposes of 
the Act, that it pursues varied objectives which must be held in balance. Certainly, the NCA is 
designed to protect consumers but it was not intended to make of South Africa a ‘debtors’ 
paradise’.
330
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Before the coming into operation of the NCA, the credit industry was regulated by the 
Usury Act331 and the Credit Agreements Act.332 During this time, the only debt relief 
mechanisms available to an over-indebted consumer were sequestration under the 
Insolvency Act and administration under the Magistrates’ Courts Act. The lack of 
appropriate debt relief measures left a large portion of society without adequate debt 
relief options. The NCA provided much needed relief to South African debtors, and 
many academics have hailed it as one of the most important pieces of legislation 
passed by Parliament since the Constitution.333 The NCA embodied a major legal 
development in credit law and added a new dimension to the foreclosure process.334 
The new legislation sought to curb the unregulated and harsh exercise of creditor 
rights and to achieve a realm of protection for debtors by levelling the playing field 
between the contracting parties.335 The NCA provided debtors with a framework 
which, up to that time, had not existed in South Africa, to mediate, negotiate, 
rearrange and resolve conflicts with creditors. This framework introduced a unique 
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system of debt relief into South African law by way of the debt review mechanism. 
Debt review sought to address the problem of over-indebtedness through the 
consensual restructuring of debts, which ultimately required full satisfaction of the 
debtor's financial obligations.336  
 
One of the main advantages of debt review, for the debtor, is that it places a 
moratorium on creditor debt enforcement. In other words, while a debtor is under 
debt review, a creditor is prohibited from enforcing any debt collection rights in terms 
of the credit agreement.337 Hence, the NCA has unarguably created greater 
protection for debtors than existed under previous legislation. However, protection of 
debtors is not the sole purpose of the NCA, as the Act requires a careful balancing of 
debtor and creditor rights.338 Despite the utopian intentions of the NCA, the Act has 
been the subject of a great deal of criticism, particularly in relation to its drafting and 
the different ways in which it can be interpreted. The ambiguities within the Act have 
led to a number of conflicting court decisions. These judgments will be discussed 
throughout this chapter.  
 
Due to the numerous flaws within the NCA, there has been a growing need for its 
shortcomings to be addressed. As a result, the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 
2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘NCAA’) was implemented on 13 March, 2015. While 
some of the contradictions contained in the NCA were corrected by the NCAA, 
ambiguity and inconsistency still remains. Accordingly, the main focus of this chapter 
will be to consider some of the inconsistencies within the NCA, in particular sections 
129 and 86 (10), before and after the amendments implemented by the NCAA, and 
to determine whether debt review has provided any relief to a debtor seeking to 
protect his home from foreclosure. This chapter will further provide recommendations 
as to how the current flaws in the NCA may be resolved.  
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4.2 Lack of clarity within the NCA: The section 129 notice  
 
It was not very long after the NCA came into operation that various problems were 
encountered in its interpretation and application.339 Approaches advocated by courts 
and academics were at variance with one another, leading to much controversy.340 
Several courts have held that the task of interpreting the NCA is a trying exercise, 
and they have spent many hours attempting to give proper meaning to the Act.341 
The inconsistencies which were identified prompted the NCR to apply to the court for 
a declaratory order to provide clarity on certain provisions of the Act, inter alia, 
Section 129.342 
 
Section 129 (1)(b) of the NCA provides that a creditor may not start legal 
proceedings to enforce an agreement before first providing the consumer with a 
Section 129 (1)(a) notice. Therefore, debt enforcement, including foreclosure, may 
only proceed once a Section 129 (1)(a) notice has been delivered to the debtor and 
the debtor has failed to respond to the notice within the stipulated time period. 
Section 129 can thus be described as the gateway to debt enforcement. However, 
this section does not indicate how this notice should be delivered to the debtor. 
Further, the use of the word ‘may’ in Section 129 (1)(a) brings into question whether 
compliance with the section is mandatory. Accordingly, although Section 129 may be 
considered as the most important section within the NCA, it can also be considered 
the most ambiguous from a legal point of view.343 Although some of the flaws within 
the section have been amended by the NCAA, the amendments have also created 
ambiguity. It is thus necessary to consider the position before and after these 
amendments to understand the history of challenges associated with interpreting the 
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NCA. The paragraphs below will consider some of the flaws within Section 129, and 
will also discuss the ambiguities these have created. 
 
The use of the word ‘may’ in Section 129 
 
Section 129 (1)(a) of the NCA provides that if a consumer is in default ‘the credit 
provider may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing’. The use of 
the word ‘may’ instead of the word ‘must’ implies that compliance with Section 129 is 
not compulsory. However, Section 129 (1)(b) provides that legal proceedings to 
enforce an agreement ‘may not’ commence until a Section 129 (1)(a) notice has 
been provided to the consumer. This emphasises that proper despatch of the 
Section 129 notice is essential.344 Most courts and academics maintain that sending 
the Section 129 (1) notice is compulsory.345 However, where the court finds that the 
creditor has failed to send the Section 129 notice to the debtor, this will not 
automatically invalidate the creditor’s litigation, as the courts have discretion to 
adjourn proceedings and make an order setting out steps for the creditor to take 
before the matter can be heard again.346 Accordingly, it is submitted that the sending 
of the Section 129 notice is a mandatory first step to enforcing a debt. It therefore 
must be questioned why the legislature decided to the use the word ‘may’ in Section 
129 (1) as this has created unnecessary confusion.347  
 
Although most academics agree that it is mandatory to send a Section 129 notice, 
several scholars are of the view that Section 129 (1) should be given its literal 
meaning and submit that the word ‘may’ denotes that the sending of the Section 129 
notice is voluntary and not mandatory.348 They contend that the basic rules of 
interpretation should be used when understanding the NCA, and therefore the 
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ordinary meaning should be given to words and phrases. They argue that it is clear 
from the purpose of the NCA that it was the intention of the legislature that a creditor 
‘must’ comply with section 129. The use of the word ‘may’ does not refer to the 
creditor’s decision concerning whether to meet the requirements of the section, but 
refers to the creditor’s decision whether to enforce or terminate the agreement.349 
Therefore, a creditor is not obliged to send out the Section 129 notice upon default 
by the debtor. A creditor will only be obliged to send out the notice if he or she 
wishes to enforce the agreement and proceed to litigate against the debtor. 
Accordingly, a creditor ‘may’ elect not to issue a Section 129 notice, if he or she does 
not intend to enforce the agreement. However, if the intention is to enforce the 
agreement, the creditor must deliver the notice.  
 
4.2.1 The prohibition against legal action 
 
If a debtor has already applied for debt review, a creditor is prohibited from initiating 
any debt enforcement litigation against the debtor in relation to that credit 
agreement.350 Conversely, subsections 86 (1) and (2) of the NCA provide that, if a 
creditor has already taken steps to enforce a credit agreement, such agreement 
cannot be included under debt review. There was subsequently much confusion and 
varying interpretations as to exactly what is intended by the time when a creditor 
‘takes steps to enforce a credit agreement’. Some academics and courts have held 
that this occurs when the Section 129 notice is delivered. Others were of the view 
that this occurs when the summons is issued and served. This controversy prompted 
Nedbank to approach the court, in the case reported as Nedbank v NCR, for a 
declaratory order to create clarity on this issue.  
 
In Nedbank v NCR, the court grappled with several issues of lack of clarity within the 
NCA. However, for the purpose of this thesis only the court’s interpretation of 
sections 129 (1) and 86 (2) will be considered.351 In this regard, the court had to 
consider whether delivery of the Section 129 notice amounted to a step by the 
creditor to enforce the credit agreement. The court found that one of the objectives of 
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the NCA is the provision of an accessible system of consensual dispute resolution. 
Section 129 was a provision developed to achieve this objective as it encouraged 
parties to iron out their differences before seeking court intervention. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal confirmed that the sending of the Section 129 (1) notice is the first 
step prior to legal proceedings and confirmed that once the notice has been sent to 
the debtor, that agreement would be excluded from debt review in terms of Section 
86 (2) of the Act .352  
 
However, several scholars have criticised the decision in Nedbank v NCR and have 
argued that it renders the debt review process cumbersome.353 The effect of the 
decision is that as soon as the creditor issues the Section 129 (1) notice, that credit 
agreement is excluded from debt review. It is submitted that this could not have been 
the intention of the legislature as the effect would be that the very act of notifying the 
debtor of his rights and remedies would cancel his rights and remedies. Further, the 
credit agreement to which the Section 129 notice relates may be the same 
agreement in which the debtor requires assistance with payment restructuring. 
Several academics are of the view that a debtor should be prohibited from applying 
for debt review when he is served with a summons as it is a long-established rule 
that a summons is the first step in litigation.354 On the other hand, it is argued that 
the debtor should not be given an extended time to apply for debt review. The 
creditor should not be unduly prejudiced and delayed in proceeding to enforce his 
claim. The NCA has made the Section 129 notice the first step in debt enforcement. 
Thus, it is submitted that once the Section 129 notice is sent to the debtor, and once 
the ten-day period provided for in the notice expires, the debtor is prohibited from 
applying for debt review and the creditor is entitled to proceed to issue and serve 
summons, and to enforce his claim. However, the ten-day period provided for by 
section 129 may be too short to enable the debtor to find a suitable debt counsellor 
and apply for debt counselling. It is therefore recommended that this period be 
extended to fifteen business days, which amounts to a three-week period. This 
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fifteen-day period would allow the debtor sufficient time to find a reputable debt 
counsellor and finalise a debt review application.355 
 
4.2.2 The contents of the Section 129 notice 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Nedbank v NCR confirmed that compliance with 
Section 129 is a compulsory step prior to initiating litigation. Thus, if a debtor is in 
default of his credit agreement repayments, the creditor is obliged to draw the default 
to the attention of the debtor. Section 129 prescribes that notice must be given to the 
debtor in writing and briefly stipulates what the notice must contain.356 It is submitted 
that the purpose of the Section 129 notice is four-fold: 
 
 the notice serves to bring the default to the attention of the debtor; 
 the notice alerts the debtor to the relief or mechanisms available to him, 
namely: the options to consult a debt counsellor, or to refer the matter to 
alternative dispute resolution; or to the Ombudsman; 
 the notice serves the function of a letter of demand and as a precursor to 
litigation and enforcement of the debt; and 
 the sending of the notice ensures adherence to the audi alteram partem rule, 
as it makes the other side aware of the action, gives that party an opportunity 
to respond, and requires the sender to prove compliance with the rule. In 
other words, the creditor must prove that the notice was correctly sent. 
  
Accordingly, it is suggested that the contents of the Section 129 notice must provide 
the debtor with sufficient information to enable him or her to exercise their common 
law and constitutional rights. The notice must warn the debtor that judgment may be 
taken against him, and in the case where immovable property has been 
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hypothecated, it must alert him to the fact that his home may be sold in execution. 
The notice must further provide the debtor with information about the debt relief 
options available to him, and information as to how he can exercise his rights. 
Hence, it is submitted that although Section 129 may be the first step in the litigation 
process, it is also the first step towards resolving the dispute between the parties and 
avoiding the legal costs and other disadvantages attached to litigation. Unfortunately, 
Section 129 fails to provide adequate detail concerning the required contents of the 
default notice. The legislature has provided little, if any, guidance as to the 
interpretation or content of Section 129 and there has been much uncertainty as to 
the requirements for compliance with the section. This has left both debtors and 
creditors in a vulnerable and difficult situation, being unaware of their exact rights 
and responsibilities. 
 
The case of FirstRand Bank v Maleke357 is an example of the uncertainty caused by 
a lack of clarity concerning the contents required in a Section 129 notice. This case 
involved four applications for default judgment against debtors who had fallen into 
default with their mortgage agreements by a few thousand rands.358 The court found 
that the debtors had paid their mortgages for several years (ranging between thirteen 
and nineteen years) prior to falling into default, and that they had all acquired 
valuable equity in their properties. Most of the debtors owed amounts that were 
negligible and there was a huge disproportionality in the harm that would result to the 
debtors if the properties were sold in execution, when compared to the minor 
prejudice to the creditor of being denied immediate payment.359 The court held that it 
was their duty to consider the constitutional implications of Section 26 of the 
Constitution when applying the NCA. The Section 129 notice did not explicitly warn 
the debtors that their homes would be sold if they failed to respond to the notice, as 
the NCA does not require the creditor to insert such a warning in the Section 129 
notice. However, the court held that this warning was necessary since the debtors 
were historically disadvantaged persons who might not have appreciated the 
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seriousness and consequences of the notices.360 On that basis, the debtors should 
have been informed of their Section 26 constitutional rights in the Section 129 notice. 
 
The Maleke case also exposes the fact that Section 129 of the NCA fails to indicate 
the content that must be included in the default notice when the debt in question 
relates to a mortgage agreement. The courts have provided differing views when 
attempting to resolve this.361 It has now been accepted that for the Section 129 
notice to be valid for foreclosure, it must provide the debtor with sufficient information 
to allow him or her to exercise their rights. The mortgagee is therefore required to 
inform the mortgagor of their Section 26 constitutional rights and the notice must 
contain a warning to the mortgagor that he may lose his home by way of 
execution.362 Despite this development, there is still a need for greater clarity 
concerning the content of the Section 129 letter.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the current Section 129 notice does not suffice as 
adequate notice to the debtor facing execution against his home as it fails 
adequately to inform the mortgagee of his rights and remedies in the foreclosure 
process. It is accordingly recommended that a special ‘foreclosure notice’ be 
adopted to cater for the situation where a debtor’s home is at risk of foreclosure.363  
 
4.2.3 The delivery of the Section 129 notice 
 
Section 129 requires that the notice of default must be ‘delivered’ to the debtor. The 
meaning of the word ‘delivered’ is of particular importance to the application of 
Section 129 as, if the default notice is not ‘delivered’ there will be non-compliance. 
The NCA, however, does not provide a definition of the word ‘delivered’ and this 
omission has led to a large body of litigation. Some courts have afforded an ordinary 
English meaning to the word ‘deliver’, while others have taken a more far-reaching 
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approach.364 Some of these cases will be discussed below. As indicated above, 
Section 129 is a pivotal provision in the NCA and the question as to whether the 
creditor has complied with its provisions is paramount in every case in which the 
creditor enforces a credit agreement.365 Thus, the lacuna in the NCA in failing to 
indicate how the Section 129 notice should be delivered, is a serious one.  
 
One of the other uncertainties within the NCA is the question of whether the Section 
129 notice must in fact reach the debtor in order for there to be effective delivery. 
(This is linked to the failure to provide a definition for the word ‘delivered’). The NCA 
also fails to provide any clarity on this matter. Section 129 (1)(a) merely provides that 
‘the creditor must draw the notice to the debtor’s attention in writing’. It does not 
explicitly indicate what the notice must state, how it must be delivered, nor whether 
the notice must physically reach the debtor.  
 
There has been a series of cases that have tackled this issue and it seems that each 
court has had its own interpretation of Section 129. Some cases have concluded that 
Section 129 requires the notice to reach the attention of the debtor, that is, the 
debtor must physically receive the notice in order for there to be compliance with the 
NCA. Other cases have found that the notice need not be physically received by the 
debtor and it is sufficient for the creditor merely to send the notice to the correct 
domicilium indicated in the credit agreement. Although this dispute was settled by 
the Constitutional Court in Sebola366 and by the NCAA, it is worthwhile to consider 
the history of cases leading up to the Sebola decision, as it once again provides an 
example of the lack of clarity within the NCA.  
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a. FirstRand Bank v Ngcobo367 
The Ngcobo case concerned the issue of whether Section 129 allows for the delivery 
of the default notice via email. The mortgage agreement provided that service of all 
documents could be sent by registered post to the domicilium address chosen by the 
debtor.368 While the debtor was in default, there had been several email 
communications between the parties. During most of this correspondence, the 
creditor expressed a willingness to assist the debtor and had even set up a meeting 
to discuss the debtor’s financial position.  
 
The court found that since the bulk of the communication between the parties had 
taken place by email, the debtor was at liberty to expect that the Section 129 notice 
would also be sent by email.369 In disagreement with the court’s decision, it is 
submitted that the credit agreement should take precedence when considering the 
delivery of documents. If the credit agreement stipulated a specific form of delivery, 
this must be complied with. If the debtors wanted notices to be sent by email, they 
should have stipulated this in the credit agreement. In the Ngcobo case, the creditor 
complied fully with the mortgage agreement as the Section 129 notice was sent to 
the domilicium address and there was no requirement or agreement for the bank to 
send the notice via email.  
 
The Ngcobo case thus exposes a flaw in Section 129 by not providing a specific form 
of delivery for the default notice. Nevertheless, and importantly, the case 
acknowledges that service via email may constitute valid delivery in terms of Section 
129. This is a welcome interpretation by the courts, as delivery via email should 
probably be preferred in this age of technology. It is submitted that delivery by email 
or fax is more reliable than delivery by regular post as electronic communication can 
be easily tracked and is both a cheaper and quicker means of correspondence than 
use of the postal services.370 
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b. Munien v BMW Financial Services 
In the Munien case, the court had to decide whether a default notice is ‘delivered’, in 
accordance with Section 129, if it is sent by registered post to the chosen domicilium, 
irrespective of whether or not it comes to the debtor’s attention.371 The court 
confirmed that the mere sending of the notice amounted to effective delivery and 
there was no need for the addressee to actually receive the notice for there to be 
compliance with Section 129.372 The court held that a balance had to be struck 
between creditors and debtors when it came to sending notices. The cost involved 
for creditors of ensuring that notices actually reached debtors would be substantial, 
and these costs would inevitably be borne by the debtor. Thus, it is not against the 
objectives of the NCA to hold that a creditor discharges his obligation of delivery by 
sending the notice to the domicilium address by registered post, or even by fax or 
email.373  
 
c. FirstRand Bank v Dhlamini374  
 
The Dhlamini case involved an application for summary judgment by FirstRand 
Bank. The bank had sent the Section 129 notice by registered post to the debtor’s 
chosen domicilium address. The notice was never collected by the debtor. In 
determining whether there had been compliance with Section 129, the court looked 
at two conflicting preceding cases, namely, the Prochaska and Munien judgments:375 
 
[In Prochaska, Naidu J held that the] section 129 (1) notice represents a radical departure 
from its predecessor. Whereas the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 merely requires the 
credit grantor to post by prepaid registered mail and, in this way, "has notified the credit 
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receiver" of default, the present Act in section 129(1)(a) creates an obligation on the credit 
provider (when it decides to take such a course) to draw the default to the notice of the 
consumer in writing.... The words 'draw the default to the notice of the consumer', 'providing 
notice' and 'delivered a notice' in the context in which these appear in the previous paragraph 
to my mind cumulatively reflect an intention on the part of the legislature to impose upon the 
credit provider an obligation which requires much more than the mere dispatching of the 
notice contemplated by section 129(1)(a) to the consumer in the manner prescribed in the Act 
and the regulations. The credit provider is required, in my view, to bring the default to the 
attention of the consumer in a way which provides an assurance to the court that the default 
has indeed been drawn 'to the notice of the consumer'.
376
 
 
[In Munien, Wallis J rejected the contention that the Section 129 (1) had to come to the 
attention of the consumer and] held that provided the credit provider delivered the notice in 
the manner chosen by the consumer in the agreement, it is irrelevant whether the notice in 
fact came to the attention of the consumer.
377
 
 
In Dhlamini, Murphy J criticised Wallis J’s interpretation in Munien, and held that 
Wallis J incorrectly considered Section 65’s application to Section 129. The correct 
question to be asked when considering compliance with Section 129 was not 
whether the notice had been ‘delivered’, but whether ‘the creditor has drawn the 
notice to the attention of the debtor’. In Munien, the court incorrectly focused on the 
word ‘delivered’ in section 130 (1), when determining whether there was compliance 
with Section 129 (1).378 Murphy J therefore concurred with Naidu J’s interpretation in 
Prochaska, and held that: 
 
Section 129(1)(a) does not require a letter to be "delivered" to the consumer, or a notice to be 
served, it requires that the consumer's default be brought to his or her notice (attention) in 
writing. While of necessity some form of delivery or service will be needed to draw notice to 
the default, such alone is not enough. There must be delivery (or service) as well as notice or 
attention being drawn to the default.
379
 
 
d. FirstRand Bank v Bernado380 
 
In Bernado, the creditor had sent the Section 129 notice via registered post and 
telefax to the debtors. The debtors claimed that Section 129 had not been complied 
with as the notice had not reached their attention. The court in Bernado followed the 
approach in Munien and held that the fact that the notice was not received by the 
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debtor did not mean that the notice was not delivered.381 The court found that the 
creditor had complied with his obligations by sending the notice by registered mail to 
the actual residential address of the debtor. Proof of delivery that the notice had 
been sent was sufficient to proceed with legal action. No greater onus was placed on 
the creditor.382 The fact that the debtor received or read the notice was irrelevant. 
 
e. Rossouw v FirstRand Bank 
 
The Rossouw case involved an appeal against a summary judgment order granted 
by the High Court. The debtors claimed that they had not received the Section 129 
notice and argued that the bank was not entitled to judgment.383 The High Court 
followed the Munien judgment and held that effective delivery of the Section 129 
notice occurs when the notice has been sent by registered post to the address 
chosen by the debtors, irrespective of whether it is actually received by the debtor.384 
The debtors appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
The Supreme Court found that the creditor did not indicate in their summons or 
judgment application the method used in delivering the notice. FirstRand merely 
alleged that they had complied with Section 129 and Section 130. The bank failed to 
supply any evidence that the notices had been sent, and the court was left to 
speculate whether there had been compliance with Section 129. The court held that 
this was not sufficient and declined to grant the summary judgment.385 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal further held that since the NCA expressly gives the debtor the option 
of selecting the mode of delivery of notices, it seems reasonable that the debtor 
should carry the risk of the notice going astray.386 Therefore, it was not necessary for 
the Section 129 notice to actually reach the debtor.387 Accordingly, the court in 
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Rossouw followed the Munien and Bernado approach and found that the creditor 
had complied with Section 129 if the notice had been correctly sent to the debtor. 
However, if the creditor failed to supply the court with any evidence that the notice 
had been sent, the creditor would not be successful in his/her application.388 
 
f. Starita v Absa Bank 
 
The Starita case dealt with rescission of a default judgment. The debtor argued that 
the creditor had failed to comply with Section 129 and claimed that she never 
received the Section 129 notice or the summons.389 The court considered the 
preceding cases and the sections in the NCA relating to the delivery of 
documents.390 Gautschi AJ criticised the court’s interpretation in the Dhlamini case, 
and held that the court in Dhlamini assumed that the words in the NCA were used 
with precision. However, it is a generally accepted fact that the Act was badly 
drafted. Therefore, undue emphasis should not be placed on the actual words in the 
NCA. Gautschi AJ held that creditors should not be burdened by ensuring actual 
receipt of notices by debtors.391 The Act does not require personal service of notices 
upon the debtor, and this is an indication of the legislature’s desire to balance the 
interests of both parties. Accordingly, the Section 129 notice does not need to be 
actually received by the debtor. It is sufficient for the notice to be sent by registered 
post to the domicilium. To require more, places far too heavy a burden on the 
creditor.392 
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g. Sebola v Standard Bank 
 
In Sebola, Standard Bank sent a Section 129 notice to the debtor via registered post. 
However, the postal services diverted the notice to an incorrect post office, and the 
debtors never received the notice. Summons was served and default judgment was 
granted against the Sebolas. The debtors applied for rescission of the default 
judgment on the ground that they had not received the Section 129 notice or the 
summons.393 The High Court found itself bound by the Rossouw decision and 
dismissed the rescission application. The Sebolas appealed to the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the purpose of the NCA is pursued 
through the consensual resolution of disputes and Section 129 plays an essential 
role in achieving this objective. Cameron J held that when considering Section 129:  
 
[T]he statute does not demand that the credit provider prove that the notice has actually come 
to the attention of the consumer, since that would ordinarily be impossible. Nor does it 
demand proof of delivery to an actual address. But given the high significance of the section 
129 notice, it seems to me that the credit provider must make averments that will satisfy the 
court from which enforcement is sought that the notice, on balance of probabilities, reached 
the consumer.... Hence, when the notice is posted, mere despatch is not enough.... The 
statute requires the credit provider to take reasonable measures to bring the notice to the 
attention of the consumer, and make averments that will satisfy a court that the notice 
probably reached the consumer, as required by section 129(1). This will ordinarily mean that 
the credit provider must provide proof that the notice was delivered to the correct post 
office.
394
 
 
Thus, Sebola added a requirement to Section 129 and placed a duty upon the 
creditor to prove that the notice was despatched to the debtor’s domicilium. This was 
similar to the finding in the Rossouw case.395 It is submitted that the court might have 
been inclined to add this requirement in Sebola as in this case the notice was sent to 
an incorrect post office.396 Several academics are of the view that the Constitutional 
Court went too far with the additional compliance requirement in Section 129 and 
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argue that the Sebola judgment did not create any certainty.397 Several scholars 
contend that delivery by registered mail allows the debtor to avoid receipt of the 
notice and to circumvent enforcement of the creditor’s rights.398 Fuchs and Otto each 
contend that the compliance requirement in Sebola is superfluous and complicates 
the interpretation of the NCA, as it does not take into consideration a well-balanced 
approach. Otto argues that the new evidentiary burden of proof is unfair and 
unnecessary, and does not promote an effective and accessible credit market and 
industry. Fuchs is of the view that the Rossouw judgment followed a more 
reasonable approach to Section 129, and suggests that all Section 129 notices must 
be delivered by registered post and ordinary mail to the domicilium address.399 This 
will cater for a situation where a debtor intentionally ignores the notice. In addition, 
Eiselen and Otto have each made suggestions to assist creditors with the Sebola 
requirements.400 They submit that a creditor can reduce the increased burden upon 
them by providing proof of delivery of the notice via alternative forms such as fax and 
email. In concurrence, it is submitted that it is becoming increasingly important for 
technology to be included within the law. Delivery via email or fax is a much quicker, 
cheaper and more reliable mechanism, and delivery by these media should be 
encouraged by the courts.  
 
h.  Kubyana v Standard Bank401 
 
This case dealt with the issue of what steps the creditor must take in order to ensure 
that the Section 129 notice reaches the debtor before commencing litigation. In 
Kubyana, the creditor sent a Section 129 notice via registered post to the address 
nominated as the domicilium in the credit agreement. According to the post office’s 
track and trace reports, the notice reached the correct post office, and the post office 
sent a notification to the debtor. The debtor failed to collect the notice and the post 
                                                 
397
 See Fuchs, PELJ, 387, and Otto and Otto, National Credit Act Explained (2013) 117-118 referring 
to Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize and Another 2012 (5) SA 574 (KZD) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Mkhize’). 
398
 See Fuchs, PELJ, 389, Otto and Otto, National Credit Act Explained (2013) 114, and Eiselen, 
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law. 
399
 Fuchs, PELJ, 387. 
400
 See Otto and Otto, National Credit Act Explained (2013) 114, and Eiselen, Journal of 
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law. 
401
 Kubyana v Standard Bank 2014 (3) SA 56 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kubyana’). 
97 
 
office returned the unclaimed Section 129 notice to the bank.402 The bank served 
summons and the debtor defended the matter. The debtor claimed that the bank had 
failed to comply with Section 129’s requirements, as the notice had been returned 
unclaimed, which showed that there had not been proper delivery.403  
 
The High Court found that there was no obligation on the creditor to use additional 
means to ensure that the debtor received the notice. It was clear that the debtor did 
not collect the notice and the debtor had a duty to explain to the court why the notice 
did not reach him despite the bank’s efforts.404 The debtor was unhappy with this 
decision and applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal. The 
Constitutional Court found that there were a vast number of conflicting decisions 
regarding the interpretation of Section 129. Therefore, it was necessary to ensure 
certainty and the proper functioning of the marketplace for the rights and obligations 
of creditors to be made clear. The court held that: 
 
[T]here is no general requirement that the notice be brought to the consumer’s subjective 
attention by the credit provider, or that personal service on the consumer is necessary for 
valid delivery under the Act.... While the section 129 obligation on the credit provider is to 
draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing, this obligation is discharged, in the 
words of section 65 (2), by making the document available to the debtor.
405
 
 
If the credit provider complies with the requirements set out in [the NCA] and receives no 
response from the consumer within the period designated by the Act, I fail to see what more 
can be expected of it. Certainly, the Act imposes no further hurdles and the credit provider is 
entitled to enforce its rights under the credit agreement. It deserves re-emphasis that the 
purpose of the Act is not only to protect consumers, but also to create a “harmonised system 
of debt restructuring, enforcement and judgment, which places priority on the eventual 
satisfaction of all responsible consumer obligations under credit agreements.” Indeed, if the 
consumer has unreasonably failed to respond to the section 129 notice, she will have 
eschewed reliance on the consensual dispute resolution mechanisms provided for by the Act. 
She will not subsequently be entitled to disrupt enforcement proceedings by claiming that the 
credit provider has failed to discharge its statutory notice obligations.
406
  
 
Mhlantha AJ concluded that the question whether delivery has been effected in 
accordance with the Act is a question that must be determined by evidence. A debtor 
who receives notice from the post office but decides not to collect the notice should 
not be permitted to frustrate the purpose of the provisions to the detriment of the 
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creditor.407 The court was not prone to an interpretation that would make it 
impossible for creditors to recover their debts and create a position where debtors 
could escape their creditors by avoiding notices. The debtor’s failure to explain why 
he did not respond to the post office’s notice created the inference that he 
deliberately avoided the notice. Such a mala fide debtor was not entitled to any 
protection.  
 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the aim of Section 129 is to create a 
framework between the creditor and debtor in order to resolve mortgage arrears in 
an inexpensive, non-acrimonious and expeditious manner without recourse to the 
courts.408 It is submitted that the object of Section 129 can only be realised if both 
parties work together in good faith to resolve the default. The debtor is required to 
collect the Section 129 notice and liaise with his creditor to rectify the default. 
Likewise, the creditor is required to act in good faith by assisting the debtor with 
payment arrangements and not proceeding hastily or prematurely with litigation. 
Hence, should any of the parties fail to adhere to their duties in good faith the court 
should not come to their protection.409 
 
i. Summary of cases and comments on delivery of the Section 129 notice 
 
Following the case analysis above, it is submitted that the NCA provides little 
guidance to the requirements for delivering the Section 129 notice to a debtor. First, 
the use in the section of the word ‘may’ makes it questionable whether delivery of the 
notice is mandatory. Secondly, the failure on the legislator to include a definition for 
the term ‘delivered’ has created unnecessary legal uncertainty. Several courts have 
attempted to interpret the meaning of Section 129 and differing decisions have 
resulted. The conflict appears to have been resolved by the Sebola judgment, which 
confirmed that Section 129 requires the notice to be delivered to the debtor by 
registered post and the creditor must supply proof that the notice was delivered to 
the correct post office.  
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The NCAA appears to have codified the Sebola approach.410 It is submitted that this 
is a fair approach and balances the interests of debtors, creditors and society. It 
does not place upon the creditor any additional requirements or a requirement for 
personal delivery.411 The Kubyana and Mkhize cases cater for the situation when a 
mala fide debtor refuses to accept delivery of the notice. In such an instance, there 
will still be compliance with Section 129 if the notice is sent to the correct domicilium. 
The courts have confirmed that if a creditor sends the notice to the correct post office 
and the debtor fails to uplift the notice, the negligence or intentional default of the 
debtor should not be allowed to constitute a valid defence against the creditor’s 
foreclosure.412  
 
Despite the above judicial and legislative developments, it is submitted that there is 
still a need for clarity in respect of the Section 129 notice. In particular, it is submitted 
that the current Section 129 notices fail to cater adequately for foreclosure 
proceedings, nor do they inform a mortgagor of all his remedies, such as the right to 
reinstatement in terms of section 129 (3).413  Accordingly, it is suggested that a 
specific ‘foreclosure notice’ be implemented to cater for foreclosure proceedings. 
The contents of this proposed foreclosure notice will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
4.3 Lack of clarity within the NCA: Section 86 (10) - termination of debt review 
 
Another example of lack of clarity within the NCA is in Section 86 (10), which relates 
to the termination of debt review. The termination of debt review has serious 
consequences for both the debtor and creditor. Once debt review is terminated, the 
debtor loses his moratorium against debt enforcement, and the creditor is entitled to 
proceed with litigation against the debtor. The NCA has, however, failed to provide 
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clear rules for the termination of debt review, and this has created much confusion. 
Some of the flaws in the termination of debt review are discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Contradictions in the termination process - ‘termination after the lapse of sixty business 
days’ 
 
Section 86 (10) provides, inter alia, that where the creditor seeks to enforce an 
agreement that is under debt review, the creditor may terminate the review after the 
lapse of sixty business days from the date of the debt review application. The 
creditor is thereafter entitled to enforce the agreement once ten business days have 
lapsed after delivery of the Section 86 (10) notice. Section 86 (10), however, does 
not set out specific grounds for the termination of the debt review. The NCA merely 
requires that the Section 86 (10) notice must be delivered to the debtor, the debt 
counsellor, and the NCR, prior to enforcement (this is similar to the problems 
exposed with the Section 129 notice).  
 
Due to the lack of clarity in Section 86 (10) of the NCA there have been varying 
interpretations of this section. Van Heerden and Coetzee believe that Section 86 
(10), read together with Section 86 (6) and regulation 24 (6), provides that the debt 
counsellor has sixty business days to fulfil his duties in terms of the debt review 
application.414 In other words, the debt counsellor has thirty business days to make a 
determination as to the debtor’s financial status, and a recommendation to court 
must be made within thirty business days thereafter. It is unclear whether Section 86 
(10) allows the creditor to terminate debt review after the sixty day period if the 
matter is pending before the court.415 This question is particularly important when 
considering the backlog experienced in the Magistrates’ Courts. Steyn has indicated 
that, given the delays and backlogs experienced at Magistrates’ Courts, it is highly 
likely that a debt review application will take longer than sixty business days to be 
heard and finalised in court.416 
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A pending debt review has serious legal consequences for both the debtor and 
creditor. First, debt review bars the debtor from entering into any further credit 
agreements. Secondly, it creates a moratorium on debt enforcement.417 Several 
scholars submit that Section 129 (2) provides that Section 86 (10) is not applicable to 
proceedings in a court that can result in a debt restructuring order, and once a debt 
counsellor refers the matter to court, it qualifies as such proceedings. They submit 
that once referral to the court is made by the debt counsellor, such proceedings can 
no longer be construed as a Section 86 process.418 Hence, once the matter is 
referred to a court in terms of Section 86 (7) and 86 (8), the creditor’s opportunity to 
terminate debt review comes to an end, as it cannot be said that the credit 
agreement ‘is being reviewed’ in terms of Section 86. 
 
Once again, case law has not provided any clarity on this issue – in fact it has 
created further confusion.419 In Standard Bank v Kruger,420 Kathree-Setiloane AJ 
held that: 
 
[O]nce a debt review is referred, by a debt counsellor with recommendations, to the 
Magistrate’s Court for consideration, in terms of section 86(8)(b) of the Act, it falls within the 
ambit of section 87 of the Act and not section 86 of the Act. Accordingly, any termination of 
the debt review, in terms of 86(10), would be unlawfull.... [O]nce a debt review has been 
referred to the Magistrate’s Court for consideration, the “debt review” process, as conducted 
in terms of section 86 of the Act ends, and the matter becomes, simply put, a review before 
the Magistrate’s Court.
421
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In the Kruger case, it was held that the only review process that could be terminated 
in terms of Section 86 (10) was the review undertaken by the debt counsellor. Any 
contrary interpretation which allowed the creditor to terminate debt review after sixty 
days, despite the matter being referred to the magistrates’ court would lead to 
absurdity as it would deprive the debtor of the opportunity to have the matter 
properly determined by the court.422 However, in the case of SA Taxi Securisation v 
Nako,423 Kemp AJ criticised the Kruger judgment and held that during the debt 
review process the rights of both the debtor and creditor must be balanced.424 He 
criticised the reasoning in Kruger and held that the court had failed to take into 
account the provisions of Section 86 (11) of the NCA which allow the court to order 
the resumption of debt review.425 Kemp AJ therefore found that Section 129 (2) did 
not preclude the creditor from instituting legal proceedings where the debt counsellor 
had referred the matter to court.426 In FirstRand Bank v Evans,427 the court 
considered the conflicting judgments of Kruger and Nako. The court followed Kemp 
AJ’s interpretation in Nako and found that the duty of the debt counsellor in terms of 
Section 86 is not extinguished by referral of the debt restructuring proposal to the 
creditor and the court. Thus, the creditor’s right to terminate debt review in terms of 
Section 86 (10) continues until the court has made an order in terms of Section 
87.428  
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In the subsequent case of Collett v FirstRand Bank,429 the Supreme Court 
considered a number of judgments in making its decision whether the creditor could 
terminate debt review prior to the matter being set down before a magistrate. The 
court considered the decision of FirstRand Bank v Papier,430 which held that: 
 
[T]he right of a credit provider to terminate the debt review is forfeited once the debt 
counsellor brings an application to the Magistrate’s Court in terms of ss 86(7) and 87. The 
argument was that because the debt counsellor has a period of 30 days within which to 
determine whether the consumer appears to be over-indebted, and the consumer a further 20 
days, in the event of a finding that he is not over-indebted, to apply directly to the Magistrate’s 
Court in terms of s 86(9) for an order contemplated in s 86(7)(c), the 60 day period was 
introduced to allow either the debt counsellor or the consumer sufficient time to approach the 
Magistrate’s Court as aforesaid. I do not think that s 86 requires the consumer or his debt 
counsellor to ‘approach the court’ within the period of 60 days. Indeed no time period is 
specified within which the debt counsellor must make application to the Magistrate’s Court. 
Nor does the NCA require the process of debt re-structuring to be complete within the period 
of 60 days after the application was made. To do so would obviously be unrealistic.
431
 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Collett confirmed the Papier judgment and held that 
the NCA did not require the debt restructuring to be complete within a sixty day 
period after application to the debt counsellor.432 Section 86 (5) requires the creditor 
and the debtor to act in good faith during debt review negotiations and this places a 
duty on the creditor not to terminate the debt review prematurely while the matter is 
pending at court.433 A debtor would have good reason to raise the termination of the 
debt review as evidence of the creditor’s bad faith. This fact would not be a defence, 
but it may be sufficient for the court not to grant judgment and to exercise 
discretion.434  
 
Brits submits that the most important principle developed in Collett was the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s confirmation that the creditor has a duty to participate in good faith 
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during debt review negotiations. The conduct of the parties is an important factor that 
the court would take into consideration when determining whether judgment should 
be granted or whether the court should exercise discretion in terms of Section 86 
(11), and allow for the resumption of debt review.435 Therefore, although over-
indebtedness cannot be regarded as a bona fide defence to a foreclosure 
application, it can be used as an opportunity for the court to exercise discretion in 
terms of Section 85 and 86 (11).436 When exercising discretion, the court will take 
into account the conduct, bona fides, of the parties and the economic reality of debt 
review being a relief to a debtor. Once again, the NCA does not indicate the exact 
factors the court must consider when exercising its discretion. Section 86 (11) merely 
indicates that the court may order resumption if it is deemed just in the 
circumstances. Hence, it appears that even if the creditor lawfully terminates debt 
review, the court may order the debt review process to resume. It is submitted that 
this may be an incorrect approach, as it affords the debtor a second opportunity of 
debt review, which may be prejudicial to the bona fide creditor. It is submitted that 
the main aim of Section 86 (11) is to assist a debtor where termination has occurred 
unlawfully, incorrectly or where the creditor has acted mala fide, and not when the 
termination was valid. 
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In summary, the court in Kruger initially held that the creditor was not entitled to 
terminate debt review while the matter was pending before the court. However, in the 
subsequent cases of Nako, Evans, Seyffert, and Collett it was held that the creditor 
was not precluded from terminating debt review while the matter was pending before 
the court. These cases found that any termination by the creditor did not prejudice 
the debtor as the debtor could still refer the matter to court in terms of Section 86 
(11) of the NCA. The interpretations in Nako, Evans, Seyffert, and Collett led to a 
situation where a debtor may be deprived of exercising his right to debt counselling 
by premature termination by the creditor. The NCAA has remedied this situation by 
amending Section 86 (10)(b) to the effect of providing that ‘no creditor may terminate 
an application for debt review in terms of the Act, if such application for review is 
already filed in court or in a tribunal’. This seems to have resolved the problem of 
creditors terminating pending debt review applications.437 While this amendment may 
resolve the problem of premature termination by creditors, it creates another 
loophole in the debt review process. In practice, a debt review application can take 
up to three to four months before being heard in court, and according to the NCAA a 
creditor is not allowed to terminate the debt review, or proceed with debt 
enforcement litigation, even if no payments are being received from the debtor. This 
appears to be an anomaly created by the NCAA, and it is suggested that exact time 
lines be put in place to protect the interests of creditors. 
 
4.3.2 Termination of debt review without sending the Section 86 (10) notice 
 
Section 86 (10) provides that the creditor ‘may’ give notice to terminate the debt 
review. As indicated earlier, the use of the word ‘may’ is susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, which is similar to the problem exposed in relation to Section 
129.438 Further, Section 86 (10) may be interpreted to mean that the sending of the 
Section 86 (10) notice does not actually terminate debt review, but merely serves as 
a notice of the intended termination. Case law and academia have provided different 
views on this issue, as some courts and academics have held that Section 86 (10) 
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merely serves as a notice of intention to terminate,439 while others have held that the 
notice itself terminates the debt review.440  
 
Another issue is whether or not the creditor is compelled to issue a Section 86 (10) 
termination notice before initiating debt enforcement. This is linked to use of the word 
‘may’. In Ferris v FirstRand Bank,441 the Constitutional Court considered the issue of 
whether the creditor is required to send a section 86 (10) when a debtor has 
defaulted on a debt rearrangement order. The court found that the creditor was not 
required to send a Section 86 (10) when terminating debt rearrangement order and 
held that: 
 
... a court may rescind a default judgment if it is erroneously sought or erroneously granted. 
But there is no error in the default judgment. Mr and Mrs Ferris breached the debt-
restructuring order. Once the restructuring order had been breached, FirstRand was entitled 
to enforce the loan without further notice. This is clear from the wording of the relevant 
sections of the Act. Section 88 (3)(b)(ii) does not require further notice – it merely precludes a 
credit provider from enforcing a debt under debt review unless, amongst others, the debtor 
defaults on a debt-restructuring order. Moreover, section 129 (2) expressly stipulates that the 
requirement to send a notice under section 129 (1) is not applicable to debts subject to debt-
restructuring orders. The wording of the debt-restructuring order itself indicates that the 
original loan will be enforceable without more notice if the debt-restructuring order is breached
 
.
442
  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Jili v FirstRand Bank443 followed the Ferris 
judgment and held that the breach of a debt restructuring order entitles the creditor 
to enforce the credit agreement without further notice.444 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Jili found that if every creditor were required to give notice to the debtor, or 
rescind the debt rearrangement order, for breach of the debt rearrangement order 
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 See Roestoff and Van Heerden, De Jure 147-148, and Van Heerden and Coetzee, PELJ (2011), 
40. Roestoff and Van Heerden submit that section 86 (10) does not terminate debt review as soon as 
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440
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before applying for judgment, it would create a potentially never ending ‘merry go 
round’. Therefore, a debt rearrangement order that had been breached did not need 
to be set aside before the creditor could seek to enforce its claim.445 
 
Van Heerden and Coetzee agree with the decisions in Ferris and Jili and submit that, 
where the debtor defaults on the debt restructuring order, a Section 86 (10) notice is 
not required prior to debt enforcement.446 On the other hand, it is submitted that the 
debtor must be provided with the Section 86 (10) notice upon termination of debt 
review. The Section 86 (10) notice informs the debtor of the creditor’s intention to 
terminate debt review and initiate litigation. The termination notice further makes the 
debtor aware of his rights, remedies and options to rectify his default. Hence, it is 
submitted that the termination of debt review without providing the debtor with a 
Section 86 (10) notice, should be considered to be an unlawful termination. 
Legislative intervention is required to correct this position. 
 
4.4 Subsections 129 (3) & (4) of the NCA: the right to reinstatement 
 
4.4.1 An overview of the right to reinstatement 
 
As indicated in Chapter Two, the application of the law of contract and general 
mortgage practice allows for the mortgagee, upon default by the mortgagor, to claim 
the entire debt outstanding in terms of the mortgage agreement. This claim and the 
amount are stipulated in the mortgagee’s summons and are initiated by enforcement 
of the acceleration clause.447 The acceleration clause in the mortgage agreement 
allows the creditor to obtain judgment against the defaulting debtor for the full 
outstanding debt, and not just the arrear amount.448  
 
The enforcement of the acceleration clause has, however, become much stricter 
since implementation of the NCA, as there have been instances where the creditor 
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 Jili, para 25. 
446
 Van Heerden and Coetzee, PELJ (2011), 48-50. See also Roestoff and Van Heerden, De Jure, 
153-157. 
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 Brits, ‘Purging Mortgage Default: Comments on the right to reinstate credit agreements in terms of 
the National Credit Act’, Stell LR (2013) (1), 165, 168 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Brits, Stell LR 
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may be denied his right to acceleration.449 The debtor’s right to reinstatement, 
provided for in Section 129 (3) of the NCA, may be seen to be in conflict with the 
creditor’s right to acceleration. A debtor may dilute the force of the acceleration 
clause, by settling the arrears, default and enforcement costs due in terms of Section 
129 (3), and defeat the creditor’s accelerated claim. In other words, once an 
agreement is reinstated by the debtor settling the arrears, default and enforcement 
costs due, the debtor’s record is wiped clean, and any judgment taken against the 
debtor for the outstanding balance in consequence of the acceleration clause is of no 
force and effect.450 Reinstatement thus allows the debtor to escape the full 
consequences of the acceleration clause by simply settling the arrears, default and 
enforcement costs. Brits has contended that once an agreement is reinstated any 
judgment or execution order taken against the debtor or the property falls away, and 
the agreement will continue to operate as if no default occurred. Should the debtor 
default after reinstatement, the creditor is required to initiate fresh proceedings, and 
issue a new Section 129 (1) notice, summons and judgment.451 Brits therefore 
contends that the right to reinstatement is a specific form of debt relief introduced by 
the NCA, as it provides a way to prevent and even reverse debt enforcement.452 Brits 
believes that the right to reinstatement fills the current gap in the system as it 
reverses the socio-economic effects of the creditor’s enforcement action.  
 
The right to reinstatement in the NCA involves two aspects. Section 129 (3) allows 
the debtor to reinstate the agreement subject to the fulfilment of certain 
requirements, namely, settlement of the arrears, default and enforcement costs. 
Section 129 (4) delineates the limits of the right and the stages at which 
reinstatement is no longer available. As with many of the sections within the NCA, 
subsections 129 (3) and (4) have been the subject of much controversy. The two 
main aspects of this controversy are: when is the debtor entitled to exercise the right 
                                                 
449
 See Brits, ‘The reinstatement of credit agreements: Remarks in response to the 2014 amendment 
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to reinstatement? and, does the right to reinstatement overturn all litigation taken by 
the creditor? 
 
With regard to the uncertainty over a debtor’s right to reinstatement, Section 129 (3) 
provided that a debtor may at any time, before the creditor has cancelled the 
agreement, reinstate the agreement by paying all amounts overdue, together with 
default and enforcement charges.453 The effect of Section 129 (3) is to permit 
reinstatement even after judgment.454 Section 129 (4), however, does not permit 
reinstatement after ‘execution’. There have been varying interpretations as to when 
‘execution’ takes place. However, it is now confirmed that execution occurs ‘after the 
sale and transfer of ownership and receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the 
property.’455 Thus, it appears that the purchaser at the sale in execution purchases 
the property subject to the debtor’s statutory right of reinstatement.456 It is submitted 
that this interpretation is unfavourable as the application of Section 129 (3) should be 
limited to prior to the sale in execution. In other words, once the property is sold in 
execution, in particular, upon the fall of the hammer at the Sheriff’s sale, the debtor 
should lose his right to reinstatement. The innocent buyer who purchases the 
property at the sale in execution should not be subject to Section 129 (3) as, if this 
were so, it would have the negative effect of deterring bidders at the sale in 
execution and reducing even further the prices obtained at auction.457 
 
With regard to the issue of whether reinstatement has the effect of overturning 
litigation taken by the creditor, it has become accepted that reinstatement does have 
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 Please note that section 129 (3) has been amended. The amended subsection will be discussed in 
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the effect of reversing legal process. However, in practice, there has been criticism 
about this approach and the consequence that reinstatement invalidates any 
judgment or attachment lawfully granted in favour of the creditor. In Nkata, the 
Constitutional Court considered the application of subsections 129 (3) and (4) and 
cleared up the contradictory interpretations of these sections. This case will be 
discussed in detail below. 
 
4.4.2 Nkata v FirstRand Bank 
 
In Nkata, the mortgagor defaulted on her mortgage repayments and FirstRand sent 
two Section 129 (1) notices to her. Both these notices were posted to incorrect 
addresses, thus none of the notices reached Nkata. FirstRand obtained default 
judgment against Nkata. Nkata thereafter settled the arrear amount on the mortgage. 
However, over the ensuing years, she fell in and out of arrears. FirstRand scheduled 
an auction for the property and the property was sold in execution.458 Nkata argued 
that Section 129 (1) had not been complied with as the notices were served at an 
incorrect address. She further argued that she had reinstated the agreement by 
settling the arrears.459  
 
The High Court’s decision460 
 
The High Court found that subsections 129 (3) and (4) could be interpreted in 
various ways and this led to much uncertainty. Depending on the interpretation of 
Section 129 (3), the mortgage agreement might have been reinstated. If this was so, 
execution could no longer be levied, and FirstRand Bank would be required to obtain 
a fresh judgment and authority to execute after complying with Section 129 (1).461  
 
FirstRand Bank argued that although the debtor settled the arrears, she failed to 
settle the enforcement costs due in terms of Section 129 (3) of the NCA. FirstRand 
had debited approximately R 28 000 in respect of legal fees to the mortgage 
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account. They argued that these legal costs had to be paid before Nkata could 
reinstate the agreement. The court rejected this contention and held that such an 
approach would be inconsistent with the ethos of the Act. The court held that: 
 
If the credit provider wants to recover the costs of enforcing the agreement from the 
consumer, the credit provider must take the appropriate steps. If the credit provider does not 
do so, and if in the meanwhile the consumer pays the full amount of the overdue instalments 
and any other amounts already due and payable, the agreement would be reinstated in terms 
of s 129(3).
462
   
 
The court confirmed that Section 129 (4)(a) provides that a consumer may not 
reinstate a credit agreement after the sale of the executed property. The court further 
confirmed that execution is a process and requires money to have been raised from 
the sale of the property and paid to the creditor. The court found that execution of the 
default judgment had not occurred by the time Nkata brought the arrears up to date, 
therefore the agreement had been validly reinstated.463 Once the agreement had 
been reinstated, the judgment ceased to operate and had no force or effect. 
Accordingly, the subsequent sale in execution was invalid and was set aside. 
FirstRand Bank appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal overruled the court a quo’s judgment. A significant 
part of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment considered the interpretation of 
Section 129 (4) and the meaning of ‘execution’. The court analysed several 
judgments which considered the meaning of ‘execution’ and found that execution is a 
process rather than an event. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that execution is 
the process of giving effect to the creditor’s right and claim, and held that the High 
Court’s interpretation, that execution only takes place when the proceeds of the sale 
in execution are paid to the creditor was erroneous.464 The court confirmed that the 
Rubicon for the right to reinstatement was the sale in execution. Therefore, a debtor 
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could not reinstate a credit agreement after the sale in execution.465 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal found that the bank had already executed the default judgment in 
terms of Section 129 (4), when the property was sold at the sale in execution, and 
therefore Nkata was not entitled to reinstate the agreement. 
 
Appeal to the Constitutional Court  
 
Nkata appealed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision to the Constitutional Court. 
One of the reasons why the Supreme Court of Appeal decided in FirstRand Bank’s 
favour was that it found that Nkata could not have reinstated the agreement as the 
creditor had executed on the default judgment and the property had already been 
sold in execution. The Constitutional Court found that this reasoning was incorrect. 
The sale in execution took place on 24 April 2013, whereas Nkata had settled her 
arrears in March 2011. Therefore, it was clear that Nkata had reinstated the 
agreement before the sale in execution.466 However, while it was common cause that 
Nkata settled the arrears due, Section 129 (3) provided that in order for the debtor to 
exercise her right to reinstatement, the debtor was required to settle (1) the arrears 
owing, (2) default charges, and (3) enforcement or legal costs. Nkata had only 
settled the arrears and not the legal costs. Therefore the main issue before the 
Constitutional Court was whether the right to reinstatement was still available to the 
debtor. 
 
The Constitutional Court was divided on the interpretation of Section 129 (3). The 
majority found that Nkata had reinstated the agreement by settling the arrears, and 
as a result the default judgment and writ was of no legal force. The minority found 
that Nkata had not reinstated the agreement as she had not settled the legal costs 
as required by Section 129 (3). The majority found that Section 129 (3) does not 
preclude reinstatement where the debtor has paid the arrear amount but had not 
been given due notice of the reasonable legal costs. FirstRand Bank had not 
demanded payment of the legal fees from the debtor and unilaterally debited these 
costs to the mortgage account. The court found that the bank could not unilaterally 
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impose the legal costs upon the debtor without them being reasonable, taxed or 
agreed upon. Moseneke DCJ held that: 
 
[T]he consumer could not be expected to take proactive steps to find out what the costs would 
be for reinstatement to be effected.  Neither could a consumer be expected to start taxation or 
agree with the credit provider on the quantification of these costs.  The credit provider is 
required to take the appropriate steps if it wants to recover the costs for enforcing an 
agreement with the consumer.... [S]ection 129(3) does not preclude the reinstatement of a 
credit agreement where the consumer has paid all the amounts that were overdue but has not 
been given due notice of the reasonable legal costs, whether agreed or taxed, of enforcing 
the credit agreement.  The legal costs would become due and payable only when they are 
reasonable, agreed or taxed, and on due notice to the consumer.
467
 
 
With regard to the contention that Section 129 (4) precluded Nkata from reinstating 
the agreement, the court held that there was no compelling reason why the meaning 
of ‘execution’ should be given an extended meaning. The bank contended that 
execution was a process that occurred when the property was attached.468 The 
Constitutional Court declined to follow this line of reasoning and found that the 
barrier for the right to reinstatement was only when the proceeds of the sale in 
execution were realised. Once an agreement is reinstated, the judgment and 
attachment is rendered without force and effect.469 
 
On the other hand, the minority found that Nkata had not reinstated the agreement 
and held that the default judgment that was granted stood valid.470 Cameron J relied 
on the plain language of Section 129 and held that since Nkata had not paid the 
legal fees as required by the NCA, the agreement had not been reinstated. Cameron 
J disagreed with the majority judgments findings that the creditor was required to 
take proactive steps to recover the legal fees. Cameron J held that the NCA placed 
the responsibility of paying all the costs upon the debtor, and not the creditor. The 
                                                 
467
 Nkata, paras 122-123. Moseneke DCJ held that it was the duty of the creditor to take proactive 
steps to recover their legal costs, and the costs only become due and payable when they were 
reasonable, agreed or taxed and on due notice to the debtor. He based this reasoning on the 
interpretation that if a creditor was not obliged to quantify and notify a debtor of the legal costs, the 
relief afforded by section 129 (3) could be frustrated and open to the creditor to thwart a 
reinstatement. 
468
 Nkata, para 130. 
469
 Nkata CC, paras 131, 170-171. Jafta J agreed with the majority, however, reached this decision on 
a different reasoning. Jafta J found that since there had been non-compliance with section 129 (1), 
namely, the notice was delivered to an incorrect address, the legal fees that flowed from that action 
were not due and unreasonable. Therefore, the debtor was not required to pay those legal costs, as 
those legal proceedings were irregular. Jafta J therefore found that the default judgment granted by 
the High Court was null and void and the sale in execution was equally invalid. 
470
 Nkata CC, para 35. 
114 
 
fact that the bank had not presented these fees to Nkata did not mean that the fees 
were not due. Nugent J concurred with Cameron J, and held that it was impractical 
to expect the creditor to attend to the taxation and to demand the costs for 
enforcement every time the debtor fell into default.471  
 
Comments on the Nkata case472 
 
The Constitutional Court in Nkata confirmed the principle that if the debtor is not 
provided with the creditor’s enforcement and legal costs, and settles the arrears due, 
the credit agreement will be reinstated and any legal action taken against the debtor 
will be overturned. This is based on the reasoning that the creditor has a duty to 
notify the debtor of the legal costs due. 
 
It is submitted that the most important issue with Section 129 (3) is whether 
reinstatement has the effect of overturning litigation taken by the creditor. In Nkata, 
the Constitutional Court found that once an agreement is reinstated, any judgment 
taken against the debtor is of no force and effect. It is submitted that the court’s 
finding that the right to reinstatement lapses or cancels any judgment is 
unsatisfactory. While it is accepted that the right to reinstatement does have the 
effect of bringing any enforcement action by the creditor to an end, this should not 
mean that any valid legal action already taken against the debtor is overturned.  It is 
submitted that in cases where the debtor falls into default again after reinstatement, 
the creditor should be entitled to revive any judgment taken against the debtor. The 
creditor should not need to start legal action afresh, as it is clear that any judgment 
validly granted by the court does not lapse until it is rescinded by the court or the 
debt is settled in full.  
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that reinstatement does not overturn legal action taken by 
the creditor, and should a debtor default again after reinstatement, the creditor can 
resume legal action from the last legal step and need not start legal action afresh. 
The reasoning for this interpretation is substantiated by the difference in the majority 
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judges’ findings in Nkata. In Nkata, Moseneke DCJ held that the debtor had 
reinstated the agreement by settling the arrear amount and found that the judgment 
taken by the creditor was ‘no longer of any force and effect’. However, Jafta J found 
that since there had been non-compliance with Section 129 (1) – as the notices were 
incorrectly served, the judgment obtained was ‘null and void’.473 It is submitted that 
there is a substantial difference in the terms ‘no longer of any force and effect’ and 
‘null and void’. It is well understood that the term ‘null and void’ means that the 
subject never existed or is invalid. Thus, in Nkata, the judgment obtained against the 
debtor never existed and was invalid (was null and void) as Section 129 had not 
been complied with. Moseneke DCJ held that the judgment was of no force and 
effect after reinstatement. It is submitted that this means that the judgment taken 
against Nkata was valid, however, once Nkata settled the arrear amount and 
reinstated the agreement, the judgment was no longer of any force and effect. In 
other words, after reinstatement the effect of the judgment was suspended and 
ineffective. It is submitted that the judgment could become effective again should the 
debtor default again. Therefore, it is argued that reinstatement does not lapse or 
rescind any valid judgment obtained. Once the debtor settles the arrear amount, the 
judgment can no longer be enforced and is no longer effective. However, should the 
debtor default after reinstatement, the judgment can be revived and become 
effective again.474  
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that an undesirable effect of the Nkata judgment is that it 
overturns legal action taken by the creditor. The interpretation in Nkata allows 
debtors to fall continually into default and to reinstate the agreement.475 According to 
this approach, if a creditor wishes to resume foreclosure where the debtor had 
previously defaulted and reinstated the agreement, the creditor would not be able to 
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commence foreclosure proceedings from the stage at which he previously pended 
litigation. If the previous default had been remedied, the creditor would be required to 
institute fresh foreclosure proceedings, starting with the Section 129 (1) notice. This 
has the potential to create administrative challenges for creditors, as every time a 
debtor falls into default, the creditor would be required to start litigation afresh and 
further attend to the taxation of his enforcement costs. It is submitted that such an 
interpretation could not have been the intention of the legislature. Brits, however, 
believes that this is a reasonable compromise between the parties. Although a 
creditor who has undertaken enforcement proceedings may be slightly 
inconvenienced, he is compensated for this as reinstatement demands that the 
debtor pay all enforcement charges.476 Further, the administrative inconvenience 
experienced by the creditor will surely be outweighed by the need to protect one’s 
home. Brits therefore submits that subsections 129 (3) and (4) must be interpreted in 
a manner that avoids unconstitutional results and avoids instances of 
disproportionate debt enforcement proceedings. 
 
Historically, if a debtor fell into default, the creditor would enforce the acceleration 
clause in the mortgage agreement and obtain judgment for the full outstanding debt. 
Only upon settlement of the full outstanding debt would the judgment obtained 
against the debtor lapse.477 The right to reinstatement and the Nkata judgment seem 
to have done away with this long established principle as it appears to allow the 
debtor to cancel or rescind judgment upon settlement of the arrear amount. This 
diminishes the power and force of the acceleration clause, and further diminishes the 
value of a valid judgment granted in favour of the creditor. It is submitted that this 
could not have been the intention of the legislature, and if it was, legislative 
intervention is urgently required to clarify the current uncertainties, in particular, 
whether reinstatement has the effect of overturning litigation taken by the creditor. 
Amendments to subsections 129 (3) and (4) were recently implemented by the 
NCAA to resolve these conflicts. However, it will be noted below that these 
amendments have in fact created more uncertainty. 
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4.4.3 NCAA changes to subsections 129 (3) and (4) 
 
As a result of the lack of clarity in subsections 129 (3) and (4), the NCAA amended 
these sections. The crucial difference in the amended Section 129 (3) is that the 
phrase ‘reinstate a credit agreement’ has been deleted and replaced with ‘the 
consumer’s right to “remedy a default” under such credit agreement’. The 
amendment no longer uses the words ‘reinstate’, therefore it has become debatable 
whether the terms ‘reinstate’ and ‘reinstatement’ are still applicable.478 However, the 
term ‘reinstatement’ is still used in Section 129 (4), hence, this indicates that the 
mechanism and term is still used in the NCA.479 The amendment, however, does not 
state what the consequence of remedying the default would be. In particular, it does 
not provide any clarity as to whether reinstatement has the consequence of 
overturning litigation already taken by the creditor.480 
 
The amendment to section 129 (4) sought to clarify the exact stage of which the 
debtor’s right to reinstatement lapses. The amended section replaced reference to 
the ‘consumer’ with ‘creditor provider’. The section now appears to refer only to the 
creditor’s rights and not the debtor’s rights. Brits submits that on a literal 
interpretation the amendment is nonsensical as it now affords the creditor the right to 
reinstate the agreement.481 This could be interpreted to mean that the creditor has 
the right or discretion to accept the debtor’s reinstatement and payment of the arrear 
amount. However, such an interpretation appears to be contrary to the NCA, as it 
allows for a position after the debtor having settled the arrears, default and 
enforcement charges, being left at the mercy of the creditor who has the choice as to 
whether to allow the reinstatement.482 Brits submits that this position is illogical, and 
recommends that the section should not be afforded a literal meaning and should still 
be interpreted as if no amendment occurred. 
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Several academics have submitted that the overall state of affairs is inadequate and 
unsatisfactory. Accordingly, there has been a call for the complete redrafting of 
subsections 129 (3) and (4) as the current concept of reinstatement is muddled and 
rife with contradictions.483 It is submitted that it is unfortunate that one must go 
through such mental gymnastics and creative interpretations to enable a clear 
understanding of the Act, and it is even more disappointing that the amendments to 
the Act, which sought to create clarity, have only created more confusion. It is 
submitted that legislative intervention is required to clarify the position and provide 
guidance, and in particular, as to whether reinstatement reverses all previous legal 
action taken by the creditor, including judgments.484 In this regard, it is submitted that 
a total redrafting of subsections 129 (3) and (4) is required to create clarity on all the 
aspects discussed above.485 
 
The judgments of FirstRand Bank v Mdletye486 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Mdletye’) 
and FirstRand Bank v Zwane487 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Zwane’) were the first 
reported cases to interpret the Nkata decision and the legislative amendments to 
section 129 (3).488 In both matters, the mortgagors were three months in arrears on 
their mortgage payments, and the mortgagee sought to obtain default judgment and 
an order of executability against the hypothecated immovable property.  
 
In Mdletye, the court considered the Nkata judgment and found that: 
 
.... if the arrears can be eliminated and other amounts referred to in s 129 (3) paid, the 
agreement will be reinstated. From the date of reinstatement, the default will have ‘no force 
and effect’. If the property is sold by virtue of an attachment following a declaration of 
executability, the agreement will not be capable of being reinstated and the respondents 
(mortgagors) will lose their home. The potential for this to occur must therefore be a factor to 
be taken into account in an application to declare the property executable.
489
  
 
In Mdletye, the mortgagors had provided the mortgagee with a reasonable payment 
proposal indicating how they intended to settle their default. The mortgagors had 
made payments in terms of their proposal and had reduced the outstanding balance 
                                                 
483
 Brits, Coetzee and Van Heerden, (2017), THRHR, 179. See also Steyn and Sharrock, ‘Remedying 
mortgage default: Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd’, (2017) SALJ 498. 
484
 See also Brits, Coetzee and Van Heerden, (2017), THRHR, 191. 
485
 See also Brits, Coetzee and Van Heerden, (2017), THRHR, 191. 
486
 FirstRand Bank Limited v Mdletye 2016 (5) SA 550 (KZD). 
487
 FirstRand Bank Limited v Zwane 2016 (6) SA 400 (GJ). 
488
 See also Steyn, Fundamina, (2017), 111-112. 
489
 Mdletye, para 11. 
119 
 
and arrear amount. Gorven J accordingly held that there was a reasonable prospect 
that the agreement could be reinstated within a short period of time,490 and held that 
proper judicial oversight would not be served if an order of executability were 
granted, as this would amount to disproportionality between the means used to exact 
payment of a judgment debt and other available means to obtain the same 
purpose.491 Gorven J granted default judgment in favour of the mortgagor for the full 
outstanding debt. However, the court adjourned the application to declare the 
property executable, and directed that the matter be set down after a period of six 
months. This six month period was intended to provide the mortgagor with an 
opportunity to remedy the default in terms of Section 129 (3).  
 
In Zwane, the court adjourned both the judgment and executability applications for a 
period of four months. In Zwane, the court made reference to the Chapter 10.17 of 
the Gauteng Practice Manual. The Practice Manual proposed the postponement of a 
judgment application to allow a consumer the opportunity to take advice and seek 
arrangements to bring the arrears up to date.492 The court, however, did find that the 
declining of a judgment may be viewed as being contrary to the principle of 
honouring agreements, and further, could render meaningless the effect of an 
acceleration clause.493 This result could be avoided if the immediate enforcement of 
the agreement could be deferred by postponing declarations of executability for a 
few months and allowing the debtor the opportunity to pay his arrears.494 The court 
accordingly postponed the judgment and executability applications for four months. 
 
In the most recent case of Mokebe, the full bench of the South Gauteng High Court 
held that the right the reinstatement must be interpreted to promote the principles of 
the NCA and the Constitution, and balance the interests of debtors and creditors.495 
The court in Mokebe concurred with the findings the Nkata that held that ‘it is only 
when the mortgage property has been sold and the proceeds of the sale have been 
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realised that there can no longer be reinstatement. Accordingly, the granting of 
monetary judgment and execution order is not a bar to reinstatement’.496 The court 
further acknowledged that amendments to subsections 129 (3) and (4) were 
nonsensical and adopted Brits reasoning that the amendments should not be taken 
literally and should be ignored.497 
 
While the courts in both Mdletye, Zwane and Mokebe did not provide any clarity on 
the issue of whether reinstatement has the effect of rescinding the previous legal 
action taken by the creditor, the postponing of applications in both Mdletye and 
Zwane brought to light the need for a formal moratorium to be established in a 
foreclosure process to provide the mortgagor a short period of time to either remedy 
the default, or consider alternatives to foreclosure. It is therefore suggested that a 
foreclosure moratorium be implemented to assist mortgagors who find themselves in 
situations such as Ntsane, Mdletye and Zwane, where the arrear amount is low.498 In 
Chapter Seven the idea of introducing a foreclosure moratorium will be considered in 
more detail. 
 
In sum, the right to reinstatement is an important remedy that is fundamental not only 
to the achievements of the NCA, but also to the Constitution, and the right to have 
access to adequate housing. The proper interpretation of subsections 129 (3) and (4) 
has been the cause of much debate, and clarity from the judiciary and legislature is 
therefore required to clarify the effect of reinstatement on judgment and orders of 
executability.  Nevertheless, it can be seen that the right to reinstatement is of 
immense value to a debtor who is facing execution against his home. A prime 
example of where it could be used is in the Ntsane case.499 The Ntsane case 
illustrated how a creditor could abuse use of the acceleration clause, and 
emphasised the value to the debtor of being given the opportunity of exercising the 
right to reinstatement by simply paying the arrear amount R 18.46,500. In Mdletye, 
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Zwane and Mokebe the courts held that where there is a possibility of the agreement 
being reinstated, it would not grant an order declaring immovable property 
executable, but rather adjourn the matter and allow the debtor the opportunity to 
reinstate the agreement. The court held that proper judicial oversight would not be 
served if it allowed execution to proceed where there was a reasonable prospect of 
reinstatement. Thus, the right to reinstatement has thrown debtors a lifeline as it 
allows them an opportunity to postpone a mortgagee’s foreclosure where there is a 
possibility of the arrear and default amounts being settled. However, in order for the 
right to reinstatement to be given full effect, there is still a need for further clarity to 
be established, and it is therefore submitted that there is a need for the legislature to 
clarify the current uncertainty in subsections 129 (3) and (4). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
For decades, academics and the general public have called for the revision of South 
African consumer laws and the need for the law to provide an effective, easily 
accessible, debt relief mechanism. It was hoped that this call had been answered by 
the enactment of the National Credit Act. However, from the above analysis, it can 
be concluded that the NCA has, on the contrary, created further unnecessary 
problems and has failed to provide clarity for either debtors or creditors. As 
discussed above, there are several interpretational gaps within sections 129 and 86 
(10) of the NCA. While some of these loopholes have been addressed by the NCAA, 
there are still several problems with the NCA’s application and interpretation. These 
legislative flaws are without doubt the greatest defect in the debt review and 
reinstatement process.  
 
In addition to its interpretational flaws, the NCA has failed to provide any workable 
solution to mortgage debt, and it appears that the NCA was never intended to serve 
as a debt relief mechanism for mortgage debt.501 A mortgage debt runs a term of 
twenty to thirty years. Therefore it would be unrealistic to extend the term of this 
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credit agreement, especially when considering that mortgage is the largest expense 
in the debtor’s estate. Hence, it is submitted that the NCA has not provided adequate 
relief for a mortgagor seeking to protect his home from foreclosure. It is therefore 
concluded that the NCA has failed in its objective of serving as an effective debt 
relief mechanism in South Africa.502 Accordingly, there is still a need for a debt relief 
mechanism that fairly balances the interests of debtors, creditors and society, in 
particular during foreclosure against a home. Debt review has failed as a workable 
solution to resolving mortgage debt, and the plight of debtors who are too poor to go 
through sequestration, and who cannot succeed in obtaining alternative debt relief 
measures, has not been adequately addressed by the NCA. The NCA has also failed 
to provide clarity as to its relationship with insolvency, and this has created more 
uncertainty. The interaction between the NCA and insolvency will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FORCED SALE OF A HOME IN INSOLVENCY LAW503 
 
The machinery of voluntary surrender was primarily designed for the benefit of creditors, and not 
for the relief of harassed debtors....The law of insolvency exists primarily for the benefit of 
creditors and a court will not sequestrate a debtor’s estate unless it is shown that sequestration 
will be to the advantage of creditors. 504 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the key building blocks in any country’s economic, social and political 
framework is the existence of a modern and effective insolvency system.505 The 
significance of a modern insolvency system has been widely acknowledged by 
several international institutions, including the World Bank and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as ‘UNCITRAL’). 
These organisations have confirmed that insolvency law is a fundamental 
developmental institution and is a cornerstone for the enhancement of a country’s 
credit market, and for its international growth.506 
 
In South Africa, consumer insolvency is governed by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, 
and is utilized by many mortgagors as a debt relief mechanism. The Insolvency Act 
is eighty years old, dating back long before the enactment of the South African 
Constitution and the NCA. The question therefore arises as to whether the policies of 
the Insolvency Act are in line with the Constitution, the NCA, and the needs of the 
current South African consumer. This chapter will briefly consider the law of 
insolvency and, in particular, its relationship with the NCA and the protection, or lack 
of protection, it affords to the home of the mortgagor. The chapter will also briefly 
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consider the fundamental principles governing South African insolvency law and 
discuss how the strict requirements of the Act create a hurdle to debtors who seek 
relief under these laws. 
 
5.2 The interface between the Insolvency Act and the NCA 
 
The relationship between the NCA and the Insolvency Act has been the subject of 
much academic discussion over the past decade.507 Neither the NCA nor the 
Insolvency Act make reference to each other, and the question arises whether there 
is a relationship between the two Acts. Some academics have submitted that since 
none of the sections in the NCA specifically mention any provisions of the Insolvency 
Act, the two Acts have separate application.508 However, it is submitted that a 
relationship does exist between insolvency and debt review as they are both debt 
relief mechanisms available to a mortgagor. A person who is overburdened with debt 
has the option to choose either debt review or the sequestration of his estate as a 
mechanism to relieve his financial troubles.509  
 
When considering the relationship between the NCA and the Insolvency Act, one of 
the controversial issues has been whether an application for debt review amounts to 
an act of insolvency in terms of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act. Several scholars 
have argued that it is nonsensical to hold that a debtor who applies for debt review 
commits an act of insolvency.510 Such an interpretation would frustrate the aims of 
the NCA which hold the debtor responsible for meeting all debts in full. However, 
several courts have found that an application for debt review does satisfy the 
                                                 
507
 See Boraine and Van Heerden ‘The interaction between debt relief measures in the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005 and aspects of Insolvency Law (2009) Potchefstroom Law Journal 22, Boraine and 
Van Heerden, ‘To sequestrate or not to sequestrate in view of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: A 
tale of two judgments, PELJ (2010) 13, 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Boraine and Van Heerden, PELJ 
(2010)’)  and Roestoff and Renke, ‘Debt relief for consumers – The interaction between insolvency 
and consumer protection legislation’ (part 2), Obiter (2006), 98, 99 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Roestoff 
and Renke, Obiter’). 
508
 Ibid.  
509
 See Ex Parte Ford 2009 (3) SA 376 (WCC) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ex Parte Ford’). See also 
Boraine and Roestoff, ‘Revisiting the state of consumer insolvency in South Africa after twenty years: 
The court’s approach, international guidelines and an appeal for urgent law reform’ (part 1 and 2) 
2014 (77) THRHR, 351 - 527, 362 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Boraine and Roestoff, THRHR’). 
510
 See Steyn, ‘Sink or Swim? Debt reviews ambivalent lifeline – A second sequel to ... A tale of two 
judgments’, PELJ, (2012) (15) 4, 190, 191 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Steyn, PELJ (2012)’), Boraine 
and Roestoff, THRHR, Otto and Otto, The National Credit Act Explained, 134, and Maghembe, PELJ, 
177. 
125 
 
requirements of section 8 (g) and therefore does amount to an act of insolvency.511 
This interpretation seems to be contrary to the aims of the NCA, as it deprives the 
debtor of the right to exercise his remedies under the NCA and places him in a 
position, under insolvency, which he may have intended to avoid.512 Thankfully, the 
NCAA has resolved this controversy. The NCAA now provides that an application for 
debt review does not amount to an act of insolvency.513 However, the NCAA has 
failed to provide any clarity as to the relationship between debt review and 
sequestration, and uncertainty therefore still remains. 
 
Another issue of controversy with the relationship between debt review and 
sequestration is whether debt review serves as a bar to sequestration. In other 
words, it is unclear whether a creditor is permitted to bring an application for the 
compulsory sequestration of the debtor’s estate while the debtor is under debt 
review. It is submitted that the sequestration of the estate of a debtor who is under 
debt review may deprive the debtor of the opportunity of exercising his remedies 
under the debt review and enjoy the advantages of the NCA, outside the realms of 
insolvency. This appears to be contrary to the objectives of the NCA. Nevertheless, 
several judgments have found that a debtor is not immune from being sequestrated 
while he is under debt review.514 
 
5.3  An overview of South African Insolvency law 
 
The main objective of South African insolvency law is to ensure the orderly and 
equitable distribution of a debtor’s estate where his assets are insufficient to meet 
the claims of all his creditors.515 The sequestration of a debtor’s estate may occur via 
two mediums – voluntary surrender516 or compulsory sequestration.517  
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One of the essential requirements for both forms of sequestration is the ‘advantage 
to creditors’ requirement. The requirement of advantage to creditors in a voluntary 
surrender application is more onerous than a compulsory sequestration application. 
One of the reasons for the increased onus is to prevent an abuse of process by 
enabling debtors to use sequestration as a means to defeat the claims of creditors. 
The ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement and the abuse of the sequestration process 
will be considered in the subsections below. 
 
5.3.1 The ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement  
 
The prevailing policy in South African insolvency law has always been that debt 
collection is for the benefit of creditors and not for the assistance of debtors.518 The 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement is the most decisive factor considered during a 
sequestration application as, if this advantage is not proven, a sequestration order 
will not be granted.519 A debtor who is unable to prove that sequestration will be to 
the advantage of creditors will be denied the relief provided by insolvency law, such 
as a stay in creditor enforcement proceedings (foreclosure), the ability to retain 
certain exempt assets, and the possibility of enjoying a discharge from liability. The 
strict application of the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement has been criticised by 
many academics. Rochelle and Evans submit that in certain circumstances a debtor 
may be ‘too poor to be sequestrated’ as his estate may not have sufficient assets to 
yield a dividend or advantage to creditors, and thus will be denied access to the 
insolvency system.520 Evans contends that the advantage to creditors policy results 
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in ‘poorer’ debtors being locked out of insolvency and could fall to be constitutionally 
foul and infringe upon section 9 of the Constitution - the right to equality.521 Section 9 
guarantees the right to equal protection and benefit under the law. The fact that a 
‘poorer’ debtor is unable to access the remedial provisions of insolvency legislation 
results in there being no equal protection and benefit for such debtors.522 Evans 
accordingly submits that the advantage to creditors’ requirement is misconceived 
and should be dropped altogether from South African insolvency law. 
 
On the other hand, Boraine and Roestoff are of the view that the ‘advantage to 
creditors’ requirement should remain in the law.523 However, they argue that proper 
alternative debt relief measures, affording debtors a discharge, need to be provided 
in South Africa.  The authors submit that when a court considers a sequestration 
application, the court must balance the interests of the debtor and creditor before 
making a decision. They suggest that the time has come for the legislature, in 
addition to the ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement, to implement an ‘advantage to 
debtors’ requirement.524 
 
Despite the challenges mentioned above, it is submitted that the ‘advantage to 
creditors’ requirement plays a significant role in the insolvency process. The 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement ensures that the insolvency process is not 
abused by unscrupulous debtors – examples of abuse of process will be discussed 
in the subsection (5.3.2) below. Nevertheless, the ‘advantage to creditors’ 
requirement may be seen to be unfairly weighted in favour of creditors. Hence, it is 
evident that there is a need for this requirement to be reviewed to fairly balance the 
rights of debtors and creditors.   
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5.3.2 Abuse of process 
 
In insolvency proceedings, an example of abuse of process is a ‘friendly 
sequestration’. Friendly sequestrations are a form of compulsory sequestration and 
are not illegal or invalid per se. However, friendly sequestrations are often used mala 
fide and an abuse of process occurs where the sequestration application is made 
with the motive, not to liquidate the assets, but to prevent the debtor’s liability for 
payment.525 The subsections below will briefly consider the concept of ‘friendly 
sequestrations’. 
 
a. Friendly sequestrations 
 
A ‘friendly sequestration’ can be described as an application by a friendly creditor to 
sequestrate a debtor in order to assist him in obtaining the relief provided by the 
insolvency system.526 This usually occurs when the colluding parties agree that the 
debtor will write to his ‘friendly creditor’ stating that he is unable to satisfy his debt. 
The friendly creditor will then apply for the sequestration of the debtor in terms of 
Section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act – an act of insolvency.527  
 
Friendly sequestrations are thus seen as an attempt by the debtor and his ‘friendly 
creditor’ to avoid the formalities and higher degree of proof required in the voluntary 
surrender process,528 and several judgments have found this practice to amount to 
an abuse of process.529 As a result of the potential for abuse, courts have adopted 
strict rules when considering these applications and held that where it is clear that 
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there is an indication of abuse of court process, courts have discretion not to grant 
an order.530  
 
b.  Cancellation of a sale in execution 
 
Over the years, the sequestration procedure has been used by many debtors as a 
procedure to frustrate a creditor’s claim. In terms of Section 5 (1) of the Insolvency 
Act, upon receipt of a notice of sequestration, a creditor is compelled to stay any and 
all execution proceedings against the debtor. Hence, if a property is set for a sale in 
execution and a debtor applies for voluntary surrender, the mortgagee is prohibited 
from proceeding with the sale of the hypothecated property. If the property is sold in 
execution by the Sheriff after receipt of a notice of sequestration, such sale is invalid 
and illegal.531 This prohibition has been used strategically by debtors in preventing 
creditors from proceeding with sales in execution, and delaying the foreclosure 
process.532 It is submitted that such an approach is unsatisfactory as it unfairly 
prejudices bona fide purchasers at sales in execution and further creates uncertainty 
and a lack of finality in the sale in execution process.  
 
5.4  Lack of modernisation in the Insolvency system 
 
Since as far back as the 1980s, the South African Law Reform Commission has 
undertaken extensive reviews of insolvency law in South Africa. Nearly forty years 
have passed since the initial reviews started, but very little effort has been made by 
government and the legislature to drive the development of insolvency law.533 Since 
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the enactment of the Insolvency Act, the political and socio-economic landscape of 
South Africa has changed dramatically by the introduction of a modern Constitution 
and consumer legislation such as the NCA.534 The values and principles upon which 
the Constitution is based radically differ from those of the Insolvency Act,535 and the 
issue of the insolvent’s home and right to have access to adequate housing is yet to 
be considered within the context of insolvency law. Chapters Three and Four536 
discussed several cases where the issue of whether foreclosure amounted to an 
infringement of Section 26 of the Constitution were discussed. The foreclosure 
against a home was not found to be unconstitutional for various reasons. Yet to be 
tested by the courts, however, is the question of whether insolvency which will result 
in the sale of the debtor’s home, amounts to an infringement of Section 26 of the 
Constitution.  
 
5.4.1 Keeping up with international standards 
 
The international standards for insolvency laws and practices have been articulated 
by the World Bank537 and other organisations such as UNCITRAL.538 In January 
2011, the World Bank published a report that identified a wide range of desired 
benefits of, and set out the core legal attributes for, an effective insolvency regime. It 
maintained that an effective insolvency system should encourage resolution and 
negotiation. This could be advanced by eliminating the stigma attached to 
insolvency, lowering the costs of sequestration, avoiding the strict court procedures 
around insolvency, and allowing for voluntary debt settlements between debtors and 
creditors. The report categorised three distinct benefits, namely, the benefit for 
creditors, the benefit for debtors and their families, and the benefit for society.539 A 
comparison of the World Bank Report’s recommendations with the current South 
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African situation reveals that South Africa does not conform to international 
standards of insolvency.540 Over the past two decades the insolvency system has 
remained creditor oriented, and this is largely due to the courts’ strict approach 
regarding sequestration as a debt relief option. Several scholars submit that in a 
modern credit driven society, debt relief is of the utmost importance and it is 
apparent the South African insolvency regime is in urgent need of reform.541  
 
5.4.2 The lack of judicial oversight 
 
During the sequestration process, judicial oversight only takes place at the point at 
which a court considers whether or not to grant the sequestration order. In other 
words, court supervision only occurs during the application process. At this stage, 
the court is mainly concerned with compliance with the legislative requirements for a 
sequestration, and no consideration, or very little, is given to Section 26 of the 
Constitution (or to any other constitutional rights), or to the fact that the debtor may 
be rendered homeless by the sequestration.542 Once a sequestration order is 
granted, there is no judicial oversight of the ensuing insolvency process. Of particular 
concern is that there is no judicial oversight during the realisation of the insolvent’s 
home. This is concerning as courts should consider circumstances which may be 
relevant to the realisation of the home. As seen in the discussion on foreclosure of 
the home in Chapter Three, Rule 46A provides that the court must consider ‘all 
relevant circumstances’ when considering an order of executability of a home. On 
the other hand, the Insolvency Act obliges the trustee to have the home sold as a 
matter of course.543 Accordingly, the notion that a home should be sold as a last 
resort, and only after consideration of all relevant circumstances, as seen in Chapter 
Three in the discussion of foreclosure proceedings, is not applied during insolvency. 
Ironically, in most cases, a sequestration application is brought for the very reason 
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that the debtor owns a home which, when realised, will yield benefit to creditors. The 
lack of judicial oversight during the foreclosure process was declared 
unconstitutional in Gundwana. It is therefore alarming that there is still a lack of 
judicial oversight during insolvency proceedings. The Insolvency Act was enacted 
well before the introduction of the Constitution and the values of the Insolvency Act 
and Constitution differ radically from one another. It may thus only be a matter of 
time before the lack of judicial oversight in the insolvency process will be subject to a 
constitutional challenge.544 
 
5.4.3 Continuing insolvency reform: Clause 118 of the Insolvency Bill  
 
The South African Law Reform Commission began working on new insolvency 
legislation from 1987, and subsequently published several reports and working 
papers. These efforts culminated in a Draft Insolvency Bill in 2000. One of the main 
aims of the law reform was to move towards the concept of unified insolvency 
legislation. However, it has been nearly two decades since the drafting of this bill and 
its implementation does not seem to be likely in the near future.  
 
The Draft Bill did not add any unique or revolutionary ideas regarding the insolvency 
system. Early versions of the Bill indicated that the ‘advantage to creditors’ 
requirement would remain entrenched in insolvency practice. However, the most 
significant inclusion in the Draft Insolvency Bill is the proposed ‘pre-liquidation 
composition’ in Clause 118.545 The composition is supervised by the Magistrates’ 
Court and provision is made for an investigation into the affairs of the debtor.546 The 
proposed composition appeared to be a new debt restructuring device, and an 
important feature of the device was that a prescribed majority, by value two-thirds of 
the concurrent creditors, could bind the minority.547 The rights of secured and 
preferent creditors would not be affected by the composition, unless they provide 
their consent in writing.548 
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Steyn submits that the proposed pre-liquidation composition process, when 
appropriately remodelled and refined, may provide a way out for over-indebted 
persons.549 Clause 118 would pose a realistic alternative to sequestration, as it 
affords the debtor an opportunity to fulfil his obligations through a restructured debt 
repayment plan. The claims of secured and preferent creditors remain unaffected, 
and only the debts of concurrent creditors are restructured and made payable by 
lower instalments over a longer period. The proposed Clause 118 protects the rights 
and interests of secured creditors, including mortgagees, as a mortgage agreement 
would not be part of the composition. This will be attractive to mortgagees, as they 
will maintain confidence that their claims will not be compromised without their 
express consent, and therefore they may be less inclined to pursue foreclosure 
against the home.550  
 
5.4.4 Comments on the modernisation of insolvency law 
 
From the analysis above, it is submitted that the Insolvency Act does not conform to 
internationally recognised principles in relation to the rehabilitation and liquidation of 
a debtor’s estate. Internationally, modern states have moved away from a strict pro-
creditor system to a more debtor-oriented approach as this has been advocated by 
several international guidelines. The INSOL Report provides that effective debt relief 
for consumers should not only be structured by way of discharge, but help should 
also be given by finding solutions for adverse financial situations and preventing the 
debtor from getting into debt again.551 The INSOL Report further provides that a 
debtor should be free to choose between liquidation and a rehabilitation 
procedure.552 These provisions are not applied in South Africa.553  
 
The consensus in academia is that the reviews that have been undertaken of South 
African insolvency law have been inappropriate.554 Scholars contend that a review of 
the entire insolvency policy needs to be undertaken. Several believe that South 
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African insolvency law, which hails from the 1936 Insolvency Act, has moved very 
little with the times, and is still steeped in a pro-creditor approach.555 They contend 
that such an approach is incompatible with modern day consumerism and contrary to 
the Constitution and the concepts of ubuntu. In addition, Steyn and Evans note that 
there have been no reform initiatives in insolvency law in relation to the home of the 
insolvent.556 The South African Law Reform Commission’s Report did not contain 
any proposal for the protection of the home, nor did it make any reference to the 
home. Steyn and Evans each submit that in every application for sequestration, the 
right to have access to adequate housing and the interests of children must be 
addressed by the courts. This will prevent people from being rendered homeless as 
a consequence of sequestration. Steyn comments that even where a debtor is 
factually insolvent, realisation of his home should only occur as a last resort, where 
there are no other alternatives.557 Evans proposes that measures should be put in 
place for the housing position of the debtor and his family to be considered prior to 
an application for sequestration and, in particular, consideration should be given to 
sections 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 
 
Further, Evans notes that none of the reform initiatives in South Africa considered 
the possibility of extending the exemption laws. He submits that there have never 
been comprehensive and substantial drives in South African law to consider the 
notion of excluded or exempt property on a policy-oriented basis. In practice, the 
current exemptions are probably insufficient for a debtor to support himself and attain 
a fresh start.558 It might become necessary for South Africa to consider broadening 
its exemption policies and possibly including the home as an asset that is exempt 
from execution and insolvency. The following section will consider this topic in 
greater detail. 
 
5.5  Failure to include a home exemption 
 
As a general rule, all property that is owned by the debtor at the date of 
sequestration forms part of the insolvent estate and can be realised for the benefit of 
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creditors. This principle is fundamental to the general policy of South African 
insolvency law that maximum assets must be recovered and included in the 
insolvent estate to the advantage of creditors.559 Although South African insolvency 
law is based on this policy to the advantage of creditors, a further policy, namely, an 
exemption policy, of allowing debtors to keep certain assets in their estate has been 
entrenched through the common law.560 This policy ensures that the insolvent and 
his family are not deprived of their dignity and basic necessities, and allows for 
certain property to be exempt from execution. Exemptions provide debtors with 
property necessary for their survival, and enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself 
and protect his family from the adverse consequences of impoverishment.561  
 
In South Africa, exemptions are regulated by the Insolvency Act. There have, 
however, been many problems with the concept of exempt and excluded property, 
and most  result from the difficulty of building a sound policy around these concepts 
in the context of a strict application of the ‘advantage to creditors’ doctrine.562 The 
‘home’ is not included as an asset that is exempt or excluded from execution or from 
the insolvent estate. Several academics have criticised the failure of the Insolvency 
Act to provide for any protection to the insolvent’s home and submit that this is a 
major lacuna in South African law.563 Academia contends that the failure to provide a 
home exemption is inappropriate as it does not provide the debtor with any assets to 
rebuild his estate.  
 
In Jaftha, the debtor argued that Section 67 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act was 
unconstitutional as it failed to exempt the home from creditor execution. Jaftha 
argued that Section 67 should be amended to exclude execution sales of homes 
below a stipulated minimum value.564 The court rejected this argument and found 
that a blanket exemption would result in a poverty trap, incapacitate the generation 
of capital and ignore the interests of creditors. Evans has questioned the reasoning 
of the court’s decision in Jaftha and argues that exemption of the home is not a novel 
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idea as the United States and United Kingdom have made provision for the 
exemption of the home in their policies.565 He submits that a policy must be 
established in South Africa to exclude a debtor’s home from attachment by creditors 
and from the insolvent estate.566 Evans argues that as a starting point, the legislature 
and/or judiciary should start by postponing the sale of the debtor’s home for a 
particular period if circumstances justify a postponement.567 Evans contends that, at 
the very least, it should become an entrenched policy to completely exclude houses 
of a certain minimum value from the reach of creditors. The availability of these 
houses as security for capital should be prohibited. 
 
On the other hand, it is submitted that a full home exemption will be undesirable in 
South Africa. The implementation of a home exemption will have a huge impact on 
foreign investment and creditor confidence, as, if homes are placed beyond the 
scope of execution, no creditor will be willing to provide capital for home funding. 
This could possibly escalate South Africa’s housing crisis, and homelessness, as few 
people will have access to capital to purchase homes without creditor assistance. 
Further, the adoption of a home exemption could create room for abuse, as mala fide 
debtors and fraudulent schemes could develop which could use the home as a 
sanctuary for corrupt activity. Hence, it is submitted that a more favourable approach 
will be the postponement of the sale of the debtor’s home. The moratorium on the 
sale of the home will protect the debtor and his home, while still maintaining the 
interests of creditors. This will allow the debtor sufficient time to recover from his 
financial misfortune and make suitable arrangements for accommodation for himself 
and his family. The postponement of the sale of the home will not deny a creditor his 
rights as the creditor will still enjoy security over the home. However, his right to 
realise the home will be postponed. In developing such a policy, it will be necessary 
to consider how foreign jurisdictions have implemented their policies. Accordingly, 
the next chapter will consider a brief analysis of foreclosure and debt relief laws in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to consider whether the current insolvency law 
and process provides any protection to the debtor and his home. From the brief 
analysis above, it is concluded that the South African insolvency system is in urgent 
need of reform. Current insolvency laws are outdated and provide minimal protection 
to the debtor and his family, and no protection to the home. The failure to provide a 
home/foreclosure moratorium or home exemption leaves the debtor and his family 
prone to homelessness, as a result of insolvency. This is unfavourable and it is 
questionable whether such a policy is constitutional. An urgent need has therefore 
arisen for law makers to formulate a new insolvency policy. It is submitted that when 
developing this policy, cognisance must be taken of the principles of the Constitution, 
ubuntu and foreign law standards – and in addition lawmakers should endeavour to 
create a balance between the rights of debtors, creditors and society. The next 
chapter will consider the application of foreclosure and insolvency laws in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN LAW 
 
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act [of the United States] is to relieve the 
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free 
from obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortune. [This] gives the 
honest but unfortunate debtor, who surrenders for distribution the property he owns at the 
time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by 
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.... This recognises bankruptcy law as a 
social device that is of utmost importance not only for the fundamental private necessary, but 
also for the greater public concern.568  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in the preceding chapters, mortgage finance is an important element of 
the housing market in many countries, as mortgage finance plays a significant role in 
spreading domestic home-ownership and attracting international investment. It 
naturally follows that mortgage debt enforcement is equally important in a country, as 
effective debt enforcement encourages strong credit provision, foreign investment 
and domestic growth.569 Thus, a complex conflict arises in achieving and protecting 
homeowner rights, while also protecting and enforcing mortgagee rights. As 
indicated earlier, finding a utopian balance between mortgagor and mortgagee rights 
has proven difficult in South Africa and in many other jurisdictions. Historically, 
although homeowner interests have always been present in legal discourse, creditor 
interests have always automatically prevailed.570   
 
This chapter seeks to consider the different foreclosure and debt relief approaches 
used by different countries, in particular, the United States of America and England. 
These countries have been chosen due to their strong connection with South African 
law and their strong influence on international consumer laws. Although the English 
and American regulatory frameworks may not suit South African economic 
conditions in a strict sense, there are similarities between these jurisdictions’ 
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historical, legal and cultural elements.571 This chapter will also briefly analyse Irish, 
Spanish and Scottish debt relief laws. These jurisdictions have been chosen as 
these countries have recently modified their debt enforcement and debt relief laws, 
and have implemented innovative policies to govern the interaction between 
mortgagors and mortgagees during the foreclosure process. It is submitted that it will 
be valuable for South African law makers to consider the approaches adopted in 
these foreign jurisdictions and to gain ideas from them as to how to develop our 
current foreclosure process and policies.572  
 
6.2 United States of American Law 
 
6.2.1 Background regarding American policies 
 
Early American insolvency and debt recovery procedures were founded on the early 
English practices and policies of debt slavery and imprisonment. The first forms of 
American insolvency legislation, namely the American Bankruptcy Acts 1800, 1841 
and 1867, were initially directed towards protecting and benefiting creditors. These 
Acts provided minimal protection to bona fide debtors in the form of either discharge 
or exemptions. Concessions and leniency towards debtors only developed during the 
18th century when exemptions and humanitarian issues began to be given 
consideration in order to protect the debtor.573 
 
Today, American consumer debt relief law is regarded as the most unique consumer 
and debt relief system in the world. The uniqueness of the system is that the citizens 
of the United States do not regard insolvency as a last resort, and in fact many 
debtors treat it as a means to another, healthier end, not as the end itself. Unlike 
South Africa, which is predominately creditor oriented, American policies and 
principles are liberal and debtor friendly. As opposed to the ‘advantage to creditors’ 
requirement which is central in South African law, the American system places 
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emphasis on the ‘fresh start’ for the ‘unfortunate debtor’.574 This ‘fresh start’ policy 
assists debtors to build up a new estate by allowing them to keep a number of their 
essential assets.575 Evans describes American insolvency law as a remedial 
mechanism with the ultimate aim to manage economic strain and preserve the 
debtor’s estate.576 He submits that the ‘fresh start’ policy is important as it prevents a 
debtor from becoming a debt slave who depends on social handouts.577 
 
6.2.2 The governing laws and debt relief mechanisms available  
 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 – otherwise known as the Bankruptcy Code 
 
The American insolvency system is currently regulated by the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978. This Act is commonly referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy Code’. Several 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code preceded the current version.578 The Code 
essentially expanded the availability of bankruptcy as a remedy to debtors, and 
expanded the exemptions available to debtors thereby improving the debtor’s 
chance of a fresh start.579 For the purposes of this thesis, Chapters 7 and 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code will be considered, as these chapters relate to the Code’s 
insolvency or debt relief applications.  
 
Chapter 7 provides for what is referred to as ‘straight bankruptcy’, and contemplates 
an orderly court-supervised procedure. Essentially, this process involves the trustee 
collecting the debtor’s assets, selling the assets and distributing the proceeds pro-
rata to creditors. The advantage of this procedure is that the debtor can keep certain 
exempt assets and receive a discharge immediately. As soon as the insolvency 
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order is granted, a separate insolvent estate is created, and simultaneously, the 
debtor starts accumulating a new estate.  
 
Chapter 13 of the Code provides for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts and income 
and is known as the ‘wage earners plan’. The arrangement is designed for an 
individual with regular income to enter into a repayment plan with creditors. Under 
this process, a rehabilitation repayment plan is proposed for a period of three to five 
years. The advantage of this plan is that the debtor retains control and possession of 
his assets and they need not be sold to liquidate creditors’ claims. Unlike Chapter 7, 
Chapter 13 debtors do not  receive an immediate discharge and are compelled to 
complete the payments under the plan before the discharge is received. Chapter 13 
is often preferable to Chapter 7 as it enables the debtor to retain valuable assets 
such as the family home. Chapter 13 is similar to debt review in South African law.   
 
One of the successes of the American bankruptcy system is the fact that it is 
supported by an institutionalised framework consisting of specialised bankruptcy 
courts, judges and trustees.580 One of the recommendations of the 1973 Reform 
Report581 was that the administration of bankruptcy should be turned over to a new 
government agency. As a result of these recommendations Congress passed the 
Bankruptcy Judges, US Trustees & Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. This Act 
provides that trustees must be appointed in every jurisdiction in the United States to 
supervise all bankruptcy cases filed within a particular district. The primary role of the 
trustee is to serve as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process and supervise the 
administration of estates. The specialised court system enables bankruptcy judges to 
hear any matter arising out of bankruptcy cases. In comparison, South Africa does 
not have specialised judicial structures for insolvency matters. Further, in contrast to 
the specialised trustee system in America, the office of the Master in South Africa is 
not specialised and it has other administrative and regulatory duties, in addition to its 
insolvency responsibilities and functions. The question thereafter arises as to 
whether there is a need for specialised insolvency structures in South Africa. 
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Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (‘BAPCPA’) 
 
Due to heavy lobbying by creditor groups criticising the pro-debtor provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, certain amendments were implemented to provide stricter 
requirements for debtors to obtain debt relief.582 In addition to these amendments, 
the BAPCPA was developed to steer bankruptcy policy in the United States away 
from the debtor friendly approach towards a creditor-oriented or neutral policy. This 
came about due to the perception that the integrity of bankruptcy process was being 
tarnished by shrewd and unscrupulous debtors who were exploiting the system.583 
Several debtors were seen to be exploiting the system by manipulating the 
homestead exemption policies and bypassing certain requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The BAPCPA was enacted to end these abuses. The BAPCPA 
retained both the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 procedures, but abolished the debtor’s 
right to choose which remedy to adopt. The BAPCPA introduced a ‘means test’ to 
determine a debtor’s qualification for relief in terms of Chapter 7. If the debtor’s 
income was above a certain threshold, the debtor was not eligible for relief under 
Chapter 7. The new legislation also changed the debtor’s obligation to repay in 
Chapter 13. Instead of proposing their own repayment plans, the new means test 
was based on the debtor’s disposable income and required that all of it be used to 
repay creditors over five years. Generally, the mortgage obligation was not included 
in the repayment plan. Hence, the regular and full mortgage repayments had to be 
maintained. The fact that the mortgagee’s security rights remained intact left the 
mortgagee satisfied while the debtor and his family were able to remain in their 
home.584 The BAPCPA brought about fundamental changes to insolvency law and its 
main intention was to force debtors to make substantial lifestyle changes before they 
could receive any relief or benefit from insolvency.  
 
Another significant amendment by the BAPCPA was the introduction of mandatory 
credit counselling and post-petition financial management education. As a pre-
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requisite to enter into bankruptcy a debtor had to receive credit counselling and 
perform budget analysis testing. The new credit counselling requirement represented 
an alternative to formal bankruptcy in the form of out of court repayment plan 
negotiations. In addition to undergoing credit counselling, the debtor was required to 
complete a personal finance management course as a precondition to receiving 
discharge. Further, the introduction of the mandatory pre-action conferences 
required the creditor to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the debtor by 
negotiating alternative payment arrangements with him, in order to ensure that the 
sale of the home occurred only as a last resort. In comparison, South African law 
does not require a debtor to undergo any financial counselling before or after 
seeking debt relief. This is problematic as it does not provide the debtor with any 
resources to assist him to learn from his mistakes. 
 
6.2.3 The Homestead Exemption  
 
The home exemption clause has been applied in the United States for more than a 
century.585 The American home exemption is said to have started in Texas in 1838, 
and this exemption was only allowed for property that was used as a primary 
residence.586 The exemption, however, could not be used where the home was fully 
mortgaged. According to the home exemption, it is the equity in the home, and not 
the home itself, that is exempt from execution. Therefore, the home exemption is 
generally not effective against the claim of a mortgagee.587  
 
The Bankruptcy Code provides for various State exemptions of property. Section 522 
of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the exemption of the debtor’s assets. The Code 
provides for a list of federal exemptions, but provides that States may opt out of 
these federal exemptions and apply their own State exemptions instead. Most States 
have elected to opt out of the federal exemptions.588 Generally, the homestead 
exemption allows for a fixed maximum value of the debtor’s residence, and as a 
result of States opting out of the federal exemptions, the exemption amount differs 
from State to State. For example, in Alaska, Alaska Statutes allow for an exemption 
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of $ 54 000. Whereas, in Florida, Florida Statutes provide its residents with an 
unlimited home exemption provided the residence does not exceed 160 acres. 
Similarly, in Texas, the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provide an unlimited exemption 
for its residents for homes not exceeding 200 acres. Some academics have criticised 
the application of the exemption laws in the United States as, due to the opting out 
provisions, some debtors will stand to benefit handsomely from the legislation, while 
others may benefit a little depending on the legislation of the particular State.589 
Some of the States that provide exemptions require debtors to file a ‘declaration of 
homestead’ in order to qualify for an exemption. Evans contends that the homestead 
legislation is of little value when the home is mortgaged, as secured creditors have 
preference over homestead equity to the exclusion of debtors and other creditors. 
Therefore, in South Africa, where the majority of homes are mortgaged, the home 
exemption will prove to be of little value, unless a provision is developed to exclude 
the home from the insolvent estate for a particular period during which time the 
debtor can come to a payment arrangement with his/her creditor.590  
 
6.2.4 Comments on American law and comparison with South African law 
 
As explained above, in comparison with American law, which is predominately 
debtor friendly, South African credit law and policies are creditor oriented, and 
founded on the principle of ensuring the ultimate advantage to creditors. The debt 
relief mechanisms available in South Africa are also founded on the principles of full 
creditor satisfaction,591 and the primary feature in South African insolvency law is the 
‘advantage to creditors’ requirement. American law has no such parallel requirement. 
In contrast, American law is founded on the principle of providing the debtor with a 
fresh start and affording the debtor an opportunity to recover from his financial 
misfortunate. 
 
American policies relating to insolvency are structured under a unified Act. In 
comparison, South African insolvency law is scattered across a variety of statutes, 
namely, the Insolvency Act, the Magistrates’ Courts Act, and the Companies Act. 
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This inevitably creates uncertainty and lack of uniformity. It is submitted that South 
Africa should follow the American example and establish uniform or unified 
legislation dealing with all aspects of insolvency. Further, unlike American law which 
has an institutionalised insolvency framework, South African law does not have 
specialised insolvency courts and judges, and it is submitted that this failure has 
resulted in inconsistency in insolvency practice. Accordingly, Chapter Seven will 
consider the adoption of specialised court structures in South Africa to ensure 
consistency in practice.  
 
In South Africa, a statutory discharge is only afforded to a debtor by means of a 
rehabilitation order after a certain period of time. This is clearly in contrast to the 
United States where the fresh start and discharge principles are the core of the 
system. While many may urge the adoption of the fresh start and discharge policies 
in South Africa, it is contended that this would be unwise. It is submitted that one of 
the purposes of insolvency and rehabilitation is to ensure that the debtor learns from 
his financial mistakes, and that creditors receive fair distribution. If the fresh start 
principle were adopted in South Africa, concern would arise about potential abuse, 
as this system would allow dishonest debtors to continue their reckless cycle of 
spending with very little consequence. This would be severely prejudicial to creditors. 
It is therefore argued that the only way a debtor should obtain a discharge and fresh 
start is if he undergoes the sequestration process. Such a drastic procedure should 
ensure that his/her financial errors will not be repeated, thereby supporting economic 
stability and consumer and creditor equality.  
  
6.3 England and Wales 
 
Early English law also imposed harsh penalties upon defaulting debtors. Debtors 
were subject to imprisonment or slavery, and under early insolvency law all the 
assets of the debtor were subject to execution.592 It was only during the 18th century 
that English law developed and adopted a more debtor-friendly approach. 
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Before 1986, where an insolvent was the sole owner of a family home (this was 
usually the husband) the family was continually exposed to the risk of his potential 
insolvency. In certain circumstances, courts would exercise discretion and allow the 
wife and children’s right of occupancy to prevail over the trustee’s right to sell the 
property. A practice thereafter developed where bankruptcy courts would refuse 
orders for possession and sale of the family home where it was likely to cause 
serious domestic hardship.593 As part of the English insolvency law reform in the 
1980s, the Cork Committee recommended a system that would delay the sale of the 
family home by the creditor.594 As a result, sections 336, 337 and 338 of the English 
Insolvency Act 1986 were enacted. These sections provide for the protection of the 
debtor’s home.595 Further, sections 14 and 335A of the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act (1996) allow for the postponement of the sale of the 
family home for up to a year from the date on which it vested with the trustee. After 
that period a further postponement is allowed in exceptional circumstances. 
Accordingly, English law developed to provide protection to the family home and 
acknowledged that the forced sale of the home not only affected the life of the 
insolvent, but also the insolvent’s spouse, children and other occupants. 
 
6.3.1 English foreclosure (repossession) practices 
 
English foreclosure law, or repossession, allows the mortgagee to take immediate 
possession of the hypothecated immovable property, and to exercise his power of 
sale and foreclosure over the property to satisfy his claim.596 The assertion of this  
possessionary right is one of the main remedies for the mortgagee, and is 
implemented as a precursor to the realisation of the mortgagee’s real right of security 
by means of a sale with vacant occupation.597 This principle is one of the 
fundamental differences between South African and English law.598 Despite this 
difference, the policy considerations in South Africa and England are similar. Both 
jurisdictions allow for the balancing of mortgagors’ and mortgagees’ rights and 
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acknowledge the need to protect the home and its occupants while equally 
protecting the creditor’s real right of security. The subsections below will consider 
some of the rules implemented in England to regulate the repossession process. 
 
a. The Mortgage Conduct of Business Rules and Pre-action Protocol for 
Possession Claims based on Mortgage or Home Purchase Plan Arrears in 
respect of Residential Property 
 
The Mortgage Conduct of Business Rules (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MCOB’) 
was issued by the Financial Services Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FSA’) 
in 2003. The MCOB governs the way mortgages are concluded and administered in 
the United Kingdom. Section 13.5 of the MCOB outlines the way in which creditors 
should deal with debtors who are in default, and provides guidelines as to when 
litigation can be instituted. The MCOB provides a guideline that the arrear amount on 
the mortgage must be equivalent to two months before court proceedings can be 
initiated. The MCOB requires the creditor to deal fairly with debtors who are in 
default and requires creditors to put in place internal written policies to comply with 
this duty. The MCOB also requires the creditor to make reasonable efforts to enter 
into payment arrangements with debtors in respect of the arrear amounts or payment 
shortfalls after the sale of the property.599 While the MCOB has been praised for 
creating new rules of practice for managing mortgage defaults, the main criticism of 
the MCOB is that the rules are not legally binding and therefore mortgagees are not 
obliged to comply with the MCOB’s terms.600 The MCOB has thus not been effective 
in compelling creditors to adhere to certain standards of fairness during mortgage 
default. 
 
As a result of these criticisms, in 2008, the Civil Justice Council circulated a 
consultation on a mortgage arrears Protocol which proposed reforms to the 
repossession process.601 This resulted in the implementation of ‘the Pre-action 
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Protocol for possession claims based on mortgage of home purchase plan arrears in 
respect of residential property’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Pre-action Protocol’). 
The Pre-action Protocol tries to encourage creditors to assist debtors and only 
proceed to repossession as a last resort. The Pre-action Protocol demands a higher 
degree of equitable dealing by creditors and encourages telephonic and written 
correspondence with the debtor prior to the initiation of litigation.602  The Pre-action 
Protocol further sets out a number of actions the court would expect creditors to 
have taken before litigating against the debtor. The Protocol also imposes upon 
creditors a number of requirements which, inter alia, make it compulsory for the 
creditor to communicate with the debtor, discuss the cause of the default, discuss 
the debtor’s financial circumstances, and consider reasonable methods to repay the 
arrear amounts.603  
 
Many major creditors, in consultation with government during the implementation of 
the Pre-action Protocol agreed that they would only start mortgage repossession 
proceedings against a debtor once the arrear amount on the mortgage had accrued 
for three months.604 Section 103 of the Law of Property Act 1925 also provides that a 
mortgagee may not exercise any repossessionary rights until the mortgagor has 
been in default of payment for at least three months after having received notice to 
pay. It was hoped that this three month period would give all parties sufficient time to 
comply with the Pre-action Protocol, and that it would allow debtors an opportunity to 
seek any financial assistance or any desired relief.605  
 
The Pre-action Protocol further provides that the creditor should consider postponing 
any repossession proceedings if the debtor has taken steps to privately market and 
sell the property. However, the creditor is not compelled to stay enforcement 
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proceedings and the Pre-action Protocol offers no guidance on the factors to be 
taken into consideration during the marketing of the property. Whitehouse claims that 
the Pre-action Protocol is an opportunity lost as it has failed to alter the rights and 
obligations of the parties. Whitehouse submits that the Pre-action Protocol does not 
significantly impact the behaviour of creditors and has assisted debtors minimally. 
She argues that most of the recommendations in the Pre-action Protocol were taken 
verbatim from the MCOB, which have not proven to be effective in curbing mortgage 
repossessions. Many creditors were unwilling to follow the recommendations of the 
MCOB in providing to debtors payment holidays or capitalisation of the arrear 
amounts. Whitehouse submits that the Pre-action Protocol should have made it 
compulsory for creditors to assist debtors and afford some protection to homeowners 
and their families.606  
 
Despite the failure of the Pre-action Protocol to provide compulsory terms, it does 
provide some sanctions to creditors who fail to comply with its rules. Paragraph 4.6 
provides that the court may take into account the parties’ compliance with the Pre-
action Protocol when making a decision in a mortgage dispute and when making an 
order for costs. The court may also impose a sanction on a party who has failed to 
comply with the Pre-action Protocol, particularly in circumstances where court 
proceedings have unnecessarily commenced and led to wasted legal costs.607  
 
In summary, the Pre-action Protocol specifically requires court enforcement 
proceedings to be brought as a last resort after all efforts to resolve the default have 
failed. The Pre-action Protocol requires the creditor to complete a formal checklist 
and to provide this checklist form to the court setting out his negotiations with the 
debtor.608 Steyn submits that a Pre-action checklist similar to the one provided for in 
the Pre-action Protocol should be compiled and applied in South Africa.609 Steyn 
submits that in order to truly uphold Section 26 of the Constitution, a more explicit 
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process should be mapped out for creditors and courts to follow as achieved in 
England by the Pre-action Protocol. It is submitted that elements of the English Pre-
action Protocol should be implemented in South Africa. Guidelines or rules for 
foreclosure process are currently absent in South African law, and this has led to 
much inconsistency and abuse. However, one of the main criticisms of the MCOB 
and the Pre-action Protocol are their failure to provide mandatory rules or to impose 
any meaningful sanctions on creditors who do not comply with their requirements. 
The Pre-action Protocol makes compliance with its terms optional and non-
obligatory. Although the Pre-action Protocol does subject creditors who do not 
comply with its terms, to adverse cost orders, more meaningful sanctions are 
required. In this respect, it is submitted that stricter rules of compliance are required 
and this supports the view that legislation in the form of a Foreclosure Act should be 
implemented in South Africa. It is suggested that legislation must be created to 
provide mandatory rules and processes for both debtors and creditors before and 
during the foreclosure process. A Foreclosure Act will create clear rules and it will set 
out strict sanctions and penalties for non-compliance for both debtors and 
creditors.610 
 
b. The Administration of Justice Act 1970 and The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
 
In Chapter Four, the right to reinstatement in section 129 (3) of the NCA was 
discussed. English law also provides its debtors with the right to reinstatement in 
section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as ‘AJA’). 
Section 36 of the AJA, entitled ‘additional powers of court in action by mortgagee for 
possession of dwelling house’, provides relief to debtors as it provides the court with 
discretion to stay any possessionary claim and grant a stay on proceedings against 
debtors facing temporary financial difficulties. Section 36 provides the court with the 
authority to adjourn proceedings for a reasonable period of time to allow the debtor 
to pay any sums due or to remedy the default. This provision therefore provides 
valuable support to a debtor facing temporary financial difficulties.611  As indicated, 
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section 36 of the AJA appears to be similar to section 129 (3) of the NCA as it is 
premised on the debtor’s ability to pay the arrear amount. 
 
English law is subject to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, and all English courts have an obligation 
to apply and interpret the common law in line with the Convention. Article 8 of the 
European Convention governs the exercise of the court’s discretion in section 36. 
Article 8 acknowledges that the content of the ‘right to a home’ may not be interfered 
with and provides that although people may not have a positive right to be provided 
with housing, they are protected against unlawful interference with their existing 
housing rights. It is submitted that Article 8 is similar, in many respects, to Section 26 
of the Constitution. Both Article 8 and Section 26 protect one’s home from unjustified 
interference, but neither explicitly entitles one to the right to housing. In other words, 
neither Article 8 nor section 26 provides an absolute right. Both provisions provide 
for qualified rights that can be infringed, or limited, under justifiable circumstances 
based on the proportionality test.612 Article 8 sets out the circumstances where 
interference with housing rights will be justifiable. Essentially, the interference must 
be prescribed by law, it must be directed at one of the aims of Article 8 (2), and it 
must be necessary in a democratic society. The conditions of maintaining the 
economic well-being of the country and protecting the rights and freedoms of others, 
will cater for the rights of creditors in terms of a mortgage agreement.613 In other 
words, the creditor’s right to foreclosure or to repossess a property will be justifiable 
in terms of Article 8. 
 
As with Section 26 of the Constitution, Article 8 also requires that there be a 
proportionate and legitimate aim to any interference of the right. This requires the 
court to examine whether the granting of foreclosure or repossesionary orders will be 
necessary taking into consideration the impact on the debtor and the occupiers.614 
Article 8 requires the court to enquire whether there is a legitimate need for the 
interference, and whether the interference is proportionate to the goal. Courts are 
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also required to enquire whether there are less invasive ways to achieve the same 
goal. However, the issue of proportionality between the right to respect the home, 
and the measures imposed to protect the rights of creditors, has not been explicitly 
worked out in judgments and thus remains unclear and is still heavily weighted in 
favour of creditors.615 As discussed in Chapter Two, in South Africa the 
proportionality test is provided for in Section 36 of the Constitution. During execution 
against the home Section 36 requires that the importance of the debtor’s right 
(housing right) must be balanced against the purpose of the violation and the impact 
of the violation (the enforcement of mortgage rights). As discussed in Chapters Two 
and Three, the enforcement of mortgage rights against residential property serves a 
legitimate public purpose and accordingly qualifies as a justifiable limitation of 
Section 26 of the Constitution. Section 36, however, provides that limitation would 
not be allowed if there were less invasive ways to achieve the same purpose, and if 
limitation amounts to an abuse of process. This is the central element of the 
proportionality test. Clear guidelines for the application of the proportionality test are 
however currently absent in both South Africa and England.  This gap emphasises 
the need for a clear proportionality test to be implemented for foreclosure scenarios, 
and it is accordingly submitted that this can be done through adopting a Foreclosure 
Act. It is submitted that a Foreclosure Act will provide for a proportionality test and 
set out exact factors for a court to consider in a foreclosure application.616 
 
6.3.2 Debt relief measures available  
 
Currently, debtors in England and Wales have two main options in dealing with their 
debt problems – namely, formal options under the Insolvency Act 1986 
(Bankruptcies and Individual Voluntary Arrangements) and informal options (Debt 
Management Plans).617  For the purpose of this thesis, the formal options will be 
considered.  
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a. Formal options under the Insolvency Act  
 
(i) Bankruptcy  
 
Early English bankruptcy laws categorised bankrupt debtors as anti-social, immoral 
individuals who took advantage of creditors.618 Bankruptcy laws in England therefore 
imposed harsh penalties, including imprisonment, and even capital punishment, on 
defaulting debtors. Over the centuries however, there has been a benign progression 
from the stigmatisation of debtors, towards the recognition that creditor interests 
would be best served by affording the debtor a fresh start. The main source of 
bankruptcy in English law is the Insolvency Act of 1986, which was founded on the 
recommendations from the Cork Report. The Act has been amended several times, 
and the Enterprise Act has probably had the largest impact to the Insolvency Act.619 
The Enterprise Act brought about reforms that attempted to eliminate the stigma of 
bankruptcy and establish a more enterprise-oriented culture.620 
 
The overall responsibility for insolvency law in England rests with the Department of 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. This responsibility is discharged by 
members of the Insolvency Service. The Insolvency Service is responsible for 
establishing insolvency policies and legislation, and also for advising the Ministry on 
domestic and international insolvency matters.621 In contrast, in the United States 
and South Africa, the American Trustee and South African Master of the High Court 
plays no active role in the establishment of insolvency policy.  
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A bankruptcy order stays all debt enforcement proceedings by creditors against the 
debtor.622 The bankruptcy is terminated by discharge and annulment. Under English 
law a debtor, the bankrupt individual, may obtain an automatic discharge, one year 
from the date of the bankruptcy order, provided that the bankrupt’s conduct does not 
give rise to public concern. Thus, the debtor must ‘earn’ this discharge and fresh 
start, and there is a considerable quid pro quo for a bankruptcy fresh start. It is 
possible for a bankrupt person to get an automatic discharge within a year only if 
he/she became bankrupt due to misfortune and if their conduct was not culpable. 
The discharge releases the bankrupt from all bankruptcy debts, and frees him from 
the disabilities and disqualifications to which he was personally subject while 
bankrupt. However, the discharge does not affect the right of any creditor to prove in 
the bankruptcy any debt from which the bankrupt is released. Also, if a bankrupt’s 
behaviour is socially unacceptable, post-discharge restrictions can be imposed. This 
may be done through a Bankruptcy Restriction Order (‘BRO’) or a Bankruptcy 
Restriction Undertaking (‘BRU’).623 
 
(ii) Individual Voluntary Arrangements (‘IVAs’)  
 
IVAs are binding consensual agreements between debtors and creditors, and are 
regarded as a formal debt relief mechanism in English law. IVAs are usually used to 
restructure unsecured debts and are facilitated by an IP within the parameters of a 
statutory framework.624 IVAs are flexible in that they allow debtors to make affordable 
contributions from assets, ongoing income or third party funds. The duration of the 
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IVA is not limited in terms of statute. However, in practice, it generally lasts for a 
period of five years.625 
 
Debtors who wish to achieve a resettlement of their debts through an IVA must start 
by making a proposal to their creditors. An IVA only becomes legally binding if it is 
approved by more than 75% of the creditors by value.626 Once an IVA is approved it 
binds all creditors. The court plays no part in the IVA approval process.627 There are 
very few limits on what can be agreed. The only statutory controls are terms that 
adversely affect the rights of secured or preferent creditors. In other words, an IVA 
may not contain any terms which affect the rights of secured or preferent creditors to 
enforce their security.628 Terms of this nature cannot be approved without the 
concurrence of the secured creditors who are affected. Therefore, debtors who are 
homeowners must keep up their full mortgage repayments to avoid repossession. 
 
IVAs have a range of potential advantages for debtors when compared to 
bankruptcy. Debtors may prefer an IVA to other options, including bankruptcy, for the 
following reasons: 
 
 IVAs provide a stay on individual debt collection efforts and freeze interest on 
outstanding debts. They allow for a measure of a discharge upon completion 
of the plan. 
 Debtors can agree to repay what they can afford over a defined time period. 
 Debtors can avoid the publicity and stigma attached to bankruptcy.  
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 IVAs, unlike bankruptcies, allow debtors in certain occupational and 
professional groups, to continue with that occupation or profession. 
 Salaried home-owners can keep up their mortgage repayments, and avoid 
exposing their home to risk. This departs from bankruptcies where the home 
is at risk.629 
 
6.3.3 Comments on English law and comparison with South African law 
 
As discussed above, in comparison with South African insolvency and debt relief 
laws, which are predominantly creditor oriented, English laws are debtor orientated 
and built on the premise that the debtor should be assisted during difficult financial 
times.  There are two main debt relief options in England, namely, bankruptcy and 
the IVA. While, the English bankruptcy process is similar to South African insolvency 
law, English insolvency law does not have an ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement. 
The English insolvency process is straightforward and more lenient than South 
African law as it provides the debtor with a discharge a year after the bankruptcy 
order. However, post-discharge restrictions were introduced in England to prevent 
any abuse of the system by unscrupulous debtors seeking to take advantage of the 
discharge. The IVA functions as a form of debt repayment plan in England. IVAs give 
debtors an opportunity for rehabilitation through a fresh start, but they make the 
debtor ‘earn’ a fresh start. IVAs allow debtors to pay according to how much they can 
afford, and this gives salaried consumers a chance to keep their homes, provided 
they can maintain their mortgage repayments.630 
 
England has also adopted several codes and protocols which provide guidelines for 
both debtors and creditors during repossession proceedings. The MCOB and the 
Pre-action Protocol provide detailed rules for both parties, in particular creditors, 
concerning their duties prior to initiating debt enforcement proceedings. However, 
one of the flaws of the MCOB and the Pre-action Protocol are that these provisions 
are not law, and therefore it is not compulsory for creditors to follow them. In 
                                                 
629
 See Walters, International Insolvency Review. 20-21. Creditors can also benefit from IVAs. They 
can receive greater returns than in bankruptcy since creditors can request payment for longer than 
the five year limit in bankruptcies. Creditors would also receive a better reputation if they support IVAs 
instead of immediately resorting to bankruptcy. 
630
 It is submitted that IVAs are similar to South Africa’s debt review system, however, under the IVA 
the mortgage agreement is not included in the debt rearrangement payment plan. 
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comparison, South African law does not have any guidelines or rules for foreclosure 
practice. It is accordingly submitted that South Africa can learn from the English 
practice of adopting rules of practice to regulate foreclosure or repossession 
proceedings. It is suggested that South Africa should adopt legislative rules for 
foreclosure practice in the form of a Foreclosure Act, with which both debtors and 
creditors must comply before, during and after the foreclosure process. 
 
6.4 A consideration of other jurisdictions  
 
The fall in the housing prices during the recession led to a high volume of mortgage 
defaults internationally.631 Many jurisdictions adapted their laws to cater for the 
increase in foreclosures. Several countries, including Scotland, Ireland and Spain 
implemented new mortgage resolution processes to provide temporary relief to 
struggling homeowners.632 Many jurisdictions introduced a foreclosure moratorium or 
temporary freeze on debt payments and interest to assist debtors during the 
recession. Several states also implemented different debt relief mechanisms to 
reduce or extend the period of payment on loans.633 The subsections below will 
briefly consider how some jurisdictions reacted to the foreclosure crisis, and discuss 
the mechanisms implemented to assist debtors to keep their homes. 
 
6.4.1 Scotland 
 
The most recent reform in Scottish foreclosure process was the Home Owner and 
Debtor Protection Act 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘HODPA’). This Act was 
implemented in response to the increased repossessions and consequent 
homelessness resulting from the 2008 recession. The HODPA, in conjunction with 
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 See Ellen and Dastrup, ‘Housing and the Great Recession’, (2012), The Stanford Centre on 
poverty and Inequality, Baker, ‘The housing bubble and the financial crisis’, Real World Economics 
Review (2009) Issue 46, 73, Holt, ‘A summary of the primary causes of the housing bubble and the 
resulting credit crisis’, The Journal of Business Inquiry (2009) 8.1, 120, and Shiller, ‘Irrational 
Exuberance’ (2006), Princeton Press (2 ed). 
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 See Andritzky, IMF Working Paper, Resolving residential mortgage distress: Time to Modify 
14/226 (2014) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Andritzky, IMF Working Paper’). 
633
 Andritzky, IMF Working Paper, 9-20. Many foreign banks modified their loan agreements to assist 
debtors either by refinancing or restructuring the loan. In America, the HOPE Alliance and the HAMP 
provided incentive payments to creditors to modify loan repayments and assist debtors. In America, 
approximately ten percent of all mortgage loans were modified under HAMP during the 2009 period. 
See also Steyn, LLD thesis, 498. 
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the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘CFRA’), introduced restrictions upon creditors wishing to enforce their real right of 
security over immovable property used for residential purposes. The HODPA 
provides that a court may not grant a repossession application in favour of a creditor 
unless it is satisfied that certain pre-action requirements have been complied with, 
and that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.634  The HODPA further 
provides for the exclusion of a debtor’s main residence from repossession up to a 
certain financial limit. 
 
The CFRA introduced a pre-action checklist which required the creditor to, inter alia, 
provide the debtor with information relating to the arrear amount due and to refer the 
debtor to debt assistance management; to make reasonable efforts to assist the 
debtor in developing a payment plan for fulfilment of his obligations and to refrain 
from any court proceedings while the debtor is taking steps to resolve the default.635 
These requirements are very similar to that of the English Pre-action Protocol. The 
main difference between the English Pre-action Protocol and CFRA is that the 
Scottish Pre-action requirements are encapsulated in national legalisation. Thus, the 
CFRA makes it compulsory for creditors to adhere to its rules, whereas in England 
the pre-action requirements set out in Protocols and Codes are not binding. 
 
The HODPA also sought to include mandatory debt advice and education to debtors 
prior to accessing any debt relief procedure, and also linked the debtor’s discharge in 
sequestration to his co-operation during this process. The HODPA further introduced 
payment holidays in all debt relief procedures and required the freezing of interest 
and other charges following entry into any debt relief program. Moreover, various 
statutory provisions allowed the court to delay the sale of the home in certain 
circumstances.636 These provisions allowed the court, after consideration of the 
debtor’s affairs, to postpone the realisation of the home for up to three years. 
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 See also sections 23 and 24 of the CFRA. Section 24A of the CFRA provides that the court must 
take into account, inter alia, the nature and reason for the default; the ability of the debtor to settle the 
default within a reasonable time; the actions taken by the creditor to assist the debtor; and alternative 
accommodation available to the debtor. 
635
 See Steyn, SLR, (2015), 146. The HODPA requires the creditor to engage in pre-action contact 
with debtors on settlement of the arrear amount, prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, and 
provide the court with details of these communications. 
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 See section 24 of the HODPA (Scotland) and section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act 1985. 
159 
 
 
Insolvency in Scotland also recently underwent major reform. The reforms were 
aimed at updating the credit law and ensuring that it was fit for the modern economy. 
The reforms sought to reduce the stigma attached to insolvency by encouraging 
entrepreneurship and reasonable business risk. The resultant changes included 
changes to the provisions for automatic discharge and the introduction of an element 
of debt relief into the debt arrangement scheme.  
 
Scottish law also provides for informal debt relief mechanisms via a trust deed for 
creditors and debt arrangement schemes. A trust deed operates as an informal 
sequestration as it conveys the debtor’s assets and income to a trustee to be 
administrated for the benefit of creditors.637 The Debt Arrangement and Attachment 
Act 2002 provide debtors with a moratorium from creditor debt enforcement through 
a debt arrangement scheme. Debt arrangement schemes allow debtors with multiple 
debts to enter into voluntary debt payment programmes with their creditors for 
repayment of their debts over a certain period of time. This programme protects the 
debtor from enforcement action by creditors, and also allows for interest and penalty 
charges to be frozen.638 Debt arrangements schemes are, however, not open for 
secured claims and thus do not affect mortgage debts.  
 
6.4.2 Ireland 
 
Ireland was one of the countries hit hardest by the recent recession. The Irish 
government reacted to this crisis by introducing several measures to reduce the 
forced sales of homes.639 The reform of Irish insolvency law resulted in three new 
debt resolution processes, namely the Code of Conduct of Mortgage Arrears 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘CCMA’), the Mortgage Arrears Resolution Process 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘MARP’), and, Personal Insolvency Arrangements 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘PIA’). 
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 McKenzie Skene, Once more unto the breach: Further bankruptcy reform in Scotland, Conference 
paper at the INSOL conference at the Hague, March 2013. Skene submits that the reforms in 
Scotland sought to achieve greater consistency amongst the debt relief procedures and sought to 
achieve a fair and just process for the payment of mortgage debt. 
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 See Scotland Debt Arrangement and Attachment Act 2002. 
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 Steyn, LLD thesis, 509. 
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In 2009,640 the original version of the CCMA was implemented by the Central Bank. 
The CCMA applied specifically to mortgaged property that was the primary residence 
of the debtor and regulated lending activities of mortgagees. The CCMA required 
mortgagees to deal sympathetically with debtors who were in payment default. It 
required every mortgage lender to have in place a MARP. One of the main 
objectives of the CCMA was to increase debtor education and counselling. Similar to 
the English Pre-action Protocol and Scottish HOPDA, the CCMA prescribes certain 
rules for creditors to follow should a debtor fall into default. However, unlike the 
English Pre-action Protocol, the CCMA is a mandatory process. The CCMA provides 
that the creditor is required to convey a warning to the debtor about the possibility 
and consequences of repossession, and undertake an assessment of the debtor’s 
finances to consider alternative payment arrangements.641 The CCMA prohibits 
creditors from commencing repossession proceedings against a debtor’s primary 
residence until every reasonable effort could be made to agree on an alternative 
arrangement.642 The CCMA further provides that at least twelve months must lapse, 
from the date on which the debtor entered MARP, before the creditor can apply to 
court to commence legal action.643 The CCMA thus serves as a foreclosure guideline 
for creditors and introduces a moratorium on foreclosure process. 
 
In 2011, MARP was formally introduced. As indicated above, MARP served as a 
regulatory guideline for the interaction between the debtor and creditor during the 
foreclosure process.644 MARP is set out in the CCMA and is aimed at facilitating 
repayment arrangements between the parties with the objective of pending 
foreclosure.645 A debtor would enter the creditor’s MARP once the mortgage was 
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 A revised version of the CCMA was introduced in July 2011 following a report by the Expert Group 
on Mortgage Arrears and Personal Debt. This version was revised again in 2013. The full Code is 
available on the Central Bank website www.centralbank.ie. 
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 See Provisions 32-34 of the CCMA. The CCMA required the creditor to consider options of 
extending the term of the mortgage period, capitalising the arrear amount, and deferring interest 
and/or instalment payments.  
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 See Provision 46 of the CCMA. 
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 Provision 47 of the CCMA. 
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process starts by the creditor requesting the debtor to complete a Standard Financial Statement form 
outlining the debtor’s financial position. The creditor will assess the form and determine whether a 
payment arrangement is possible. Once an arrangement is concluded debt enforcement proceedings 
are placed on hold. 
645
 MARP caters for three instances, namely, when a debtor is pre-arrears (not in arrears, but 
anticipates falling into default), already in default, or when an existing payment arrangement breaks 
down.  
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thirty one days in arrears.646 MARP made it mandatory for all banks to develop 
mortgage resolution strategies aimed to assist debtors. These programs, however, 
had some challenges as many banks experienced difficulties in engaging with 
debtors, particularly where arrear amounts built up loans for years without any legal 
consequences due to the moratorium. In other words, while a debtor is engaged in 
MARP the creditor is prohibited from enforcing any repossession proceedings 
against the debtor.647 Many debtors used the process as a stalling tactic and 
frustrated the claims of creditors. As a result, several rules were developed to 
exclude MARP’s application from debtors who are deemed to be un-cooperative.648 
In this respect, MARP equally requires bona fide co-operation by both the debtor and 
creditor, and provides strong provisions on what happens should a debtor be 
declared un-cooperative.649 Once MARP no longer applies, the creditor can 
commence legal proceedings. The creditor is required to inform the debtor in writing 
of the commencement of legal action and inform the debtor about the options of 
voluntary surrender and voluntary sale. The repossession proceedings can 
commence either three months from the date the debtor entered MARP, or eight 
months from the date when the default initially arose, whichever is later.650  
 
The Personal Insolvency Act 2012 also provides for debt relief in the form of a PIA. 
PIAs were developed to cater for the settlement of unsecured and secured debts, 
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 The CCMA provides that once the arrears are outstanding for thirty one days, the creditor must 
provide the debtor with a letter advising the debtor of the arrear amount due, the payments missed 
and explain the MARP process to the debtor. The letter must also alert the debtor to the 
consequences of non co-operation, and the effect of the default on the debtor’s credit rating (this is 
somewhat similar to the section 129 notice in the NCA). 
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 Andritsky, IMF Working Paper, 17. The foreclosure moratoria limited creditors’ options of pursing 
delinquent borrowers, and these legal barriers weakened the leverage of many banks in engaging 
with consumers. The more generous provisions in Ireland relaxed the debtor’s willingness to negotiate 
with creditors. Further, during the moratorium period, the condition and value of the home deteriorated 
and this negatively affected the creditor’s security. Banks were required to build new strategies and 
cultures for loan collections. This involved the introduction of new loan modification options. 
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 A debtor is deemed to be unco-operative if he fails to make full and honest disclosure of 
information, or deliberately delays in real engagement with the creditor. 
649
 See Review of the Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears, Response to Consultation Paper CP63 
by the MABS National Development Limited, January 2013.  
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 See also section 2 of the Family Home Bill 2011. The Bill precludes a creditor from commencing 
repossession proceedings against a family home unless it certifies, in writing, to the court that it has 
complied with the CCMA. Section 2 further requires the court to consider the conduct of the creditor in 
assisting the debtor with restructuring the loan and recapitalising the arrear amount. The Bill allows 
the court to refuse an order for repossession and instead order that the debtor remain in the family 
home as a court approved tenant, requiring the debtor to pay rental to the creditor on terms fixed by 
the court. The Bill is yet to be implemented. 
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including mortgages up to three million euros. PIAs usually last a term of six years.651 
The Insolvency Service of Ireland has published detailed information and guidelines 
about PIAs.652 A debtor applying for PIA must have co-operated with MARP for at 
least six months and have been unable to agree on an alternative payment 
arrangement. Majority creditor approval is required to conclude a PIA and after 
approval the arrangement is administered by the Insolvency Service and approved 
by the courts. A key feature of the PIA is that, in the majority of cases, the debtor will 
be able to remain in his home.653 The PIA appears to have been specifically tailored 
to facilitate mortgage debts alongside other debts.  
 
The PIA process begins with the debtor and a Personal Insolvency Practitioner 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘PIPs’) developing a proposal. The Insolvency Service of 
Ireland provides guidance and regulates PIPs.654 The PIP will apply to court for a 
protective certificate which confirms that the creditor cannot proceed with debt 
enforcement against the debtor while the PIA is in place. Under the PIA, the debtor 
repays a percentage of his debts in one monthly payments over a period of time to 
his PIP for distribution to the creditors. The overall aim of the PIA is to resolve 
unsecured debt within seven years and restructure the secured debt thereafter. If 
there is any outstanding unsecured debt after seven years, creditors will write off 
these debts.655  Thus, at the end of the process, the debtors unsecured debts will be 
discharged or settled, and the remaining secured debts will need to be maintained 
and settled in full. In this way PIA’s are similar to South Africa’s debt review. 
However, unlike debt review, which does not place a limitation on the numbers of 
times a debtor can apply for debt review, PIA’s may only be engaged in once during 
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 See sections 120-122 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 and Guide to a Personal Insolvency 
Arrangement, by the Insolvency Service of Ireland, September 2015.  
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 See ‘A solution for people with unmanageable debts including mortgages’, guidelines for PIAs by 
the Insolvency Service of Ireland. 
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 See ‘A solution for people with unmanageable debts including mortgages, by the Insolvency 
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of Ireland. 
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 See ‘A solution for people with unmanageable debts including mortgages, by the Insolvency 
Service of Ireland’. 
163 
 
the debtor’s lifetime. If the debtor defaults on the arrangement, the creditor is entitled 
to proceed with foreclosure.656   
 
6.4.3 Spain 
 
Spanish foreclosure law has been described as the strictest debt enforcement 
system in Europe.657 During 2012, Spanish courts authorised over 50 000 
foreclosures and court records reveal that from 2006 to 2013 over 500 000 families 
lost their homes to foreclosure. These statistics reveal that Spain’s mortgage laws 
give particular leverage to mortgagees and other creditors. This is shown by the fact 
that even after debtors cede their homes to banks, under Spanish law homeowners 
continue to carry mortgage debt left over after the auction of the home.658 In this 
respect, Spanish law is similar to South African law, as both jurisdictions hold the 
debtor liable for any monetary shortfall after the forced sale of the property. Spanish 
law is, however, stricter than South African law as in Spain the mortgage debt is 
excluded from bankruptcy. Further, no fresh start is afforded to Spanish debtors and 
they cannot even own a car after foreclosure.  
 
During 2012, Spanish citizens undertook several protests after the suicide of nine 
homeowners who were facing foreclosure of their homes.659 This public outcry 
resulted in the reform of Spanish foreclosure law. The Spanish government 
introduced foreclosure guidelines in the form of a ‘Code of Good Practice’ for banks 
to deal with debtors. The Code allowed for a temporary halt or moratorium on 
foreclosure proceedings in the form of a two year freeze on foreclosure. The two 
year freeze was afforded to single parent families, unemployed debtors, households 
with children under three years of age, persons with serious disabilities or illness, 
and families with a household income of less than 1 600 euros. The Code also 
provided more leeway for debtors to renegotiate mortgage repayments and stay in 
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their homes. These initiatives extended the period of the mortgage and helped the 
debtor to decrease mortgage payments. Further, Spanish laws have recently been 
amended to place limits on the amount of interest and costs on defaulting loans, and 
they allow the debtor up to ten years to repay arrear amounts.660 
 
One of the other options exercised in Spain is the ‘mortgage to rent’ conversation. 
This allows a defaulting debtor to sell his home to the bank, and remain in 
occupation as a tenant and pay rental to the bank. The debtor also has an 
opportunity to repurchase the property once his financial position becomes stable 
again.661 
 
6.4.4 New Zealand  
 
New Zealand has also recently reformed its debt relief laws. The Insolvency Act 55 
of 2006 of New Zealand provides for several alternative measures to bankruptcy in 
the form of proposals, summary instalment orders662 and the ‘no asset’ procedure.663 
New Zealand was one of the first jurisdictions that made provision for the ‘NINA’ - no 
income, no asset, debtor. 
 
Sections 361 to 377 of the New Zealand Insolvency Act makes provision for NINA 
debtors. The NINA process usually lasts for a twelve month period, as opposed to 
the three year period under insolvency. Once the NINA procedure becomes 
effective, a moratorium is placed on debt enforcement proceedings and the debtor is 
not allowed to obtain any further credit (this is similar to South Africa’s debt review). 
The New Zealand government set up strict entry requirements for the NINA 
procedure to prevent any cases of abuse.664 After a period of twelve months, the 
                                                 
660
 Andritzky, IMF Working Paper, 12. Many European States have responded to consumer pressure 
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prevented banks from foreclosing against homes. 
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 See Andritzky, IMF Working Paper, 14. 
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 Summary instalment orders are essentially payment plans between the creditor and debtor 
agreeing for the debtor to pay a reduced instalment for a period of three to five years. 
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 See Part 5 of the New Zealand Insolvency Act, and Brown, The financial health benefits of a quick 
NAP-New Zealand’s solution to consumer insolvency, INSOL Conference, Vancouver, June 2009, 8. 
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 See section 363 of the New Zealand Insolvency Act. A debtor is required to apply to an assignee 
and submit a statement of affairs as to his financial position, assets and liabilities. The NINA 
procedure can be terminated by the assignee if the debtor was dishonest in his application and 
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NINA debtor will be automatically discharged from the procedure. One of the major 
driving forces behind the introduction of the NINA procedure was the need to 
channel asset-less debtors to a more appropriate debt relief measure.665 
 
As in South African law, in New Zealand sequestration can be applied for by either 
the debtor or creditor. The sequestration application also occurs by court application 
and no moratorium is provided to the debtor prior to the court approval of the 
sequestration. New Zealand, however, does not provide for an ‘advantage to 
creditors’ requirement. Hence, in South Africa, a NINA debtor will not be successful 
with a sequestration application. South Africa does not provide any assistance to the 
NINA debtor. The NINA debtor, in South Africa, is punished as, if a debtor has no 
assets to satisfy the ‘advantage to creditor’ requirement, he is left without any debt 
relief remedy. Roestoff and Coetzee submit that South Africa can seek guidance 
from New Zealand in realising that it is not sensible to put a NINA debtor through a 
costly sequestration procedure. They claim that the current debt review procedure 
and the proposed pre-liquidation composition will not assist NINA debtors. The no 
asset procedure in New Zealand offers an uncomplicated mechanism whose 
simplicity is attractive to a developing country’.666 
 
6.4.5 Other States and overall comments 
 
In 2009, the European Commission recognised the severe consequences of 
foreclosure and compiled a Working Paper667 to examine the measures in place by 
member states to react to the increase in foreclosures. The European Commission 
proposed measures to promote responsible lending with the aim of reducing the rate 
of residential foreclosures. The Working Paper revealed that in many member states, 
creditors voluntarily adopted internal policies to assist debtors and avoid 
                                                                                                                                                        
concealed assets. In such cases, the debtor will be liable for penalties and any interest that may have 
accrued while the procedure was in place. 
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 Coetzee and Roestoff, Consumer debt relief in South Africa – Should the insolvency system 
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 See Coetzee and Roestoff, Consumer debt relief in South Africa, 37. 
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procedures for residential mortgage loans, (2011). 
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foreclosure.668 In France, many creditors relied on specialised mediation and 
arbitration mechanisms to negotiate arrangements with debtors.669 In France, there is 
also an official body that acts as an arbiter between the bank and the debtor to work 
out repayment of the loan. Only if this process fails will the bank take the matter to 
court. 
 
Certain states, in reaction to the increased foreclosure rates, introduced moratoria or 
loan modification terms to assist debtors. In France, provisions were set in place to 
allow courts to suspend the debtor’s payment obligations for up to two years. In 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, debtors could seek assistance from the 
courts by requesting reduced instalment payments, delayed payments, reduced 
interest rates or recapitalisation of the arrear amounts.670 In Germany, a debtor can 
apply for the suspension of any summons served by a creditor if there is a 
reasonable prospect of repaying the arrear amount within six months. A similar 
approach is adopted in Scotland, Hungary and Belgium, as courts and creditors 
usually allow time extensions to debtors to allow them to get their affairs in order and 
settle the arrear amount within a reasonable time period. This practice also forces 
creditors to enter into payment arrangements with debtors and to reschedule debts. 
The European Commission Working Paper found that several states required a 
minimum period to lapse before the creditor could initiate foreclosure proceedings. 
This minimum period was vital as it allowed the parties to negotiate with each other 
to reach a suitable arrangement.671 This is beneficial to both parties as it allows the 
debtor time to settle any outstanding payments, and saves the creditor from 
unnecessary legal costs.  
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 In 2015, the Croatian government announced a fresh start scheme which was aimed at providing a 
discharge to poor individuals. The Scheme requires municipalities and banks to write off debts of 
certain debtors. Policymakers that give debtors a fresh start under these circumstances without a debt 
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higher interest rates and fees. See also The Feasibility of Debt Forgiveness Programme in South 
Africa, April 2015, by the NCR, 8. 
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South African law fails to provide any guidelines to creditors on appropriate timelines 
on when to, or when not to, initiate litigation. Accordingly, in South Africa different 
organisations use different rules when considering whether to start debt collection 
proceedings, and this has created inconsistency in practice. As noted above, this is 
in contrast to England, Scotland and Ireland, where codes or legislation provide 
exact guidelines to debtors and creditors as to when foreclosure can be initiated, and 
the duties of each party during this process. 
 
From the analysis above, it is noted that different countries have adopted different 
methods to deal with their debt challenges. Overall, all the countries provide some 
form of forbearance with their debtors. Many states adopt a foreclosure moratorium, 
or debt rearrangement and loan modification policies, to restructure loan 
repayments. These countries have realised that loan modifications or a moratorium 
could offer a mutually beneficial way to resolve mortgage defaults.672 Foreclosures 
impact heavily on the economy of the country, and harsh foreclosure processes may 
destroy many societal values and structures and result in losses for all the parties 
concerned. Thus, alternative solutions such as loan modifications, debt repayment 
plans and moratoria can provide substantial economic and social benefits. 
Internationally, these forbearance procedures have assisted several debtors to keep 
their homes. These procedures can however attract free-riders, looking to take 
advantage of the system and to reduce or escape their payments. In this respect, it 
is submitted that entry requirements be established to prevent any abuse of the 
system. Chapter Seven will consider the idea of including a foreclosure moratorium 
in South Africa. 
 
6.5 Conclusion and recommendations  
 
When comparing South African law with foreign jurisdictions, it is submitted that, 
despite the international trend to assist over-indebted consumers, South African laws 
have remained pro-creditor. Thus, most foreign countries, like England and the 
United States, have provided greater protection to homeowner interests than are 
available in South Africa. Although the South African system provides debtors with 
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some debt relief procedures, in the form of debt review and sequestration, many 
debtors are excluded from these remedies for various reasons (see Chapters Four 
and Five). Accordingly, the debt relief options in South Africa have been largely 
unsuccessful in assisting a debtor facing foreclosure.  
 
The comparative analysis above reveals that internationally there are three main 
approaches to assisting debtors during foreclosure. One option is the home 
exemption. This approach is adopted in the United States (as mentioned it is 
submitted that this option would not be suitable for South Africa). The common 
feature of the home exemption is that it does not apply to mortgages, and thus does 
not serve as an effective mechanism for mortgagors seeking to save their homes. 
The second option involves implementing debt relief measures which restructure 
unsecured debts, with a partial discharge, while ensuring that the full mortgage 
instalments are maintained. This is seen with the IVA’s in England. Further, it is 
noted that the debt relief options available in other countries specifically exclude 
mortgage repayments from the debt restructuring process. Accordingly, while the 
debtor is under the debt relief program, he is still required to maintain his full 
mortgage instalments. In comparison with South Africa’s debt review under the NCA, 
mortgage repayments are included in the rearrangement plan, and this can be done 
without the consent of the mortgagee. It is submitted that the inclusion of the 
mortgage debt in the debt review process is one of the principal flaws of the South 
African debt review process. 
 
The third option instituted by many foreign countries is a combination of legislative 
provisions and rules that protect mortgagors and delay the forced sale of the home. 
This approach is adopted in England, Scotland, Ireland and Spain, and it is 
submitted that it may be the best option to implement in South Africa (this option will 
be discussed further in the following chapter). The introduction of a foreclosure 
moratorium has also been used by many countries to protect homeowners. 
However, it is submitted that there is a fine line involved in striking a balance 
between the rights of debtors and creditors, as a prolonged moratorium may 
undermine the debt collection process and lead to lower credit supply and higher 
mortgage interest rates. The right to foreclosure should not be undermined as the 
strength of foreclosure rights play a significant role in investor confidence and 
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mortgage finance rates. However, large scale foreclosures can also have a negative 
effect on the economy by lowering housing prices and increasing social costs as 
foreclosure usually results in families relocating or seeking social assistance. Hence, 
while, a foreclosure moratorium may reduce the negative externalities attached to a 
foreclosure, the moratorium creates room for debtors to default on their loans. It is 
therefore suggested that a debtor should not enjoy an automatic right to a 
moratorium. A debtor seeking a moratorium must apply for such an indulgence 
before a court. It is submitted that although a moratorium serves a deep social 
benefit by shielding families from homelessness, it also has the effect of delaying 
foreclosure and this may create an incentive for the dishonest to default and create 
higher default rates. A blanket moratorium will create room for abuse, and it is 
therefore submitted that a debtor seeking a moratorium must be required to earn 
such a privilege. 
 
Further, as noted in section 6.4, several jurisdictions have introduced protocols, 
codes, or legislation making it compulsory for the creditor to act in good faith during a 
foreclosure process. These protocols and codes set out rules for both debtors and 
creditors before, and during, the foreclosure process. For example, America, 
England and Scotland have introduced pre-action conferences which require the 
creditor to negotiate with the debtor prior to proceeding to foreclosure. These rules 
have created guidelines of good practice and also create consistency in application. 
Ireland is an example of a country that has gone further and set legislative guidelines 
and rules governing the foreclosure process and interaction via the CCMA and 
MARP. 
 
Another practice that has developed in some jurisdictions is the ‘mortgage to rent’ 
conversion. In the United States, investors assist homeowners who are undergoing 
foreclosure by identifying homes, and offering to buy, not the houses themselves, but 
the mortgage. Under these ‘mortgage to rent’ programs the debtor sells the home to 
the bank and the parties agree that the debtor can remain in occupation on the 
property as a tenant, with the option to buy back the property. Similarly, in England 
and Wales, the Mortgage Rescue Scheme was introduced in January 2009 and 
aimed to assist homeowners in financial difficulty who were at risk of repossession 
and homelessness. The scheme enables social landlords to acquire homes and rent 
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them back to the debtors. The scheme runs for two years. The FSA implemented 
protective frameworks to regulate these sales and rent-back schemes, and thereby 
prevent any exploitation of vulnerable debtors facing foreclosure. 
 
In summary, if South Africa is to become an economic power with international 
standing, our legal system needs to be developed to bring it in line with international 
standards. South African policies are steeped in a creditor-oriented approach. In 
contrast, United States and English policies equally balance the interests of creditors 
and debtors and take into account the objectives of providing the debtor with a fresh 
start and with preserving the asset value of the estate. These American and English 
policies essentially protect the interests of all parties affected by the debtor’s 
financial difficulties. It is therefore contended that South Africa should undertake a 
reform of its credit laws to bring it in line with these more up-to-date economic and 
social practices. In particular, reform of the insolvency and debt relief laws is 
required along with a re-evaluation of the treatment of the home during these 
processes. In the next chapter, several recommendations will be made as to how to 
improve South African law and how to balance the rights of debtors and creditors 
fairly during the foreclosure process. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
[There is a] need for the enunciation of appropriate policies and principles to be applied when 
a mortgagee seeks the sale in execution of a defaulting mortgagor’s home. Besides obviously 
serving the interests of lending institutions that require certainty in the administration of their 
business, it would be in the interests of the broader community for the courts, or even the 
legislature, to provide a more clearly defined framework within which the required balance is 
to be struck between, on the one hand, mortgagee’s security interest, and on the other hand, 
homeowner’s rights to security of tenure.
673
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as a conclusion to the thesis and is divided into three parts. The 
first will summarise the preceding chapters, and highlight the flaws and gaps within 
the current South African foreclosure process. The second will provide detailed and 
novel recommendations as to how the flaws in the foreclosure process might be 
resolved. These recommendations will be supported by a proposed Foreclosure Act, 
which is attached as an annexure to this chapter. The final part of the chapter will 
provide concluding remarks on the topic of foreclosure in South Africa. 
 
7.2 Summary and Conclusion 
 
As set out in Chapter One, the primary purpose of this thesis was to critically analyse 
the current foreclosure and debt relief systems in South Africa; to expose the flaws 
and inefficiencies in these systems; and to provide recommendations as to how 
these issues can be addressed satisfactorily. The subsequent chapters discussed 
the different aspects of foreclosure law in detail, and revealed the flaws within each 
area of foreclosure. The section below briefly summarises the findings of each of 
these chapters. 
 
The underlying rights of mortgagees and mortgagors were considered in detail in 
Chapter Two. It was noted that while mortgagors enjoyed strong and clear protection 
of their real right of security, mortgagees did not enjoy the same clarity and 
protection with regard to their right to a home or their constitutional right to have 
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access to adequate housing. From the analysis of the mortgagor’s rights, it was 
noted that the biggest problem in quantifying the right to a home, or the right to have 
access to adequate housing, was the absence of a legal definition of ‘the home’. The 
failure of law-makers to provide this definition has presented a hurdle in developing 
mortgagor rights and enhancing the protection of the home. The emotional elements 
that attach to a home, which are difficult to quantify, have made the task of 
developing such a legal definition challenging.674 On the other hand, the analysis of 
the mortgagee’s rights found that mortgagees enjoy strong protection under the law. 
The mortgagee’s real right of security against the hypothecated immovable property 
(the home) entitles the mortgagee to seek direct execution against the home in 
circumstances where the mortgage payments are in default.  
 
Chapter Two further established that current South African legislation and case law 
does not provided any guidance with regards to the balancing of mortgagor and 
mortgagee rights, and this has resulted in much uncertainty. The foreclosure against 
a home results in a conflict between mortgagor and mortgagee rights. Accordingly, it 
is important that a clear balance be struck between a mortgagor’s right to a home, 
and a mortgagee’s right to execution against the home, during foreclosure. It was 
concluded that the uncertainties expressed in Chapter Two could only be resolved 
by legislative intervention, and it was recommended that a Foreclosure Act be 
enacted providing a clear legal definition of the home. The introduction of a 
Foreclosure Act would also serve the purpose of assisting the courts during the 
foreclosure process by establishing exact rules to balance mortgagor and mortgagee 
rights, and thereby recognising the true value of the home, while giving equal 
importance to the enforcement of legitimate mortgagee rights. 
 
The current rules and practices governing the foreclosure process were considered 
in Chapter Three. Here the lack of consistency and the uncertainty in the foreclosure 
process were brought to light along with the need to establish clarity. Several cases 
were considered, inter alia, Jaftha, Saunderson, Ntsane, Gundwana and Mokebe.675 
All of these cases maintained differing applications of foreclosure procedure, 
particularly in relation to the mortgagee’s right to direct execution against the 
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hypothecated property. In Saunderson, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
registrar possessed the authority to grant monetary judgment and an order for 
executability against immovable property. However, in Gundwana, the Constitutional 
Court overruled Saunderson, and found that only a court is permitted to grant an 
order of executability against immovable property. In Mokebe, the full bench of the 
South Gauteng High Court held that an application for monetary judgment and an 
order for executability must be brought simultaneously, and not on a piecemeal 
basis. The case analysis of foreclosure law in Chapter Three revealed the 
inconsistency, lack of regulation and lack of any clear guidelines available during the 
foreclosure process. It was concluded that these anomalies could only be 
satisfactorily resolved by legislative intervention in the form of the introduction of a 
Foreclosure Act, which would establish clear rules for the foreclosure process. 
 
Chapter Four considered the application of debt review under the NCA. Several 
sections of the NCA were considered, in particular Sections 129 and 86. Several 
inconsistencies and ambiguities within the NCA were revealed which have made the 
interpretation and application of the Act difficult, consequently prejudicing both 
debtors and creditors. It was noted that the correct interpretation of some sections of 
the NCA are still being assessed, in particular Section 129 (3), and that the 
amendments by the NCAA have not truly resolved its interpretational problems.676 
The chapter therefore concluded that the NCA had failed to provide any effective 
relief for a debtor seeking to save his home from foreclosure. Thus, it was argued 
that there is an urgent need for a debt relief mechanism to be established specifically 
to assist with mortgage debt, and that this relief could best be provided in the form of 
a foreclosure moratorium.677  
 
Chapter Five briefly discussed the application of insolvency law in South Africa. This 
chapter considered the interaction between the Insolvency Act and the NCA, and the 
need for clarity with regard to the relationship between these two Acts.678 The 
chapter further revealed the lack of an up-to date South African insolvency system 
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and the failure of South African insolvency law to adhere to international rules and 
trends.679 The backwardness of our current insolvency system has resulted in it 
being ineffective in assisting South African consumers who require debt relief.  
 
Chapter Six considered the different debt relief mechanisms available in the United 
States of America and in England.680 These jurisdictions provide assistance to their 
debtors in the form of either a homestead exemption or a foreclosure moratorium. 
Further, it was noted that the debt rearrangement plans offered to debtors in these 
jurisdictions specifically exclude secured debts. In other words, a mortgage debt 
could not form part of any debt repayment plan. This was adopted to protect the 
interests of secured creditors and to ensure that the debtor kept his home during any 
debt repayment process. This is in contrast to South Africa’s debt review process, 
where the mortgage debt is not excluded from debt restructuring, and this inclusion 
of the mortgage debt under debt review has been the subject of much criticism.  
 
Several foreign jurisdictions have also adopted codes, protocols or specific 
legislation to provide rules or guidelines of good practice for both mortgagors and 
mortgagees during foreclosure process. These rules regulated the conduct of both 
parties during the foreclosure process and created clarity as to their rights and 
responsibilities.681 In comparison, South African law fails to provide any rules or 
guidelines for their foreclosure process and this absence of foreclosure rules has 
created much uncertainty and confusion. Thus, it is recommended that South Africa 
learn from foreign jurisdictions and implement a coherent set of rules to govern 
foreclosure law. Once again, it is submitted that this can only be done by the 
introduction of a Foreclosure Act. 
 
Overall, it is argued that the current structures that regulate foreclosure against a 
home in South Africa are inadequate. The current law fails to provide adequate relief 
or protection to debtors, and also fails to provide a clear and straightforward process 
for creditors to enforce their rights. As indicated, the NCA, which governs debt 
enforcement, has several interpretational gaps and the debt review procedure has 
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not provided effective relief to a mortgagor seeking to prevent the foreclosure of his 
home. In addition, South Africa’s insolvency laws are outdated, and their strict 
creditor-oriented approach severely prejudices bona fide debtors wishing to seek 
debt relief. Therefore it was evident that both insolvency and debt review processes 
have failed to serve as effective debt relief mediums for mortgagors, and the lack of 
regulation in the foreclosure process has resulted in much inconsistency and abuse. 
 
The most appropriate way to resolve these problems would appear to be the 
introduction of a South African Foreclosure Act which would govern the whole 
foreclosure process. The main purposes of such an Act would be to balance the 
rights of mortgagors and of mortgagees fairly during the foreclosure process, and to 
provide clear rules as to the rights and responsibilities of both parties. 
Recommendations for the implementation of such a Foreclosure Act are considered 
below. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
The primary recommendation throughout this thesis has been that a Foreclosure Act 
should be enacted to address the flaws in the current South African foreclosure 
process. A Foreclosure Act would create a streamlined process with precise rules, 
rights and responsibilities delineated for both debtors and creditors. These rules will 
make it easier for the courts, the debtors and the creditors to establish what 
circumstances render foreclosure justifiable, or not justifiable. A Foreclosure Act 
would also provide specific precedents in the form of legal documents for each 
foreclosure stage, namely, a specialised letter of demand, summons and judgment 
application. This will create certainty and uniformity in process. (Examples of these 
precedents are attached as annexures to this chapter). In addition, a Foreclosure Act 
would introduce novel structures to assist both debtors and creditors to reach 
suitable alternatives to execution against the home. These recommendations are 
discussed below. 
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7.3.1 The introduction of a mandatory pre-litigation resolution process  
 
In Chapter Six,682 it was noted that several foreign jurisdictions require the mortgagor 
and mortgagee to engage in pre-litigation/mediation processes prior to initiating 
foreclosure proceedings. These pre-litigation processes compel mortgagees to 
communicate with, and to assist, their mortgagors prior to initiating litigation. This 
process ensures that litigation is initiated only as a last resort. In England,683 the 
MCOB and Pre-action Protocol set out guidelines for both debtors and creditors to 
follow during the repossession process. These provide for pre-litigation contact 
between the parties, and provide rules as to how negotiations should proceed. The 
MCOB and Pre-action Protocol are however not binding, and do not compel parties 
to follow their rules. Scotland and Ireland, on the other hand, are examples of 
countries that set mandatory rules for pre-litigation contact and mediation.684 These 
rules set down exact processes for a creditor to follow prior to proceeding with 
litigation.  
 
It is submitted that South Africa should follow the example of these jurisdictions and, 
within a proposed Foreclosure Act, implement mandatory pre-litigation rules for the 
foreclosure process. In Ntsane, Bertelsmann J held that parties should engage in 
mediation prior to proceeding with foreclosure and further suggested that banks 
should have their own internal mediation bodies to assist debtors in this respect. 
Therefore, it is suggested that a Foreclosure Act will require every mortgage lending 
institution to have an internal pre-litigation negotiation department. The Foreclosure 
Act would require every mortgagee’s pre-litigation negotiation department to require 
the mortgagee and mortgagor to work amicably together in order to reach a 
favourable solution to the mortgage arrears by, inter alia, rescheduling the arrears; 
reducing instalment payments for a defined period; lowering interest rates; marketing 
the selling of the property; extending the term of the loan; or implementing ‘mortgage 
to rent’ conversions. It is submitted that only in circumstances where an arrangement 
is not possible, or where the debtor is uncooperative in the pre-litigation process, 
should the creditor be allowed to proceed to litigation. Prior to proceeding to 
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litigation, the mortgagee must complete a pre-litigation checklist and detail the efforts 
engaged in with the mortgagor to resolve the matter. The mortgagee must provide 
the Foreclosure Court with a copy of this checklist, and must attach a copy of the 
pre-litigation checklist to the summons served on the mortgagor. This checklist will 
assist the courts in determining whether or not all options have been exercised by 
the debtor and creditor, thereby ensuring that foreclosure is initiated only as a last 
resort. 
 
7.3.2 The establishment of specialised ‘Foreclosure Courts’ 
 
The involvement of the courts is paramount in the foreclosure process. This was 
emphasised by the Constitutional Court in Gundwana where the court confirmed that 
judicial oversight is ‘a must’ during execution against residential property. Hence, it is 
important for expert or specialised judges to hear foreclosure applications and apply 
foreclosure process consistently. One of the reasons for the lack of clarity in the 
current foreclosure process is the inconsistent approaches applied by various courts 
in different provincial jurisdictions. The lack of consistency in judicial process and 
decision-making was set out in Chapter Three.685 It is argued that a unified court 
system with specialised judges could resolve the issue of inconsistency and lack of 
uniformity. It is therefore recommended that every regional and district high court 
establish a ‘Foreclosure Court’ (court rooms) specifically for foreclosure matters. This 
will create a specialised court structure for foreclosure applications and would 
provide the necessary priority, uniformity and expertise for dealing with these 
matters. 
 
It is also suggested that legal assistance be provided to home-owners who are 
unable to afford attorneys, in the form of Legal Aid. Therefore it is recommended that 
a Foreclosure Legal Aid Clinic (or a foreclosure department within the Legal Aid 
Clinic) be established at every Foreclosure Court to represent disadvantaged home-
owners. This will ensure that debtors are on an equal legal footing with creditors. 
Foreclosure Courts should also allow debtors to represent themselves should they 
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wish. These proposals will reduce the legal costs attached to current foreclosure 
applications and eradicate the time delays currently experienced at the high court. 
 
7.3.3 The implementation of standardised or precedent foreclosure legal documents 
 
In Chapter Three, the different stages of the foreclosure process were considered. It 
was noted that each stage contained various flaws.686 For example, in Saunderson, 
the court found that there was a flaw in the foreclosure summons as it failed to alert 
debtors to their constitutional rights. In Mortinson, the court found that the 
foreclosure judgment affidavits failed to provide the court with sufficient information 
as to the status of the mortgage and the property. In Folscher and Fraser, the court 
found that the legislature had failed to include a definition for the term ‘all relevant 
circumstances’ in Rule 46 (1), and that this resulted in much uncertainty. In an effort 
to resolve these issues, it is recommended that uniform/precedent legal documents 
be used for each stage of the foreclosure process. In other words, at each different 
stage (involving the letter of demand, summons, judgment, writ and sale in execution 
stages) the creditor would be required to comply with a precedent legal document. 
The use of precedent foreclosure documents will ensure consistency and clarity in 
practice. The subsections below will consider each stage of the foreclosure process 
and provide recommendations as to how certainty can be created with the use of 
these documents. The letter of demand will be considered first. 
 
a. The ‘Foreclosure Letter of Demand’  
 
It is recommended that a letter of demand be formulated specifically for foreclosure 
matters, namely, a ‘foreclosure letter of demand’. (A draft example of this letter is 
attached as an annexure to this chapter). This letter will replace the current section 
129 notice, and will include additional information for the debtor on the following 
important factors: 
 
 the current balance and arrears on the mortgage; 
 the date payment must be made to avoid litigation being initiated; 
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 the debtor’s constitutional, legislative, and common law rights and remedies; 
 the debtor’s right to apply for mediation, debt review, pre-litigation negotiation, 
his right to market and sell the property privately, or to avail himself of any 
other available relief, for instance a foreclosure moratorium (which will be 
discussed in the following subsections); 
 the consequences of foreclosure (inter alia, an adverse credit record and 
judgment listing, and the possibility of his home being sold); and 
 his right to reinstatement by settling the arrears due, together with reasonable 
enforcement costs.687 
 
It is submitted that this foreclosure letter of demand would fully advise the debtor of 
all his rights and remedies, and would make him aware of the seriousness of losing 
his home if the matter were not resolved. It is suggested that delivery of this 
document could be affected by various means, inter alia, post, fax or email, and that 
proof of delivery will fulfill the creditor’s duty under the Foreclosure Act. This will be 
an improvement upon the current Section 129 notice. (As explained in Chapter Four, 
several errors have been experienced in the past with regards to the contents and 
delivery requirements of default notices.688) It is believed that this special foreclosure 
letter of demand will address each of the current inconsistencies. It is recommended 
that the foreclosure letter of demand must be sent to the debtor once the mortgage 
account is thirty (30) calendar days in arrears. 
 
b. The ‘Foreclosure Summons’  
 
In Snyders and Saunderson, the courts established several requirements to 
supplement a foreclosure summons, including the requirement that the debtor must 
be advised of his Section 26 constitutional rights. Further, various practice directives 
and rules were issued in different jurisdictions setting out other requirements for 
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summonses. For example, in Gauteng the requirement of personal service of 
summons was recently implemented.689 It is submitted that a coherent approach is 
urgently required in all the provincial jurisdictions. Hence, it is recommended that the 
Foreclosure Act will contain a precedent for the ‘Foreclosure Summons’ that must be 
used for all foreclosure matters in South Africa. The Foreclosure Act should provide 
that a summons can only be served once the mortgage account is three (3) months 
in arrears, and after the debtor and creditor have engaged in pre-litigation 
negotiation. The creditor will be required to annex a pre-litigation negotiation 
checklist to the summons which will detail the efforts made by the debtor and creditor 
to reach an arrangement. 
 
c. Foreclosure Judgment applications  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there are currently no rules or guidelines available to 
assist courts in determining under what circumstances judgment can or cannot be 
granted. This omission has resulted in much inconsistency and lack of clarity. The 
Ntsane judgment is an example which illustrates how abuse of process and 
unfairness can arise due to a lack of guidelines establishing when judgment is 
justifiable and when it is not. The Mdletye and Zwane judgments are examples 
where the courts used their own discretion to postpone the orders of executability 
against an immovable property.690 Therefore it is submitted that parameters be set 
whereby, if the arrear amount is not more than six percent (6 %) of the outstanding 
balance, judgment and writ should not be granted.691 An example of a foreclosure 
judgment application is attached to this chapter as an annexure. 
 
d. Warrant of attachment and Rule 46   
 
The Gundwana judgment and Rule 46 confirmed that judicial oversight is required for 
all matters where execution is sought against a primary residence. In Chapter Three, 
it was noted that there is a lack of clarity as to the interpretation of ‘all relevant 
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circumstances’ in Rule 46 and Rule 46A, and the failure of the legislature to provide 
an exact list of factors for the court to consider during a Rule 46A application, 
creates room for doubt.692 This lack of clarity was further exposed in the Mokebe 
judgment. It is thus recommended that the Foreclosure Act will provide a clear set of 
factors for the court to consider during the application of Rule 46A and any other 
foreclosure related application. 
 
e. The inclusion of a proportionality test or specific factors for the court to 
consider during a foreclosure application  
 
In Jaftha and Mortinson, the court set out several factors for a court to consider 
during execution against a home.693 The Foreclosure Act would seek to expand on 
these factors and would endeavour to draw up an exact list of factors that the court 
must consider when hearing a foreclosure application. The primary factor for the 
court to consider is the bona fides of each party. However, the following secondary 
factors can also be considered, inter alia: 
 
 whether the rules of court and the Foreclosure Act have been complied with; 
 the current mortgage debt and the amount of the arrears; 
 whether there are alternative means in which judgment can be satisfied; 
 whether there is any disproportionality between the form of execution and 
other possible means to exact payment. (A proportionality test would consider 
the current mortgage debt and arrears owed, compared to the value of the 
property); 
 the attempts made by the debtor and creditor to rehabilitate the loan (involving 
consideration of the pre-litigation checklist); 
 the number of times the debtor has been in default; 
 the market valuation of the property; 
 the financial position of both parties; 
 the purpose for which the property is used; 
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 the conduct of both parties and, in particular, their conduct during pre-litigation 
negotiations; 
 the municipal arrears and/or body corporate levies owing, if any; 
 the likelihood of the debtor becoming homeless as a result of the order; and 
 any other compelling circumstances. 
  
7.3.4 A consideration of ‘Mortgage to Rent’ conversions  
 
It is submitted that the option of mortgage to rental buy-back conversions should also 
be seriously considered in South Africa. As indicated in Chapter Six, this option is 
exercised in Scotland, Ireland and Hungary.694 The ‘mortgage to rent’ option will 
allow the defaulting debtor to sell his home to the creditor at a fair value (or for the 
balance due on the mortgage) and remain in occupation on the property while paying 
a fair monthly rental. Such an arrangement will allow the debtor the opportunity to 
buy back his home if his financial position improves. The ‘mortgage to rent’ option 
protects both the debtor and creditor, as the debtor still has a roof over his head, and 
the creditor has ownership rights over the property and also receives rental from the 
debtor. It is, however, suggested that strict rules should be set to govern mortgage to 
rent conversions as any loopholes could create room for abuse by unscrupulous 
creditors.695 
 
7.3.5 The introduction of a foreclosure moratorium  
 
From the analysis of foreign law in Chapter Six, it was noted that there were two 
main forms of debt relief provided to debtors, namely: a homestead exemption, or a 
foreclosure moratorium. As discussed above, it is submitted that South Africa should 
adopt a foreclosure moratorium on the forced sale of the debtor’s home. A stay on 
foreclosure proceedings for a specific period will provide the debtor with adequate 
opportunity to reach a payment arrangement on the mortgage arrears, or to proceed 
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with the marketing and private sale of the property.  However, the debtor should not 
be entitled to an automatic moratorium as this may create room for abuse by mala 
fide debtors. It is recommended that a moratorium must be applied for by the debtor 
to the Foreclosure Court. The services of an attorney will not be necessary for this 
application. It is suggested that a moratorium should be provided for nine (9) months 
and could possibly be extended by a further three (3) months (a maximum period of 
twelve months). It is believed that this period will provide the debtor with sufficient 
time to either remedy his default or consider alternatives to foreclosure. A debtor 
seeking a moratorium must complete a precedent motivation checklist, which will be 
attached to every foreclosure letter of demand and summons. (A copy of this 
application is attached as an annexure to this chapter). The debtor’s moratorium 
application must contain the following information, inter alia: 
 
 who is residing on the property, and the ages and occupation/employment of 
the occupants; 
 the length of time all parties have been in occupation of the property; 
 the reason for the mortgage falling into default; 
 the reason a moratorium is sought, and the debtor’s intentions during and 
after the moratorium period; 
 the debtor’s action plan to remedy the arrears; 
 a detailed account of the debtor’s income and expenditure; 
 the total household income; 
 an inventory of the debtor’s movable property; 
 whether the debtor owns any other immovable property or has any alternative 
accommodation available; 
 the current valuation of the property; 
 the current balance owing of the mortgage agreement; 
 the remaining term of the loan agreement; and 
 the amount of any outstanding municipal rates and levies. 
 
The application for a foreclosure moratorium must be delivered to the creditor. A 
creditor can oppose the granting of the moratorium on the grounds that: 
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 the debtor has acted mala fide (the debtor has been dishonest, un-
cooperative in negotiations, has committed fraud or intends to vandalise the 
property); and 
 the debtor and his family do not reside on the property (the property is not 
their primary residence). 
 
It is submitted that the courts should have discretion to grant the moratorium after 
consideration of all the relevant facts. It must be acknowledged that a moratorium 
creates delays in creditor enforcement, and opportunities for delinquent debtors to 
abuse the system. Hence, the granting of a moratorium should only be provided as 
an indulgence to a bona fide debtor seeking assistance in saving his home and 
recovering from his financial difficulties. Once a judgment has been granted the 
debtor will lose his right to seek a moratorium. A debtor can only obtain a moratorium 
once during the lifetime of the mortgage. 
 
7.3.6 The introduction of mandatory consumer education 
 
The Banking Association of South Africa has acknowledged that there is a lack of 
financial awareness and understanding about issues of borrowing and lending on the 
part of many consumers. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, many debtors 
are unaware of the legal terms in a mortgage agreement and also unaware of their 
rights and remedies should they fall into default. Financial education has been a 
huge challenge in South Africa, and the lack of it is detrimental both to the debtor 
and to the economy as a whole. It is thus submitted that an in-depth educational 
program needs to be established for consumers in South Africa.  
 
It is also submitted that the American experience of adopting mandatory debt 
counselling education is commendable. As discussed in Chapter Six,696 American 
policies require debtors who have undergone a debt rearrangement plan, to 
undertake a financial training course to assist them manage their debt. These 
courses assist debtors in understanding consumer laws, and in managing their debts 
and preventing them from defaulting on their loans in the future. It is recommended 
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that these programs be adopted in South Africa, as many debtors are unable to 
understand consumer laws and policies, and many fail to structure personal debt 
management plans. Accordingly, it is recommended that every debtor who applies 
for debt review or a foreclosure moratorium must undertake a debt management 
course. This course should educate the debtor on financial planning skills and 
expand his/her knowledge of consumer laws. However, it is submitted that educating 
debtors who are already in financial trouble will not fully resolve the challenge of poor 
consumer education in South Africa. Thus, it is recommended that consumer 
education courses be also introduced at a high school level. This would equip the 
next generation of consumers to manage their finances more effectively. It is 
therefore suggested that all high schools provide their pupils with a financial planning 
course of one year duration. This recommendation could be a joint venture with the 
Department of Education and the Department of Trade and Industry. This venture 
would expand the knowledge of consumer law and equip the youth to manage their 
finances when they are out of school. Overspending and mismanagement of income 
is a major problem in South Africa and gaining financial knowledge at an early age 
will help to prevent the current problem of over-indebtedness from developing 
further. 
 
7.3.7 Monitoring of the Sale in Execution process 
 
In Chapter Three, the sale in execution process was discussed and it was noted that 
the current process has some loopholes which create room for abuse.697 It is 
accordingly suggested that the ‘sale in execution’ process needs to be more strictly 
regulated and that this could be achieved by introducing judicial oversight into the 
process. It is therefore recommended that all sales in execution must be facilitated 
by the Foreclosure Courts and, in particular, by the registrar of the court in 
partnership with the Sheriff. A creditor wishing to proceed with a sale in execution 
must make an application to the Foreclosure Court for a sale date. The Foreclosure 
Court, in conjunction with the Sheriff, will provide the creditor with a date. The Sheriff 
will thereafter attend to the service of the sale notices to the debtor. It is 
recommended that further advertising of the auctioned property is necessary to 
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increase the number of bidders present at the auction. Hence, a week before the 
sale, the sale in execution will appear on the court roll and court notice boards to 
make interested parties aware of the sale. On the day of the sale, the Sheriff, in 
partnership with the registrar, will conduct the auction in court (a court room). It is 
submitted that since the auction proceedings occur in court with two separate 
independent parties, there is limited possibility of any collusion, corruption or abuse.  
 
With regard to the amendments by Rule 46A for the court to set a reserve price, the 
writer is not in favour of this amendment. It is submitted that the structure of the 
auction process should not be changed, and the property at a sale in execution 
should be sold to the highest bidder on the day of the auction. The calculation of a 
reserve price creates accounting and statistical applications in the law, and this 
should be avoided. Nevertheless, it is suggested that sales in execution should not 
be allowed if the outstanding debt is less than twenty percent (20%) of the market 
value of the property, or if the arrears due are less than for a twelve (12) month 
period. It is submitted that in such a scenario, the creditor is not at any severe risk 
and it would be easier to recover his debt from the execution of movable assets.  
 
7.3.8 Introduction of a Foreclosure Regulatory Body (FRB) 
 
It is submitted that one of the main reasons why South Africa has a much higher 
foreclosure rate than other countries is that our laws fail to regulate the behaviour of 
mortgagees. Accordingly, it is suggested that a Foreclosure Regulatory Body (FRB) 
be established to monitor both mortgagors’ and mortgagees’ compliance with the 
Foreclosure Act. It is envisaged that the FRB will serve a similar function to the NCR 
with the NCA. The FRB will fulfil the role of governing consumer foreclosure 
disputes, complaints and queries, and will have the authority to issue penalties to 
both debtors and creditors who fail to comply with the standards in the Foreclosure 
Act. It is also envisaged that the FRB will play a role in enhancing consumer 
education by engaging in national workshops and programs in rural areas and public 
schools, and alert consumers to their rights and remedies. 
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7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to discuss the flaws in the foreclosure process and to 
provide recommendations as to how these flaws could be resolved. The thesis 
considered an array of examples from the literature and from court decisions that 
discussed foreclosure and debt relief processes in South Africa. The literature and 
case law revealed the inconsistencies in the foreclosure process and brought to light 
the need for a more coherent approach to be established. It was evident that the only 
way the flaws in the foreclosure process could be resolved was by the 
implementation of a Foreclosure Act.  
 
A Foreclosure Act would create consistency in the law by establishing a uniform 
framework for the foreclosure process. Most importantly, the implementation of a 
Foreclosure Act would give effect to Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution by 
protecting and providing clarity as to the rights and responsibilities of mortgagors and 
mortgagees alike. In conclusion, a Foreclosure Act would create certainty in the law 
and provide clear protection for mortgagors, mortgagees and society as a whole. 
Moreover, such an Act would be beneficial to the country’s economy and could 
increase investor confidence. It is therefore evident that there is an urgent need for 
such an Act.  Indeed failure to create such a Foreclosure Act could possibly result in 
a social and economic crisis. 
 
A draft proposal of a Foreclosure Act is attached as an annexure to this chapter. 
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ANNEXURE 
 
THE FORECLOSURE ACT PROPOSAL 
 
The draft sections below serve as mere indicators of how the Foreclosure Act should be structured 
and what it should include. 
 
Full title 
 
The Foreclosure Act No 1 of 2019: The Foreclosure Act  
 
Section 1: Purpose of the Act 
 
The purpose of the Foreclosure Act is to create clarity and uniformity on the 
foreclosure process in South Africa. There has been a lack of consistency in the 
application of foreclosure law and process in the different provincial divisions and 
this is mainly due to the lack of national legislative governance during foreclosure of 
a home. The Foreclosure Act seeks to establish uniform rules to be applied during 
the foreclosure process, and to address the current inconsistencies in the execution 
against hypothecated immovable property. The ultimate goal of the Foreclosure Act 
is to ensure a fair and just foreclosure process, where execution against the home is 
resorted to only after all reasonable alternatives have been exercised.  
 
The current legal process provides a minimum standard. However, the spirit of the 
Constitution and the concept of Ubuntu are absent, and must be adopted and 
embraced by all the role players in the foreclosure process. 
 
Section 2: Definitions  
 
‘The home’ – the home is any immovable property which is utilised as a primary 
residence for its occupants. 
  
‘Foreclosure’ - the legal procedure governed by the Foreclosure Act used to execute 
against hypothecated immovable property in terms of a mortgage agreement. 
 
‘Foreclosure moratorium’ - a specific period of grace provided to the debtor wherein 
the creditor is prohibited from proceeding with debt enforcement (foreclosure) 
against the debtor and his home. 
 
‘The Foreclosure Court’ – a specialised court structure within the District and 
Regional High Court exclusively adjudicating foreclosure disputes.  
 
189 
 
‘The Foreclosure Regulatory Body’ – a body established in terms of the Foreclosure 
Act to regulate the conduct of both debtors and creditors during the foreclosure 
process. 
 
 
Section 3: The foreclosure letter of demand 
 
 
When a mortgage is thirty (30) calendar days in default, the creditor must send a 
foreclosure letter of demand to the debtor. A precedent foreclosure letter of demand 
is annexed in the Schedule of this Act. This foreclosure letter of demand can be sent 
by either: registered post, telefax or email. Proof of delivery that the notice has been 
sent to the correct address chosen by the debtor will serve as fulfilment of this 
section. 
 
Section 4: Pre-litigation resolution process 
 
The Foreclosure Act requires every mortgage lender to establish an in-house pre-
litigation negotiation centre to mediate all consumer arrear queries.  
 
After the creditor has sent a foreclosure letter of demand in terms of section 3, the 
creditor’s pre-litigation negotiation centre must contact the debtor and bona fide seek 
alternatives to foreclosure. 
 
The creditor and debtor must collectively, and in good faith, consider the options of, 
inter alia, reducing the monthly instalments, reducing the interest payable, 
recapitalising the arrears, extending the term of the mortgage, converting the 
mortgage into a rental option, or selling the property privately. 
 
It is mandatory for pre-litigation negotiation to take place prior to debt enforcement 
(foreclosure) at the Foreclosure Court. Failure upon the part of the creditor to bona 
fide engage in pre-litigation negotiation will result in a penalty being issued against 
the creditor by the Foreclosure Regulatory Body. Failure upon the part of the debtor 
to bona fide engage in pre-litigation negotiation will entitle the creditor to immediately 
proceed with litigation, and will result in the debtor losing his right to claim a 
foreclosure moratorium, provided for in section 6 of this Act. 
 
Should the pre-litigation negotiations be unsuccessful, or should the debtor be un-
cooperative in engagement, the creditor can proceed with issuance of a foreclosure 
summons and must provide the Foreclosure Court with a pre-action checklist 
detailing his pre-litigation negotiation efforts.  
 
A creditor can only proceed to issue a foreclosure summons once the payment 
default on the mortgage is evaluated to be three (3) months in arrears. However, if 
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the debtor is un-cooperative in the pre-litigation negotiations, the creditor may 
proceed with foreclosure prior to the account arrears reaching three (3) months. 
 
A debtor will be considered to be un-cooperative in pre-litigation negotiations if he, 
inter alia, fails to provide the creditor with any requested information within a period 
of seven (7) working days, provides the creditor with incorrect or fraudulent 
information, fails to engage with the creditor in a bona fide manner, or refuses to 
communicate with the creditor. 
 
Section  5: The Foreclosure process 
 
The foreclosure letter of demand. Once a mortgage account is thirty (30) calendar 
days in arrears, the creditor must send the debtor a foreclosure letter of demand. 
This letter can be delivered by: registered mail, fax, or email. The foreclosure letter of 
demand must alert the debtor to his rights and remedies and his duty to engage in 
pre-litigation negotiation with the creditor. 
 
The foreclosure summons. Should pre-litigation negotiation prove unsuccessful and 
the account fall three (3) months into arrears, the creditor can proceed with litigation 
and serve a foreclosure summons upon the debtor. The creditor must complete and 
annex a pre-litigation checklist to the foreclosure summons and indicate the efforts 
made to engage with the debtor and avoid foreclosure. Service of the summons is to 
be effected by the Sheriff of the High Court to the nominated domicilium address 
(personal service of the summons is not required). 
 
The foreclosure judgment and writ application. An application for judgment can be 
made by the creditor once the arrears on the mortgage is equal to six percent (6 %) 
of the current balance, or the account arrears be equivalent to six (6) months in 
arrears. Once court judgment has been granted, a debtor will not be allowed to apply 
for a foreclosure moratorium. 
 
During the judgment and attachment application the court is required to consider the 
following factors before granting an order, inter alia: compliance with the Foreclosure 
Act and relevant legislation; the outstanding balance and arrears due; alternative 
means in which judgment can be satisfied; the conduct of both parties during pre-
litigation negotiation; the valuation of the property; the purpose for which the property 
is used; the outstanding rates and levies; the likelihood of the debtor being 
homeless; and any other compelling circumstances. The conduct of the parties will 
be the primary factor that must be considered by the court. 
 
The sale in execution – the creditor is required to apply to the Foreclosure Court for 
a sale in execution date. An application for a sale date can only be made once the 
arrear amount due is over twenty percent (20 %) of the outstanding balance and/or 
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twenty percent (20 %) of the market value of the property, and/or equivalent to 
twelve (12) months in arrears. 
 
The creditor’s application for a sale date will be assessed by the Foreclosure Court 
and a sale date will be set. The sale must be advertised in the Government Gazette 
and local newspaper in the jurisdiction of the property thirty (30) calendar days prior 
to the sale date. A week before the sale date, the sale will appear on the Foreclosure 
Court roll and notice boards. 
 
The sale will be conducted by the Registrar of the Foreclosure Court in partnership 
with the Sheriff of the High Court. 
 
Once a sale in execution date is set, the debtor will be prohibited from reinstating the 
agreement in terms of section 129 (3) of the National Credit Act. 
 
On the day of the sale in execution, the property will be sold to the highest bidder. 
The opening bid for all auctions will be set at R 50 000. 
 
Section 6 – The foreclosure moratorium  
 
A debtor can apply to the Foreclosure Court for a foreclosure moratorium for a period 
of nine (9) months. 
 
An application for a foreclosure moratorium can be made by the debtor at any time 
before judgment is granted by the Foreclosure Court. 
 
The Foreclosure Court may consider the following circumstances during the 
application for a foreclosure moratorium: inter alia, the occupants on the property 
and the period of their occupation; the reason for the arrears; the reason why a 
moratorium is sought; the debtor’s action plan to remedy the arrears; the debtor’s 
income and expenditure; the current valuation of the property; the outstanding 
balance on the mortgage; and the remaining term of the mortgage. 
 
A creditor can oppose the granting of a foreclosure moratorium on the grounds that, 
inter alia, the debtor’s application is mala fide or the property is not used as a 
primary residence. 
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
A FORECLOSURE COURT IN TERMS OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT) 
 
Case No. # 
 
In the matter between: 
 
ABC BANK Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
DEBTOR                          
Defendant 
 
 
INDEX – PRECEDENT FORECLOSURE DOCUMENTS IN TERMS OF THE 
FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
 
Item   
 
1. The Foreclosure Act Moratorium  
 
 
2.  The Foreclosure Act Letter of Demand 
        
  
3. The Foreclosure Act Summons and Pre-action Checklist    
       
 
4. The Foreclosure Act Default Judgment Affidavit     
     
 
5. The Foreclosure Act Warrant of Attachment       
         
 
6. The Foreclosure Act Sale in Execution         
 
 
 
193 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR A FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
A FORECLOSURE COURT IN TERMS OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT) 
 
Case No. # 
 
In the matter between: 
 
ABC BANK Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
DEBTOR                            
Defendant 
 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR A FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM IN TERMS OF SECTION 
6 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, 
DEBTOR’S NAME and IDENTITY NUMBER 
 
do hereby make oath and say that: 
 
1. (The debtor to indicate his/her status, inter alia, employment, marital status, 
age etc.) 
 
2. History of the mortgage: 
 
2.1 (Debtor to indicate how the mortgage originated, and period of the 
mortgage. and the payments made. Further, provide information as to 
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the period of time the property has been used as a primary residence 
and the number of occupants on the property, their occupation and 
ages). 
 
2.2 (Property address to the provided – street address and erf number). 
 
3. Reason for the arrears 
 
3.1 The debtor must provide a detailed explanation for the reason the mortgage 
fell into arrears and the reason for his current financial predicament e.g. 
unemployment, divorce, etc (income and expenditure and supporting 
documents to be attached)  
 
4. Action plan during the foreclosure moratorium period 
  
4.1 The debtor must provide detailed information as to how he intends to rectify 
his default during the moratorium period, inter alia, whether the property will 
be marketed and sold privately; his efforts to actively seek employment; 
whether he is expecting to receive funds which will settle the arrear amount 
and/or full mortgage.   
 
5. Efforts to engage with the creditor  
 
5.1 The debtor must outline the efforts he has made to communicate 
with his creditor and engage in a payment or mortgage 
rearrangement plan. A copy of the pre-action checklist must be 
attached. 
 
6. Any other compelling reasons or circumstances 
  
 6.1  
_____________________________  
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DEBTOR’S NAME 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the Deponent has declared that s/he knows and 
understands the contents of this Affidavit and that to the best of his/her knowledge 
and belief it is the truth, which Affidavit has been signed and sworn to before me at 
    on this the   day of   
 2018 and that the provisions of the Regulations contained in Government 
Notice No. R1258 of 21 July 1972, as amended, have been complied with. 
 
    
 _________________________________ 
       COMMISSIONER OF OATHS 
       NAME: 
       ADDRESS: 
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FORECLOSURE LETTER OF DEMAND IN TERMS OF SECTION 3 OF THE 
FORECLOSURE ACT  
 
Date:  
 
Debtor’s Name xx 
Address xxx per email 
 
 
Dear Mr and Mrs xxx 
 
‘Without Prejudice’                                                          
 
LEGAL NOTICE IN TERMS OF SECTION 3 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
ACCOUNT CURRENT BALANCE – R X 
ACCOUNT CURRENT ARREARS – R X 
 
We refer to previous correspondence in respect of the arrears on your account and 
confirm that your account has now fallen more than thirty days (30) in arrears. We 
confirm that your account is R XXX in arrears and your currently monthly instalment 
is R xxxx. 
 
Please take note that your account has now been escalated to the pre-litigation 
negotiation department who will be contacting you to engage in pre-action 
negotiation in terms of section 4 for the Foreclosure Act.   
 
In order to rectify your default, you are now required to: 
 
 pay the default arrears within ten (10) business days of delivery of this letter, 
and reinstate the mortgage agreement in terms of section 129 (3) of the 
National Credit Act; or 
 contact our offices directly to discuss the possibility of making a payment 
arrangement in terms of section 4 of the Foreclosure Act. 
 
Should you fail to settle the outstanding arrears, and fail to engage in pre-action 
negotiation with us, we confirm that we will instruct our attorneys to proceed with 
foreclosure in terms of section 5 of the Foreclosure Act. Kindly note that attorney 
legal fees will be incurred herein, and the resultant legal action may result in the 
forced sale of your home.  
 
Should the arrears not be settled, or a payment arrangement not be finalised, the 
Sheriff of the High Court will be attending your property to serve a “Foreclosure 
Court Summons” upon you. Should an arrangement still not be formalised and the 
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account remain in arrears, we will proceed to enforce our rights in terms of the 
mortgage agreement and obtain “Court Judgment” against you for the full 
outstanding balance on your account (kindly note that in terms of section 11 of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969, this judgment will remain against you for a period of 
thirty (30) years and will negatively affect for credit ratings and scores). Thereafter, 
we will proceed to obtain a “Writ and Attachment” and instruct the Sheriff of the High 
Court and Foreclosure Court to proceed with a Sale in Execution / Auction Sale 
against the hypothecated immoveable property. 
 
We sincerely hope that all of the above processes will not be necessary. We 
accordingly request you urgently to settle the full arrears on your account, or to 
contact us to formalise a payment arrangement to avoid any further legal action 
being taken against you. 
 
Regards, 
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FORECLOSURE SUMMONS AND PARTICULARS OF CLAIM IN TERMS OF 
SECTION 5 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
PARTICULARS OF CLAIM 
 
1 PARTIES 
 
1.1 The Plaintiff is CREDITOR’S FULL DETAILS (full trading name and CIPC and 
NCR registration number) with principal place of business at x (relevant 
certificates must be attached). 
 
 
1.2 The Defendant DEBTOR’S FULL NAMES AND ID NUMBERS a major 
male/female of full contractual capacity, with domicillium citandi et executandi 
chosen by him/her at: XXX 
 
2 LOAN AGREEMENT 
 
2.1 On or about the (date and place), the DEBTOR and CREDITOR, entered into 
a written loan agreement of which a copy is attached hereto as annexure “X”.  
 
 In terms of which it was agreed that: 
 
2.1.1  The full amount outstanding, from time to time, would bear interest (creditor to 
explain the interest calculations charged e.g. Jibar, Repo or Prime rates) 
 
2.1.2 As security for the obligations of the DEBTOR, the DEBTOR authorised the 
registration of a mortgage bond over: 
 
 a. A PROPERTY CONSISTING OF –  
 
 (a) FULL DETAILS OF THE HYPOTHECATED PROPERTY, ERF NOS, 
PROPERTY ADDRESS, SIZE OF THE PROPERTY, ETC. 
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  HELD UNDER TITLE DEED NUMBER X, which property is situated within 
the jurisdiction of the Foreclosure Court, in favour of the CREDITOR. 
 
  The bond referred to above was duly registered under Bond No. in the
 Deeds Office on (date). In terms of the bond the DEBTOR 
 bound specifically as a mortgage the property, in favour of the 
 CREDITOR, as security for R X  (amount of the agreement) 
 
 
2.1.3   The amount of indebtedness of the DEBTOR (including interest) and the rate 
of interest and the manner in which same is calculated and/or charged is 
currently and shall be determined and prima facie proved by a certificate 
signed by any duly authorised representative representing the CREDITOR 
(creditor’s certificate of balance and account statement to be attached). 
 
3. PERFORMANCE / DEFAULT BY THE DEBTOR 
 
3.1 All of the conditions to which the Loan Agreement was subject were timeously 
fulfilled by the CREDITOR. 
 
3.2 The DEBTOR has failed to timeously and punctually perform its obligations 
under the loan by falling into arrears with the monthly instalments, (which 
arrears were R X as at date) and which arrears the DEBTOR, despite demand, 
fails and/or neglects to pay (Confirmation that the mortgage is three months 
in arrears – account statements to be attached). 
 
4. THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
4.1  As a result of the breach of the loan agreement by the DEBTOR, the 
CREDITOR called on the DEBTOR to make payment of R X in terms of 
section 3 of the Foreclosure Act. A copy of the Foreclosure Letter of 
Demand is attached hereto. Notwithstanding such demand the DEBTOR has 
failed and/or neglected to make payment of the aforementioned sum or any 
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part thereof. Proof of dispatch of the Foreclosure Letter of Demand (by pre–
paid registered post or electronic delivery) is attached hereto. 
 
4.2   Furthermore, the CREDITOR confirms that it has engaged in pre-litigation 
negotiation with the DEBTOR, in terms of section 4 of the Foreclosure Act, in 
an attempt to resolve the arrears and prevent litigation. However, the 
DEBTOR has breached all arrangements concluded or has been un-
cooperative during the negotiation process. (Pre-litigation checklist to be 
attached confirming the creditor’s efforts to assist the debtor).  
 
4.3  The DEBTOR is alerted to section 6 of the Foreclosure Act and his right to 
apply for a foreclosure moratorium. Should this application be successful, the 
CREDITOR will be prohibited from proceeding with foreclosure for a period of 
nine (9) months. 
 
5. THE CONSTITUTION 
 
5.1  The DEBTOR’S attention is drawn to the provisions of Section 26 (1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which accords to everyone the 
right to have access to adequate housing and such right may be implicated by 
the order sought herein. Should the DEBTOR’S claim that the order for 
execution will infringe that right it is incumbent on the DEBTOR to place 
information supporting that claim before the Foreclosure Court. Failure to do 
so may result in such an order being made. 
 
6. EXECUTABILITY AND SALE OF THE HOME 
 
6.1   The DEBTOR’S attention is drawn to the provisions of Rule 46 (1) of the 
Uniform Rules of Court and section 5 of the Foreclosure Act, in terms of which 
the DEBTOR is advised that should judgment be granted, the Foreclosure 
Court may in future, declare the property executable and authorise the Sheriff 
of the Court to issue a Writ of Execution against the relevant immovable 
property. Thereafter a sale in execution shall take place wherein the 
immovable property will be sold at public auction. The aforesaid may lead to 
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the eviction of the DEBTOR and/or any other persons occupying the relevant 
immovable property. 
 
6.2  Should the relevant immovable property be the primary residence of the 
DEBTOR, the DEBTOR is entitled to place any circumstances before this 
Foreclosure Court, in the prescribed manner, as to why the Foreclosure Court 
should not order the execution of the relevant immovable property. 
 
7. RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
7.1  The DEBTOR’S monthly instalment amount is R X. The arrears as at DATE 
amount to R X and three (3) calendar months in arrears. The arrears 
accumulated partially as a result of sporadic and/or non-payment of the 
instalment made by the Defendants from DATE to DATE. The balance due 
and owing by the Defendants is R X.  
 
7.2  A copy of the DEBTOR’S account statement, reflecting that payments have 
not been received in accordance with the Loan Agreement, is attached hereto 
as Annexure “X”. 
 
7.3  The approximate market value of the immovable property which is subject to 
the mortgage bond is R X. This is confirmed by an internal valuation report 
dated X attached hereto as Annexure “X”.  
 
7.4  Despite demand and various endeavours to enter into an arrangement with 
the DEBTOR, the DEBTOR could not advance alternative means and/or 
arrangements to satisfy the arrears and/or indebtedness. 
 
WHEREFORE the CREDITOR claims: 
 
1. Payment in the amount of R X; 
 
2. Interest on the sum of R X at the rate of X % per annum; 
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3. An order declaring the abovementioned property to be specially executable; 
 
4. That the above Foreclosure Court authorise issue judgment and a warrant of 
attachment in respect of the immovable property. 
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PRE-LITIGATION CHECKLIST REQUIRED TO BE ATTACHED TO THE 
FORECLOSURE SUMMONS 
 
MORTGAGE PRE-NEGOTIATION CHECKLIST IN TERMS OF THE 
FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
1. DETAILS OF THE MORTGAGE 
(Full mortgage statement and recent valuation of the property to be attached) 
INITIAL MORTGAGE AMOUNT  
CURRENT BALANCE  
ARREARS AMOUNT   
MONTHS IN ARREARS   
VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY   
PROPERTY ADDRESS AND 
DESCRIPTION  
 
 
2. DETAILS OF THE DEBTOR 
(Debtor’s income and expenditure to be attached) 
 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS  
DEBTOR’S AGE  
MORTGAGE MONTHLY INSTALMENT  
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS RESIDING 
ON THE PROPERTY 
 
DEBTOR’S MONTHLY INCOME  
HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME  
REASON THE DEBTOR FELL INTO 
ARREARS 
 
 
3. PRE-LITIGATION EFFORTS  
(The creditor is to provide a detailed account of the efforts undertaken to 
assist the debtor and the debtor’s co-operation during these processes) 
 
REDUCED PAYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS AND OR INTEREST 
Date engaged / offers considered 
RECAPITALISING THE ARREARS  
MARKETING AND SELLING OF THE 
PROPERTY 
Date engaged / offers received  
MORTGAGE TO RENT CONVERSION  
CONDUCT OF THE DEBTOR DURING 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Summary of meetings, telephone 
conversations, emails, etc. 
OUTCOME OF THE ABOVE 
PROCESSES 
 
CONSIDERATION OF A 
FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 
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DEFAULT JUDGMENT APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT IN TERMS OF SECTION 
5 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
       
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
A FORECLOSURE COURT IN TERMS OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT) 
 
Case No. # 
 
In the matter between: 
 
ABC BANK Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
DEBTOR                            
Defendant 
 
 
 
AFFIDAVIT FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 5 OF THE 
FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
 
I, the undersigned, 
 
CREDITOR’S NAME OR PERSON HAVING AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF 
OF THE CREDITOR 
 
do hereby make oath and say that: 
 
1. I am employed by ABC BANK (registration number ###) as a Manager in the 
foreclosure department. I have, save where the context clearly indicates 
otherwise, personal knowledge of the facts herein contained which are, to 
the best of my belief both true and correct and I can and do swear positively 
thereto.  To the extent that submissions are made on legal issues, such 
submissions are based on advice which has been provided by legal advisors 
and I accept such advice to be correct.  . 
 
2.  
ABC BANK 
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2.1. Herein the creditor explains its capacity provides evidence of its legitimacy - 
NCR documents, CIPC documents, company resolutions, compliance with all 
regulations, NCA, Companies Act etc. These documents must be attached as 
ANNEXURE A 
 
3.  
 
In my capacity as a Manager of the foreclosure department, I have access to, and 
have under my control, all documents, records and information to enable me to 
monitor and determine: 
 
3.1. the status of the loans administered by ABC BANK (which includes the # loan 
# / loans referred to in this action) and the compliance by borrowers with their 
obligations to the Lender in terms of the loans. 
 
4.  
 
In preparation for deposing to this affidavit, I have had regard to the records relating 
specifically to the Loan under account number # and I have determined and confirm 
the following: 
 
PURPOSE OF THIS APPLICATION 
 
5.  
 
The purpose of this application is to seek an order for Default Judgment in the 
following terms: 
 
5.1. Payment of the sum of R ########. 
 
 
5.2. Payment of interest on the sum of R #### at the rate of #### % per annum 
compounded monthly in arrear from  #### to date of payment. Account 
statement to be attached as ANNEXURE B. 
 
 
5.3. An Order declaring the property known as: 
Full details of the property, street number and address erf numbers, to be 
specially executable. Updated valuation of the property to be attached as 
ANNEXURE C. 
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5.4. Costs of this application on an attorney and client scale to be taxed. 
 
 
COMPLIANCE 
 
6.  
 
6.1. In terms of Standard Bank v Saunderson, the Defendant’s attention has been 
drawn to Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which 
accords to everyone the right to have access to adequate housing and the 
Defendant has been informed that should he/she claim that the order sought 
will infringe upon that right, that it is incumbent on the Defendant to place 
information supporting such claim before the Foreclosure Court; 
 
6.2. The Defendant has been advised that in terms of Rule 46(1)(c)(ii) of the 
Rules of Court and section 5 of the Foreclosure Act, no writ of execution shall 
be issued against his/her primary residence, unless a Foreclosure Court, 
having considered all the circumstances, orders execution against such 
property; 
 
 
PAYMENT HISTORY 
7.  
 
7.1. The arrears amount as at the date on which the summons was issued was 
approximately R########, with the monthly instalment being R########.  
Confirmation that the account was three months in arrears. 
 
7.2. The current arrears as at (######) amounts to R#####, with the current 
monthly instalment being R######. This arrear amount is over six (6) percent 
of the current balance owing, as required by section 5 of the Foreclosure Act. 
 
7.3. The Defendant’s account is currently ####### months in arrears. 
 
7.4. The last payment made by the Defendant was on #######, in the amount of 
R###### and the total amount outstanding under the bond in terms which 
execution is sought is R#####.   
 
 
 
RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
8.  
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8.1. The immovable property which the Plaintiff seeks to have declared 
executable was not acquired by means of, or with the assistance of, a state 
subsidy (in terms of Absa Bank v Ntsane). 
 
8.2. It is unknown whether the immovable property sought to be declared 
executable is the primary residence of the Defendant and is currently being 
occupied by the Defendant, or is utilised for residential purposes  
 
8.3. The debt which is sought to be enforced was incurred in order to acquire the 
immovable property sought to be declared executable. 
 
8.4. The amount claimed in the summons is R######### and there is no 
possibility that the Defendant’s liabilities to the Plaintiff may be liquidated 
within a reasonable time period without having to execute against the 
Defendant’s primary residence. The creditor has engaged in pre-litigation 
negotiation with the debtor and this has proven fruitless (attach a copy of the 
pre-action checklist and ANNEXURE D). 
 
8.5. At the time that the loan agreement was concluded, the Defendant had the 
necessary income source to service the loan repayments as it became due 
(SUPPLY EVIDENCE OF ASSESSMENTS DONE) 
 
8.6. Given the Defendant’s inability to maintain the monthly instalments, it is clear 
that the Defendant is not in a position to service the obligations under the 
credit agreements, or satisfy the judgment debt. 
 
8.7. The extent of the arrears and outstanding balance is sufficient, the Plaintiff 
believes, to justify execution against the immovable property as it is not likely 
that the Defendant will possess sufficient movable goods to satisfy the 
amount due to the Plaintiff. 
 
 
 
COMPLIANCE WITH FORECLOSURE LETTER OF DEMAND IN TERMS OF 
SECTION 3 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
9.  
 
9.1. The provisions of Section 3 of the Foreclosure Act have been complied with 
in that the compulsory notice in terms of the Act was sent to the Defendant’s 
chosen address by prepaid registered post, fax or email. The notice together 
with proof of dispatch by prepaid registered post is annexed to the summons 
as ANNEXURE D respectively. 
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9.2. In terms of Standard Bank v Sebola, and section 5 of the Foreclosure Act, the 
post-dispatch “track and trace” printout from the website of the South African 
Post Office indicating delivery at the relevant post office, or electronic delivery 
message confirmation,  is annexed to the summons; 
 
9.3. A period of at least fifteen (15) business days elapsed between the date that 
the lender delivered the foreclosure letter of demand in terms of Section 3 of 
the Foreclosure, and the Defendant’s response/ failure to respond to the 
aforesaid notice.  No pre-litigation agreement as envisaged in Section 4 of 
the Foreclosure Act has therefore been concluded. 
 
9.4.  I respectfully submit that: 
 
9.4.1. none of the provisions contained in the NCA or the Foreclosure 
Act precludes the institution of this action; 
 
 
9.4.2. the jurisdictional requirements contemplated in the NCA and 
Foreclosure Act have been complied with and that there is nothing 
contemplated in the aforementioned Acts which preclude the 
above Foreclosure Court from determining this matter. 
 
10. In the premise I submit it is just and equitable that the immovable property 
be  declared executable, and pray for an order in terms of the application for 
default  judgment to which this affidavit is attached.  
 
 
_____________________________  
# 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the Deponent has declared that he/she knows and 
understands the contents of this Affidavit and that to the best of his/her knowledge 
and belief it is the truth, which Affidavit has been signed and sworn to before me at 
    on this the   day of   
 201x and that the provisions of the Regulations contained in Government 
Notice No. R1258 of 21 July 1972, as amended, have been complied with. 
 
 
    
 _________________________________ 
       COMMISSIONER OF OATHS 
       NAME: 
       ADDRESS: 
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WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT OF THE HYPOTHECATED IMMOVABLE 
PROPERTY IN TERMS OF SECTION 5 OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
A FORECLOSURE COURT IN TERMS OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT) 
 
Case No. # 
 
In the matter between: 
 
ABC BANK Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
DEBTOR                                      
Defendant 
 
 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 5 OF THE FORECLOSURE 
ACT 
 
 
 
TO: THE SHERIFF FOR THE DISTRICT OF # 
 
WHEREAS you are directed to cause to be realised the sum of R x together with 
interest thereon at the rate of % per annum as from date to date of payment, in 
satisfaction of a judgment debt and costs obtained by APPLICANT/PLAINTIFF against 
the Respondent/Defendant. 
 
AND WHEREAS the undermentioned property was declared specially executable for 
the said sums on x  in terms of the judgment (attached) granted by the Foreclosure 
Court; 
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NOW THEREFORE you are directed to attach and take into execution the immovable 
property of the said Respondent/Defendant, being: 
 
Full details of the property 
 
And cause to be realised there from the aforesaid sum of x together with interest 
thereon at the rate of x % per annum as from x to date of payment, costs still to be 
taxed, together with the costs hereof and your charges in and about the same, and to 
dispose of the proceeds thereof in accordance with Rule of Court No. 46. 
 
Any party dissatisfied with the Judgment granted or direction given by the Registrar may 
in terms of Rule 31(5)d and within 20 (TWENTY) days after he/she/they have acquired 
knowledge of such Judgment or direction, set the matter down for reconsideration by 
the Court. 
 
FOR WHICH THIS SHALL BE YOUR WARRANT. 
             
DATED AT _______________ ON THIS ____ DAY OF ________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
THE REGISTRAR OF THE FORECLOSURE COURT 
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APPLICATION FOR A SALE IN EXECUTION DATE TO BE SET BY THE 
FORECLOSURE COURT 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
A FORECLOSURE COURT IN TERMS OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT) 
 
Case No. # 
 
In the matter between: 
 
ABC BANK Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
DEBTOR                                      
Defendant 
 
 
 
NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR SALE IN EXECUTION IN TERMS OF SECTION 5 
OF THE FORECLOSURE ACT 
 
 
 
TO: THE SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT; 
 THE REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT; and  
 THE ABOVEMENTIONED DEBTOR 
 
In pursuance of a judgment granted by this Honourable Court on date, and a 
Warrant of Execution issued on date, the CREDITOR now wishes to apply for a 
SALE IN EXECUTION DATE for the undermentioned immovable property. In 
complaince with section 5 of the Foreclosure Act, the CREDITOR confirms that the 
current arrears amount due on the mortgage is above 20% of the current mortgage 
balance, and/or over 20% of the Market Value of the undermentioned immovable 
property, and/or the mortgage is twelve (12) months in arrears (attached a copy of 
the accourt statement and recent valuation of the property).  
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Once a SALE IN EXECUTION DATE is set by the Foreclosure Act, the 
undermentioned property will be sold in execution by the Sheriff of the High Court in 
conjunction with the Registrar of the High Court at THE FORECLOSURE COURT OF 
SOUTH AFRICA: JOHANNESBURG DIVISION, to the highest bidder. 
 
Full Conditions of Sale can be inspected at the offices of the SHERIFF OF THE HIGH 
COURT, and the REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT. The Conditions of Sale will 
also be read out by the Sheriff prior to the sale in execution. 
 
The Execution  Creditor, Sheriff and/or  Plaintiff's Attorneys do not give any  warranties 
with regard to the description and/or improvements.  
 
FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY 
       
 
 
 
___________________________ 
CREDITOR’S ATTORNEYS DETAILS 
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